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ABSTRACT 
The Child Support Agency became operational in April 1993. The 
government hoped to introduce a system which would be clear 
and consistent and would deliver realistic amounts of child 
maintenance from more absent parents than under the old court 
and Department of Social Security systems. In so doing, the new 
system would reduce animosity between parents by removing 
child maintenance from any other divorce or separation 
negotiations and applying a fixed formula. 
However, it quickly became obvious that the new system for the 
assessment, collection and enforcement of maintenance for 
children was failing. This study adds to the debate about why the 
system failed by looking at what influenced government policy, 
both in the setting up of the Agency and in the changes 
introduced between April 1993 and April 1996. 
The study draws on evidence from politicians and political 
parties, the civil service, the voluntary sector and protest groups 
set up specifically to oppose the Agency. By outlining the 
attempts made by these various groups to influence the 
government and by closely examining the detail of the legislation 
and the formula used by the Agency, the study shows where the 
government responded positively to lobbying and whose influence 
was effectively ignored. The study also shows how the 
government managed to retain its commitment to reducing public 
expenditure and promoting "family values" as the basis of child 
support policy, but in practice failed to deliver on the main aims 
of the policy. 
Having analysed the failings of the system, the study concludes 
with some positive suggestions for improvement. 
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LIST OF TERMS 
Absent parent 
- 
this term refers to the natural parent who does 
not have day to day care of the child or children. The term has 
been criticised in many respects and is used here for simplicity 
only. It is acknowledged that the term can be offensive and 
does not take proper account of the amount of involvement the 
parent may in fact. have. This term applies equally to natural 
fathers, natural mothers and adoptive parents, but does not 
extend to step parents. 
Agency 
- 
this term is used for the Child Support Agency. 
DSS 
- 
Department of Social Security. 
FC 
- 
Family Credit. 
First family 
- 
this term is used in government papers to mean 
the household containing the child/children for whom 
maintenance is sought. This is also the household containing 
the person/parent with care. It should be acknowledged that 
this is a simplistic term and does riot recognise the reality of 
many people's lives. 
IS 
- 
Income Support 
Is 
Mother, father, he, she 
- 
throughout this work the author 
refers to the parent with care as the mother / she, etc and the 
absent parent as the father / he, etc. This is for simplicity only 
and it should be recognised that both terms can apply equall. v 
to mothers and fathers. The use of he and she etc in this way 
follows the convention adopted in all government papers on the 
subject of child maintenance. However, regulations apply 
equally to mothers as absent parents and fathers as parents 
with care. 
Parent with care 
- 
this term refers to the person or parent who 
has day to day care of the child or children. This is the term 
used throughout government documents and replaced the term 
"caring parent" used in the White Paper Children Come First (Cm 
1264, Oct 90). This term applies equally to mothers and fathers. 
Although referred to throughout this thesis as "parent" with 
care, it is possible to have a "person" with care who is not a 
parent. 
Protest group 
- 
this term is used to refer to the organisations 
specifically created to fight the Child Support Act and the Child 
Support Agency. The funding and structure of the 
organisations are included within the thesis. Organisations 
included in this category are: 
i r, 
NACSA 
- 
Network Against the Child Support Agency 
APART 
- 
All Parents Asking for Reasonable Treatment 
Second family 
- 
this term is used in government papers to 
mean the household containing the absent parent. This term 
can be misleading. For example, if a man fathers a child in a 
relationship outside his marriage, the child's household would 
be the "first" family. The established marriage household of the 
absent parent would be called the "second" family. 
Voluntary organisation 
- 
this term is used in this thesis to 
refer to organisations in the voluntary sector. however, the 
workers are often not voluntary. Funding and structure of the 
various organisations are included within the thesis. 
Organisations in this group are: 
NCOPF 
- 
National Council for One Parent Families 
CPAG 
- 
Child Poverty Action Group 
NACAB 
- 
National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux 
Gingerbread 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
The question of who should support parents bringing up 
children single-handedly has taxed governments for 
hundreds of years. The dilemma of offering sufficient 
financial assistance whilst not wishing to encourage lone 
parenthood nor discourage employment is not new. 
However, the dramatic rise in the number of lone parents 
since the 1970s and the increasing dependence of lone 
parent households on state welfare programmes forced a 
rethink of government policy towards the end of the 
1980s. 
The result of this rethink was the Child Support Agency, 
operational from April 1993. The Agency was set up 
under the Child Support Act 1991 to deliver a child 
support scheme which would collect larger amounts, 
more regularly and reliably, from more absent parents 
than had been achieved under the old court and 
Department of Social Security systems. This was to be 
done using a strict formula, to be applied by the new 
Agency with virtually no discretion, to produce 
is 
consistent, clear and predictable assessments and 
effective collection and enforcement. 
The reality was somewhat different. Within months of 
the start of operations, it was clear that the Agency was 
failing, the system was in disrepute and there was 
growing resistance from absent parents. The Agency had 
to tackle persistent, deliberate non-cooperation and faced 
criticism from all sides. Often the Agency was blamed for 
what. was in fact flawed policy and the government had to 
take action to try to alleviate the many difficulties being 
seen. 
Action was taken in the form of further legislation and a 
change of emphasis by the Agency. Nevertheless, the 
system failed to improve and as the general election of 
1997 approached it was clear that radical action was 
required. 
This study looks at how government policy has evolved in 
this area, specifically considering the two White Papers 
Children Come First (October 1990) and Improving Child 
Support (January 1995). The aim is to present evidence 
to show what factors influenced the creation of the 
19 
Agency in its chosen form and subsequently what 
influenced change between April 1993 and April 1996. 
How this evidence was collected and analysed is set out 
in chapter 4. 
Throughout the work, reference is made to Hall (1975) 
and Waine (1995). Chapter 4 gives details of how this 
piece of work incorporates methods and ideas taken from 
these two studies. 
To place the current child support system in context, 
chapter 2 provides statistics relating to contemporary 
lone parenthood, including labour market participation 
and benefit dependency. Chapter 3 examines 
government policy towards child support since the 
Second World War. 
The government's declared aims in setting up the new 
system were to increase the amount of maintenance paid 
and to increase the numbers of absent parents paving 
towards the upkeep of their children, thus decreasing 
government expenditure on benefits. As part of this, the 
20 
aim was to have a clear and consistent formula. It was 
also suggested that by removing negotiation over child 
maintenance from the parents themselves and from any 
other issues of divorce or separation, the new system 
would reduce animosity between ex-partners and improve 
relations between parents and children. Given the 
indisputable failings of the system introduced in 1993 
and the limited evidence of improvement since, this study 
may help to explain why the policy failed so decisively to 
deliver the government's declared aims. 
21 
CHAPTER TWO 
Lone Parenthood 
-A Problem? 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out to provide the backcloth to the study. The 
following section outlines statistics relating to lone parenthood 
in the 
_years 
before the introduction of the Agency. As well as 
numbers of lone parents, there are details of employment 
patterns amongst lone parents and how these compare with 
married couples. 
The third section provides insights into the opinions expressed 
by a range of contemporary commentators into the state of lone 
parenthood in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
2.2 Statistics tell the story 
Social Trends 26 shows how the number of lone parents rose 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The proportion of dependent 
children living in lone parent families tripled between 1972 and 
1994-95 with 20 per cent of children living with just one of their 
parents by 1994-95. This was said to reflect the increasing 
ý-, 
number of births outside marriage and increasing levels of 
divorce during this period. 
The proportion of families in Great Britain headed by a lone 
parent increased from nearly 8 per cent in 1971 to 22 per cent 
in 1993. By 1993, one in five mothers with dependent children 
was a lone mother. Although the proportion of lone fathers 
doubled between 1971 and 1993, it remained small at two per 
cent of families with dependent children. 
Nearly two-fifths of lone mothers were "single" in Great Britain 
in 1994-95 while almost the same proportion were divorced. 
Social Trends concluded that the gradual increase in the 
proportion of ]one mothers until the mid 1980s was caused 
mainly by increasing numbers of divorced mothers. However, 
since then the proportion of divorced lone mothers had 
stabilised whilst the proportion of single never married mothers 
had more than doubled. There were also marked regional 
variations in the level of lone parenthood (Social Trends 26, pp 
54-55). 
The cost of benefits paid to lone parents rose sharply during the 
1980s. In 1980/81, the government had paid £856 million in 
benefits to lone parents. This had risen to £9,148 million in 
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1994/95. This far outstripped the rise in total benefit 
expenditure, which rose from £22,658 million in 1980/81 to 
£85,221 million in 1994/95 (DSS, 1995, p. 3) 
Lone mothers on Income Support in Max' 1994 numbered 
1,028,000. Lone mothers on Family Credit at the same time 
numbered 239,800. This added up to over one and a quarter 
million lone mothers relying on some form of means tested 
benefits (DSS, 1995, Table A2.15 and Al 
. 
03). 
The extent of labour market participations lone mothers 
The General Household Survey details the extent of women's 
participation in the labour market, and sets out figures for 
different categories of lone parent. These figures show 
interesting differences. Table 1 below shows that in 1994 a 
higher percentage of married women were working than any 
category of lone parent, and this applied to both full time and 
part time employment. The table also shows that divorced and 
separated lone mothers are much more likely to work part time 
than those classed as "single" lone mothers. This could be due 
to more maintenance being provided by the absent parent, 
although it. could also reflect the picture before the break-up of 
the marriage. "Single" lone mothers may never have worked, or 
24 
may have worked full time and been unable to sustain that 
employment once they became lone mothers. Separated and 
divorced mothers could well be continuing part. time 
employment taken on during their marriage. The "Inactivity, " of 
widows is likely to be a result of the fact that this group tends to 
contain a higher proportion of older women. The effect of age of 
the children being cared for is looked at below. 
TABLE 1 
Economic status of women with dependent children by 
family type 
(Great Britain; 1994) 
Family type Working Working Total Unemp Inactive 
lull time part time working loved 
ýý, 
Married mother 24 42 66 31 
Lone mother 17 23 41) 10 
Single 16 14 31 12 
Widowed 110] 1271 1371 j0! 1631 
Divorced 19 31 50 8 
-II 
Separated 16 25 41 10 I`) 
(Table 2.18, page 31 of General Household Survey, 1994) 
Further tables show different rates of employment with 
varying age of child. Table 2 below shows that whilst 16% 
of married women with a youngest child under 5 work full 
time, only 8`iß, of lone mothers do. 36% of married women 
25 
with under 5s work part time, whilst only 15%0 of lone 
mothers do, and this figure is particularly low for "single" 
lone mothers. 
For those with children aged 5 or over: 47`/, of married 
women work part time, but only 30% of lone mothers 
work part time. 
Indeed, the extent of lone mothers' employment shows a 
different trend over time to that of married mothers. Whereas 
married mothers' participation in the labour market has 
increased since 1977-79, from 15% to 22"% full time in 1992- 
1994, and from 37% to 42%, part time, the figures for lone 
mothers show a different trend, at least for full time 
employment and overall. Those classified as "single" are much 
less likely to work full time than they were in 1977-79 (25° 
down to 13`%)x, although their participation in part time work 
has risen from 1I 'No to 16%,, more of an increase than other 
categories of lone mothers (see Table 3 overleaf). The statistics 
from Table 3 are represented in Figures 1-6 following. 
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TABLE 2 
Lone mothers and married women with dependent children: 
percentage working full time and part time by age of 
youngest child and marital status 
(Great Britain; 1992-94 combine(i) 
Age of youngest Lune mot hers Morrie d women 
ili pendent child : )tnglc Widowed Divorced Se pur, itrri All with d, -j, (-nrlint 
, 
"r, whether woman lone children 
working lull or mot h( Is 
part time "",.. 
Under 5 years: 
full time 9-588 16 
part time 11- 20 20 15 30 
All working 20 
- 
25 28 23 51 
5 years and over: 
full time 22 16 23 26 23 27 
part time 27 24 32 29 30 47 
All working 49 41 55 56 53 74 
All ages: 
full time 13 17 19 18 16 22 
part time 16 24 29 25 23 42 
All working 30 40 49 43 40 64 
(Table 2.19, page 31, of General Household Survey', 1994) 
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TABLE 3 
-Lone mothers and married women with dependent 
children: percentages working full time and part time by 
marital status: 1977 t o 1994 
(Great Britain) 
7771) 71) 81 81 83 8385 8587 878O 81) O1 1) 1 1a3 flO a 
Marital status 
lip, whet her working 
full or part time % 
Lone mothers 
Single 
full 25 27 18 9 14 12 11 11 13 
part 11 11 12 11 13 14 16 18 16 
All working 36 38 30 20 27 27 29 30 29 
Widowed 
full 16 17 14 15 13 20 24 20 16 
part 34 32 29 37 35 38 31 26 24 
All working 50 49 44 52 48 58 55 46 40 
Divorced 
full 26 27 21 23 22 20 24 20 19 
part 26 29 27 24 29 26 30 29 29 
All working 52 56 48 47 50 46 55 50 49 
Separated 
full 19 18 18 15 16 15 18 20 18 
part 24 26 23 22 23 24 25 25 25 
All working 44 45 41 37 39 40 44 46 43 
All lone mothers 
full 22 23 19 17 18 17 18 17 16 
part 24 25 23 22 24 23 24 24 23 
All working 47 49 42 39 42 40 43 41 40 
Married women with depend ent children 
full 15 15 14 15 17 19 21 22 22 
part 37 36 35 35 37 40 40 40 42 
All working 52 52 49 50 54 59 62 63 64 
(Table 7.9, page 200, General Household Sutvev 
, 
1994 ) 
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FIGURE 1- LONE MOTHERS SINGLE 
Lone mothers and married women with dependent children: 
percentages working full time and part time by marital 
status 1977 to 1994 (Great Britain). From Table 7.9, page 
200, General Household Survey, 1994) 
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FIGURE 2- LONE MOTHERS WIDOWED 
Lone mothers and married women with dependent children: 
percentages working full time and part time by marital 
status 1977 to 1994 (Great Britain). From Table 7.9, page 
200, General Household Survey, 1994) 
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FIGURE 3- LONE MOTHERS DIVORCED 
Lone mothers and married women with dependent children: 
percentages working full time and part time by marital 
status 1977 to 1994 (Great Britain). From Table 7.9, page 
200, General Household Survey, 1994) 
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FIGURE 4- LONE MOTHERS SEPARATED 
Lone mothers and married women with dependent children: 
percentages working full time and part time by marital 
status 1977 to 1994 (Great Britain). From Table 7.9, page 
200, General Household Survey, 1994) 
LL 
rn 
0) 
(v) 
rn 
LLI rn 
4 00 
W 
CD rn 00 
co 00 r- cn w W 
0? LO 
co 
Lo 
W 
>- 0 
W 
Z 
00 
0 OD 
00 
.'r coo 
U) 
ti 
O LO O LO o u-) O LO o 
Nt MMNN 
. -- T- 
AO1dW3 NI % 
32 
FIGURE 5- ALL LONE MOTHERS 
Lone mothers and married women with dependent children: 
percentages working full time and part time by marital 
status 1977 to 1994 (Great Britain). From Table 7.9, page 
200, General Household Survey, 1994) 
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FIGURE 6- MARRIED WOMEN WITH DEPENDENT Ch ILDREN 
Lone mothers and married women with dependent children: 
percentages working full time and part time by marital 
status 1977 to 1994 (Great Britain). From Table 7.9, page 
200, General Household Survey, 1994) 
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Age of children and likelihood of paid employment 
Looking at changes over time as well as age of youngest child, 
there has been a significant change in employment rates for 
married women. Whereas 5%0 of married women with a 
youngest child under 5 worked full time in 1977-79,16% did so 
in 1992-94. In contrast, lone mothers in this category were 
withdrawing from full time paid employment (13`%, to 8(YO). For 
part time work, married women with their youngest child under 
5 increased participation from 22`%> to 35`%x, while lone mothers 
increased from 13%, to 15%0 (see Table 4 following). 
For those with children over 5, the change since 1977 has not 
been so marked, but still shows an increase (from 21 % to 27), o) 
for married mothers, but a decrease (from 26% to 23%x) for ]one 
mothers in full time employment. (See Table 4 following). 
These figures should also be looked at in comparison with the 
situation for women as a whole, that is including those without 
dependent children. In 1984,57`VO of those aged 16-59 and 
married were in work. By 1994, this had risen to 71 °'%, 
compared with earlier figures quoted of 53%, for lone parents 
with children 5 or over (23% full time + 30(1/'o part time) and 74°() 
for married mothers with children 5 or over (27% full time + 
47% part time). Figures for all women, regardless of marital 
35 
status or children but aged 16-59, were 57%) in 1984 and 67% 
in 1994 (see Table 7.13, page 204, General Household Survey, 
1994). 
Social Focus on Women further analyses the participation of 
lone mothers in the labour market, calculating the percentage 
in work relative to the age of the child, including categories of 0- 
4 years, 5- 10 years and 11 
-15 years. This more detailed 
breakdown shows that although lone mothers start from a lower 
base, they are more inclined to take on full time work as the 
child gets older, until for the 1 1-15 years of age of child 
category, the figures for lone and married mothers in full time 
employment are comparable at 32% and 341%). 
Similarly, for part time workers, lone mothers, from a low base, 
become more inclined to take on part time work as the age of 
the child increases, and the percentage doubled when 
comparing 0-4 years with 5-10 ears. (See Table 5 below. ) 
These statistics are also displayed in Figures 7-9 below. 
ib 
TABLE 4 
Married women and lone mothers with dependent children: 
percentages working full time and part time by youngest 
dependent child: 1977 to 1994 (Great Britain) 
Agee( 77 71) 71) S1 RI 83 83 Fis >iS 87 8'7 8O 8') ()1 111 'iii 
v(Iungc'st 
dependent child and whether 
womcn working full OF part umc °.. 
Married women with dependent children 
Under 5 years 
full time 56669 12 14 14 16 
part time 22 22 19 22 25 28 32 34 35 
All working 27 28 25 28 34 40 46 49 51 
5 years or over 
full time 21 21 20 21 22 24 27 27 27 
part time 45 45 44 44 46 48 47 45 47 
All working 66 66 64 65 68 73 74 73 74 
All ages 
full time 15 15 14 15 17 19 21 22 22 
part. time 37 36 35 35 37 40 40 40 42 
All working 52 52 49 50 54 59 62 63 64 
Lone mothers 
Under 5 years 
full time 13 12 7 7 9 8 8 7 8 
part time 13 12 11 9 11 13 14 15 15 
All working 26 24 18 16 20 21 23 23 23 
5 years or over 
full time 26 28 25 23 23 23 27 24 23 
part time 29 31 29 29 32 29 32 31 30 
All working 56 59 54 52 55 53 60 56 53 
All ages 
full time 22 23 19 17 18 17 18 17 16 
part time 24 25 23 22 24 23 24 24 23 
All working 47 49 42 39 42 40 43 41 40 (Table 7.10, p. 201, Ge neral Household S urvey, 1994) 
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TABLE 5 
Economic activity status of mother: by age of youngest child, 
Spring 1994 
(United Kingdom, percentages) 
I, one mothers Married mothers All mothers 
0-4 years 
Working full time 9 18 16 
Working part time 14 33 29 
Unemployed 856 
Inactive 69 44 49 
5-10 years 
Working full time 16 21 20 
Working part time 28 49 44 
Unemployed 10 56 
Inactive 46 25 30 
I 1-IS years 
Working full time 32 34 34 
Working part time 29 42 40 
Unemployed 934 
Inactive 30 20 22 
(Table 2.12, page 26, Social Focus on Women, 1995) 
H 1 
FIGURE 7-0-4 YEARS 
Economic activity status of mother: by age of youngest child, 
Spring 1994 (UK) 
(Table 2.12, page 26, Social Focus on Women, 1995) 
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FIGURE 8-5- 10 YEARS 
Economic activity status of mother: by age of youngest child, 
Spring 1994 (UK) 
(Table 2.12, page 26, Social Focus on Women, 1995) 
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FIGURE 9- 11 
- 
15 YEARS 
Economic activity status of mother: by age of youngest child, 
Spring 1994 (UK) 
(Table 2.12, page 26, Social Focus on Women, 1995) 
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TABLE 6 
Children: by family type and economic activity status of 
head of family, August 1993 
(Great Britain, percentages) 
Male h<°ac1 married vl I lone I'üürnü1 lone 111 
/coil al )itin; purc-Ill purcnl I"inilir!, 
Wý)iking toll timt 82 47 13 '71 
Working part time 26 21 .i 
u nt mplovi il 10 15 ý) 1U 
Inactive 32 57 11 
(Table 3.6, page 39, Social Focus on Children, 1994) 
Displayed as Figures 10-13 following. 
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FIGURE 10 
- 
MALE HEAD MARRIED / COHABITING 
Children: by family type and economic activity status of 
head of family, August 1993 
(Great Britain, percentages) 
(Table 3.6, page 39, Social Focus on Children, 1994) 
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FIGURE 11 
- 
MALE LONE PARENT 
Children: by family type and economic activity status of 
head of family, August 1993 
(Great Britain, percentages) 
(Table 3.6, page 39, Social Focus on Children, 1994) 
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FIGURE 12 
- 
FEMALE LONE PARENT 
Children: by family type and economic activity status of 
head of family, August 1993 
(Great Britain, percentages) 
(Table 3.6, page 39, Social Focus on Children, 1994) 
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FIGURE 13 
- 
ALL FAMILIES 
Children: by family type and economic activity status of 
head of family, August 1993 
(Great Britain, percentages) 
(Table 3.6, page 39, Social Focus on Children, 1994) 
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The figures for married mothers and lone parent mothers 
should also be compared with the situation for fathers. These 
comparisons are available in Social Focus on Children (and 
reproduced here as Table 6 and Figures 10 
- 
13 above) and 
compare employment rates of male head of family in 
married/ cohabiting couples with heads of families who are male 
lone parents, female lone parents and all families. Clearly, male 
lone parents are much more likely than female lone parents to 
be in full time employment (47`/n compared to 13('/0). This must 
be seen in conjunction with statistics showing the average age 
of children in the care of lone parents, where the tendency is for 
lone fathers to be caring for older children than lone mothers 
do, as shown in Table 7 and Figure 14 following. 
TABLE 7 
Age of youngest dependent child by family type 
(Great Britain, 1993 and 1994 combined) 
I'amily type Age of youngest dependent child 
0-4 5O 10- 15 Ib und Total 
()V('I" 
Married couple % 44 24 26 6 78 
Lone mother %) 43 27 25 5 20 
Lone father %) 14 16 58 12 2 
All lone parents I%) 41 26 27 6 22 
Total °, <% 43 25 26 6 100 
(Table 2.15, page 29, General Household Survey, 1994) 
_}7 
FIGURE 14 
- 
AGE OF YOUNGEST DEPENDENT CHILD BY 
FAMILY TYPE 
Table 2.14, page 29, General Household Survey, 1994) 
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The fact that more lone fathers work full time than lone mothers 
could also be due to the differential between rates of pay for 
men and women, making a man's employment more likely to 
escape the benefits trap than a woman's. There are more 
women than men earning low wages; one-third of women earn 
£ 190 per week or less compared with 13% of men; three- 
quarters of men earn over £230 per week compared with only 
one-half of women (1994 figures). (See Table 8 below. ) 
TABLE 8 
(Table 2.25, page 33, Social Focus on Women, 1995) 
Average gross weekly earnings': by gender, April 1994 
United Kingdom 
Percentages 
a- 
3- 
2- 
1 
0 r- 
1.1 
49 
Iw CUU 300 400 500 600 700 800 
£ per week 
7 Full-time employees on adult rares who pay was not affected for the survey per; od Cy ahsence 
Source: Employment Department 
These differences may be the result of a number of factors. The 
benefit system is designed in such a way that employment may 
be particularly difficult for lone mothers compared with married 
mothers. The system currently operating means that someone 
taking up employment. having been on means tested benefits 
will almost certainly have their benefit reduced, or even removed 
altogether. This means lone mothers often have to earn a 
substantial wage to warrant giving up the relative security, if 
low level, of benefits. This contrasts with the position for 
married women whose partner's earnings are likely to already 
remove the family from the means tested system, with the result 
that any earned income obtained by the mother is a total gain to 
the household. 
The poverty trap created by the benefits system is particularly 
unfortunate given the likelihood of low level qualifications 
amongst lone mothers. The General Household Survey shows 
that 35% of lone parents in 1994 had no qualifications 
whatsoever. This compared with 22% of other family heads, 
and is likely to make it even more difficult for lone parents to 
gain employment paying a high enough salary to counter the 
benefits trap. (See Table 9 below. ) 
{(ý 
TABLE 9 
Highest qualification of family head by family type: lone 
parent families compared with other families 
(Great Britain, 1993 and 1994 combined) 
Highest qualification lone parent families Other families 
level attained `%, "r(, 
Degree or equivalent 4 14 
Higher education below degree 8 14 
GCE `A' level or equivalent 10 16 
GCSE grades A-C or " 28 22 
GCSE grades D-G or " [... ] 12 9 
Foreign or other 23 
No qualifications 35 22 
(Table 2.17, page 30, General Household Survey, 1994) 
Childcare is also likely to be a particular problem for lone 
parents. Given the poor provision of pre-school childcare by the 
state, and the rather slow growth in after-school and holiday 
schemes for over 5s, finding affordable and quality childcare is 
difficult. Family Credit allows for childcare costs (to a relatively 
low extent) but only with registered childcare providers. This 
excludes the family and friends provision which is likely to be 
more useful. Income Support makes no allowance for childcare 
costs at all, and with an earned income disregard of only £l 5 
per week, this is a clear disincentive to lone parents to take 
employment. of less than 16 hours per week. (But see later 
St 
details of Labour's "New Deal" for lone parents launched in 
1997. ) 
Women still tend to work in particular types of job; men still 
tend to work mainly with other men and women with other 
women. What has been termed 'horizontal' segregation means 
that equal patio legislation continues to have only limited success 
in bringing together the level of men's and women's wages. 
Added to this, the career break taken by many women to have 
children continues to exacerbate 'vertical' segregation, with 
women returning after a break taking work for which they may 
be over-qualified in order to obtain suitable hours, conditions or 
location of employment. 
Post-war employment legislation continued to work against all 
women, in that it tended to discriminate against part time 
employees, the majority of whom are women. Restricted rights 
to benefits such as maternity pay, redundancy packages, 
holiday and sick pay, continued to apply to those working part 
time until very recently, particularly for those working less than 
8 hours a week for one employer. The signing of the Social 
Chapter by the Labour government in 1997 will make 
significant changes in this respect, introducing European 
legislation to protect workers. 
5? 
Although many workers will have improved rights under 
changes expected in the late 1990s, changes in the employment 
market, with increased use of casual labour, short term 
contracts, zero-hour contracts, etc. have generally acted against 
the employee by reducing security and rights. Whilst flexibility 
may be essential for a lone parent to return to work, the 
flexibility offered has tended to benefit the employer rather than 
the employee, and has made giving up the relative security of 
benefits even harder. 
2.3 "Lone parent families are a problem" 
This section looks at recent attitudes to lone parenthood as 
expressed by commentators on the left and the right, those who 
are not themselves in government, but who are members of 
"think tanks" and pressure groups. The period examined here 
is the late 1980s and early 1990s. More specific comments b 
voluntary organisations closely involved with child support 
issues are covered in later chapters. 
Lone parent families are not new. As Jane Millar points out: 
r; 
"Marital breakdown rates in the nineteenth centurN, were 
probably not very different from those found today, the 
difference being that divorce rather than death is now the 
main cause of lone parenthood. " 
(Millar, 1992, p. 152) 
Whether lone parent status was the result of death of a spouse, 
divorce, or illegitimacy has invariably affected the treatment 
meted out by government and by society at large. The debate 
continues today; the moral rights and wrongs of policies which 
could be said to assist or deter lone parenthood are high on the 
political agenda. This part of the chapter lays out conflicting 
opinions expressed in the late 1980s and earl`- 1990s on 
whether lone parenthood per se is a problem and, if it is, how 
best the status can be discouraged, or how best the families can 
be helped. More specific policy solutions put forward following 
announcement of the Child Support Act proposals are looked 
at in later chapters. 
Commentators on the right (for example Butler and Pirie) feel 
strongly that lone parenthood is a problem and is therefore to 
be discouraged. They believe that to give benefits to those 
bringing up children alone is to encourage 'bad' behaviour and 
will therefore be damaging to society in the long term. 
Pirie writes: 
5-4 
"Anything you do to relieve distress will instigate more of 
the behaviour which caused the distress 
... 
By relieving 
distress we make it more tolerable, and we make it less 
necessary to avoid the condition 
... 
If we give money to 
unmarried mothers to relieve the poverty in which their 
children are brought up, we make unmarried motherhood 
more acceptable than it was, and we will get more of it. " 
(Pine, 1994, p. 25) 
Butler goes on to assert that by cushioning the effects of lone 
parenthood, at the expense of the general tax paver, we are in 
danger of 'strangling the opposite values by taxing people who 
save, people who maintain stable relationships, and people who 
do everything they can to keep themselves in work' (Butler, 
1994, p. 17). 
This seems very similar to the arguments supporting the Poor 
Law 
- 
the fear of supporting the feckless or 'undeserving' who 
could have acted to avoid their situation, but will not whilst 
some other provision is made for them. 
Green argues that stigma attached to claiming benefits can act 
in a positive way. He writes: 
".. but if we criticise a person who has fallen on hard 
times due to their own inappropriate behaviour 
... 
we 
spend our time criticising them because we believe them 
capable of more. Failure never hurt anyone because it is 
55 
through our failures as well as our successes that we 
grow. To criticise a person is to treat him as a dignified 
individual capable of functioning as a morally-responsible 
citizen. To refrain from criticising individuals whose 
conduct may be self-injuring as well as harmful to others 
is 
... 
to write them off as not worth bothering with. It is to 
treat them as the powerless victims of circumstance and 
thus to fail to acknowledge the very capacity that makes 
us all human, our ability to act as thinking, valuing, 
choosing individuals. " 
(Green, 1990, p. ix) 
Clearly this presumes that we would all agree on the definition 
of 'inappropriate behaviour' and 'failure'. If being unable to 
financially support yourself is 'failure' then Green's argument is 
clearly reminiscent of principles of deserving and undeserving 
underpinning the Poor Law. 
Murray, in describing the 'underclass' is quite open in his 
comparison with the 'feckless' and 'undeserving poor' (see 
Murray, 1990). He believes that the problems of the underclass 
will not be solved with benefits, or even jobs, but that the 
underclass is made up of people who live and bring up their 
children according to different values, values which can 
contaminate others in society (Murray, 1990, p. 4). 
Again reminiscent of some judgemental aspects of the Poor Law, 
Murray draws a distinction between illegitimacy and other forms 
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of lone parenthood. He asserts that illegitimacy denotes a 
different mindset 
- 
one which sees marriage as unnecessarv for 
having children (Murray, 1990, p. 5). He further asserts that 
'Communities need families. Communities need fathers' (p. 7). 
He bases this argument on his belief that boys need to know 
what a 'good father' is if they are to be good fathers themselves 
in the future, and a belief that there is a greater tendency for 
children to 'run wild' if there is no father around (pp. I1 and 
12). This is disputed by David Utting's study which concluded: 
"the widely held assumption that. two parents are 
automatically a better safeguard against delinquency is 
not, however, supported by the evidence. " 
(in Hewitt & Leach, 1993, p. 13) 
Murray is convinced that it is the benefits paid to women 
bringing up children alone that encourages them to be lone 
parents. He claims that it. is the rise in the level of benefits 
(even though they are still low) which has made the raising of 
children alone an economic possibility, and that in the past the 
use of severe economic punishment meant single parenthood 
would be actively avoided. At the same time, the pressure on 
men to marry has diminished (Murray, 1990, pp. 28-31). 
Murray fails to address the structural difficulties faced by 
women in the employment market, and does not. address the 
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dilemma faced by those lone parents who are attempting to he 
involved in paid work whilst bringing up children with little 
support from elsewhere, eg poor childcare facilities and 
inflexible work practices. 
Looking at cohabitation rates and divorce, Brown argues that it 
cannot be said to be 'better' to have a father and lose him 
through divorce, than to start fatherless but acquire one 
(Brown, 1990, p. 46). This contrasts with Murray's assertion 
that to bring an illegitimate child into the world signifies a lack 
of acceptable values on the part of the mother which is not only 
damaging to the child but potentially to wider society as well. 
Brown contends that it is not the removal of benefits which will 
solve the problems of lone parents, (according to Murray by 
discouraging their formation in the first place). Brown believes it 
is policies which bring about the removal of obstacles currently 
preventing lone parents from working as well as raising 
children, and the proper pursuit of maintenance from fathers, 
that will solve problems in a positive way, without the need for a 
return to the more morally judgemental aspects of the Poor Law 
(Brown, 1990, p. 48). 
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Walker counters Murray's arguments by pointing out that 
countries with high illegitimacy rates such as Denmark, do not 
have any more problems than in the UK. He concludes that 
Murray's thesis simply lifts the guilt from governments (and 
others in society) by blaming the victims (Walker, 1990,. pp. 52- 
58). 
Deakin argues that children classed as illegitimate today are 
quite likely to he living with both their natural parents, many! of 
whom will later marry, or are equally likely to become part of a 
family with a man in the future. Deakin points out that Murray 
fails to mention step-families or 'reconstituted' families, 
although the reality is that lone parenthood is only a stage in 
the life cycle and is usually temporary. Deakin therefore 
concludes that illegitimacy should not he seen as a threat 
(Deakin, 1990, p. 60). Murray's ideas for local solutions are 
compared with the Elizabethan Poor Law parishes 'prodding 
those whose occupations or morals did not square with local 
values' (Deakin, 1990, p. 64). 
There are, however, many commentators in support of Murrav's 
ideas, for example, Harris writing for the Institute of Economic 
Affairs who states that: 
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the dramatic increase in unmarried mothers owes a good 
deal to the special payments and subsidised housing 
priority won by the pressure group for that biological 
curiosity of 'single-parent' families. " 
(Harris, 1988, p. 23) 
Harris believes that all benefits have a dual effect 
- 
an 'income' 
effect of increasing spending power of the recipient; and a 'price' 
effect, which raises the incentive to qualify for the subsidy or 
benefit, thus encouraging becoming or remaining unemployed 
or poor or homeless (or presumably a lone parent). He 
advocates counselling and pastoral care and a stress on morals, 
wherever possible to be delivered in the local community by 
voluntary action (Harris, 1988, pp. 23 and 26). 
The emphasis on morals is not restricted to right-wing 
commentators. Frank Field, Labour MP for Birkenhead and 
Chairman of the Social Security Select Committee (and later 
appointed to the Department of Social Security- in the Labour 
government from May 1997), clearly believes a large number of 
lone parents, particularly those who are still young themselves 
and have never married, are likely to behave in a manner which 
others in society may judge immoral, 
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"The likelihood is that among this group mothers will have 
a number of sexual partners in succession. A series of 
half siblings results. " 
(Field, 1995, p. 12) 
"What does it mean for hundreds of thousands and 
possibly, by now, millions of young people that their 
mother has had a number of other partners, most of 
whom gave her children 
- 
their step-brothers and sisters? 
What message is being put across to children when much 
of family life is spent eating in front of a TV screen while a 
succession of different boyfriends occupy the seats behind 
them? " 
(field, 1995, p. 13) 
"... these mothers are overwhelmingly young and are 
therefore likely to become part of a growing group of 
single parents who have a series of children by different 
partners. " 
(Field, 1995, p. 11 1) 
Field offers no evidence for such assertions vet this belief clearly 
colours his view on the appropriateness of benefits: 
"We also need to confront the values which are taught by 
our social security system. No system of welfare can be 
independent of values. These values need to be brought 
to the fore. Is it right, for example, that young, never- 
married mothers, should gain additional income support 
premiums when few if any voters think that such 
behaviour is acceptable, let alone rewardable? " 
(Field, 1995, pp. 21-22) 
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Field relents a little by accepting that mothers should not be 
pressurised into unsatisfactorvv relationships, and, contradicting 
his earlier condemnation, speaks of "the heroic endeavours of 
most single parents to bring up their children to the very best of 
their abilities" (pp. 113-114). Nevertheless, one moral message 
is clear throughout his book, that is his concern at the rising 
number of never-married lone parents. Yet he fails to address 
the increase in cohabiting relationships or the fact that many 
children of lone parents were conceived and born into 
relationships which at the time were considered permanent. A 
study by Bradshaw and Millar in 1991 found that about 17 per 
cent of the single mothers in their sample had lived with their 
former partners before becoming a lone parent (in Millar, 1992, 
p. 153). The marriage licence seems to be central to Field's 
moral message which could be said to be rather out of touch 
with the reality of today's society. 
Work by Marsh et al (1997) showed that the vast majority of 
lone parents had had all their children by one partner alone. 
This applied to 8 out of 10 of the never-married lone parents 
interviewed in the study and 9 out of 10 of the formerly married 
(880 lone parents were chosen as a nationally representative 
sample). Fewer than three in every one hundred had had 
children with three different partners. 
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Krause (1994), taking a contrasting view to Murray and to some 
extent Field, believes that we cannot continue treating lone 
parent child rearing as deviant. He claims that the emphasis on 
culpability of the absent father, on immorality, irresponsibility 
and fault, has over-ridden the genuine needs of children, and 
taken away any sense of public responsibility for children. 
Krause argues that the state does owe some responsibility to 
children as future workers and supporters of others. He goes 
on to express the belief that in the future more government 
financial support to children may be necessary, as birth rates 
fall and potential parents find that the 'opportunity cost of child 
rearing becomes prohibitive'. DINKYS' (dual-income, no kids 
vet) futures could be in jeopardy if the society of tomorrow is 
made up of a high proportion of social outcasts 
- 
or those made 
to feel outcasts by little regard for social and education needs 
and the extent and impact of poverty. Krause believes that only 
a healthy, educated and willing working generation will generate 
the income necessary to provide retirement for their 
predecessors and that therefore having children (or not having 
them) is not just a private matter (Krause, 1994, pp. 220-229). 
The Report of the Commission on Social Justice similarly 
concludes that: 
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"... the unpaid work of parents and other carers must be 
recognised in family-friendly policies at the workplace and 
in the organisation of the welfare state" 
(Social Justice, 1994, p. 104). 
The report stresses the importance of education, training and 
employment for all and concludes that it is up to government to 
ensure that services and policies are in place to allow access for 
all. These services and policies should include the provision of 
good childcare facilities with particular help for lone parents 
(Social Justice, 1994, p. 178). 
In exchange for better educational opportunities, the provision 
of good childcare and more protection for part-time workers, the 
report concludes that mothers of school-age children should be 
available for work, for at least part-time work, if they (or their 
partners) wish to claim benefit. Those with children under 5 or 
with a disabled child would be allowed to claim benefits without 
being available for work, and there would be a period of 
adjustment allowed on separation, divorce or widowhood (Social 
Justice, 1994, p. 240). 
As part of a policy of redesigning the welfare state and 
encouraging work, the report recognises the shortfalls of the 
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current system which so often traps lone parents on benefit and 
in poverty (Social Justice, 1994, p. 239). Changes to the 
disregard are suggested to encourage employment and 
maintenance from absent parents (p. 251). 
Lone parents and their children are not seen as a 'problem' by 
the report, which stresses that all families need measures to 
help them earn their own living. In summary, the report 
advocates: 
-a national strategy for under-fives, including nursery 
education and childcare 
- 
jobs, education and training 
- 
family 
-friendly employment policies 
- 
income support disregard on childcare expenses 
- 
reform of child benefit 
- 
reform of the Child Support Act 
(Social Justice, 1994, p. 252) 
The need to value all children is stressed as is the need to value 
the work of bringing up children. Children, in whatever family- 
form they live, must be respected and treated well if they are to 
have self-respect and respect for others (Social Justice, 1994, p. 
311). This of course contrasts sharply with the Right's ideas of 
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discouragement and penalties to be applied to lone parent 
families regardless of the effects on the children involved. 
The report goes on to assert that communities must also play 
their part in the upbringing of children and providing a good 
environment (Social Justice, 1994, p. 313 and pp. 325-331). 
However, the report acknowledges that communities can be 
racial, discriminatory and exclusionary (Social Justice, 1994, p. 
326). Local people should be assisted by government to provide 
political, institutional and financial frameworks by which 
families can be assisted in their nurturing role (Social Justice, 
1994, p. 370). At the same time, parents' own responsibilities 
should be clearly set out in a 'statement of parents' 
responsibilities' (Social Justice, 1994, pp. 320-321). 
Throughout the report it is stressed that parents are not the 
only people involved in a child's upbringing. 
One member of the Social Justice Commission, Dr. Penelope 
Leach, in a separate publication, calls for even more recognition 
of the value of parenting and the need for the support of society 
as a whole to put children and parents first. She highlights the 
steps other countries have taken in this direction, for example 
the establishment of a Children's Ombudsperson in Norxvay. 
The discussion of the British Labour Parts in 1992 around the 
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creation of a Cabinet-level post of Minister for Children needs 
further developing, Leach believes, even to the extent of 
introducing 'child impact statements' required for any planning 
or licensing application, any policy proposal, any new regulation 
or addition to case la", (Leach, 1994, p. 194). 
Another avid supporter of family responsibility and strong 
communities is Etzioni. However, unlike Krause, Leach, and 
the Social Justice Commission, Etzioni does not stress a need 
for state support for all kinds of families and declares a clear 
preference for the traditional family form. The 
'communitarianism' put forward by Etzioni includes a need for 
communities to 'discipline' themselves and to police the social 
behaviour of individual members for the common good. Of 
paramount importance is a moral foundation, with fathers and 
mothers having the same duties and rights and being 
encouraged to stay together until the children are grown. This 
is, according to Etzioni, the way to raise children responsibly, 
and ultimately in the best interests of society as a whole. As 
Suzanne Moore writes in the Guardian, this cannot. always be 
said to be 'for the good of the children' (for discussion see the 
Guardian: John Gray 8 March, 1995; Suzanne Moore 9 March, 
1995; Martin Walker 13 March 1995). 
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Etzioni believes support in the form of child care provision 
should come firstly from parents themselves through co- 
operative schemes. Employers and government should give 
additional support only if parents cannot themselves spend 
more (financially and in terms of time) on child care (Etzioni, 
1993, p. 1 1). He stresses the need for parental commitment, 
particularly time, and acknowledges that a lone parent may be 
better than what he terms 'two-career absentee parents' 
(Etzioni, 1993, p. 9). However, he argues that there are several 
compelling reasons why two-parent families are the most. 
suitable form for children, not least of which is the heavy 
demands on time and energy. He goes on to identifv two 'modes 
of parents' 
- 
supporting and achievement oriented 
- 
which he 
feels makes two parents preferable: 
"One parent may be more supportive, the source of 
emotional security that all children require if they dare to 
grow up in a threatening world. The other parent may be 
more achievement oriented, pushing children to extend 
themselves beyond the comfortable cradle of love. In 
many countries mothers have historically often fulfilled 
the former role, while fathers have typically adopted the 
latter. 
.... 
What matters most is the two parent mode. " 
(Etzioni, 1993, p. 15). 
In support of two-parent families Etzioni declares a preference 
for pre-marriage counselling, for example by religious bodies, as 
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well as the teaching of effective communication skills in schools. 
He also believes that harder and less socially acceptable divorce, 
particularly where children are involved, is essential, with 
restrictive laws being used to "communicate and symbolise 
those values that the community holds dear" 
If the conclusion is, therefore, that lone parent families are a 
problem for themselves and for the larger community, if they are 
seen as in some way 'deviant', there will also be perceived a 
need for this form of family to be discouraged in whatever way 
possible. For the Right this may mean a reduction or even 
removal of benefits, to act as a deterrent to others, and to make 
the state of lone-parenthood as undesirable as possible. For 
some, discouragement may be through moral pressure and 
disapproval, perhaps with the re-emphasis on adoption as a wa-y 
of prevention of lone parent family formation, coupled with the 
provision of hostels for single mothers. In 1995, an Institute of 
Economic Affairs paper discussed 'the ultimate privatisation' 
- 
the privatisation of the family 
- 
with the encouragement of 
adoption of babies born to poor single parents by wealthy 
childless couples (Henderson, 1995, pp. 4-5). 
On the other hand, lone parent families could be treated as 
simply another family-form, possibly with some acknowledged 
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extra difficulties to overcome when compared with two-parent 
families, but with no stigma attached and no need for 
discouragement. Recognising the value of children to society 
and the need to help all families, whatever form they take, can 
remove the 'problem' of lone parenthood altogether. The issues 
then become family policy, poverty, housing, employment, etc., 
not lone parenthood as such (see Letts, 1983, p. 7). Hewitt. and 
Leach conclude: 
"We cannot continue to scapegoat ]one mothers 
... 
with 
talk of 'cycles of deprivation' or an 'underclass' that 
sounds as if these misfortunes had a will and an 
existence beyond our understanding or control 
... 
the 
undervaluing 
.. 
of both mothers and fathers list 
profoundly damaging not only to children and their 
immediate families, but to the whole of our society" 
(Hewitt and Leach, 1993, p. 43). 
2.4 Commentary 
This chapter has "set the scene" within which the Child 
Support Act was born. Rising government expenditure on 
benefits to lone parents, low levels of paid employment by lone 
parents, often hostile and judgemental "think tank" 
publications, all contributed to the conclusion that lone 
parenthood is indeed a problem. Sadly, these views were 
strikingly similar to those expressed decades and even centuries 
earlier. 
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Chapter 3 examines government policy towards lone 
parenthood, looking at the development of the post-war benefits 
system and specifically how lone parent families were included 
in that system. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Evolution of Government Policy 
Towards Lone Parenthood 
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter provided a brief overview of lone 
parenthood in the UK after the Second World War. Statistics 
were provided which showed rising numbers of lone parent 
families and how this affected levels of benefit expenditure by 
government through the 1970s and 1980s. This chapter looks 
at how the post-war benefit system developed, specifically in 
relation to its treatment of lone parent households. 
The exceptional circumstances of the Second World War 
brought about a change in attitude by central government. The 
policies for maintaining children involved in the evacuation 
programmes are detailed. These show a significant shift. in the 
government's attitude towards parental liability to maintain 
from that demonstrated under the Poor Law. The government 
was prepared during the Second World War to contribute much 
more towards the cost of bringing up children. 
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The Beveridge proposals in relation to lone parents are 
examined in this chapter. Although not all his proposals were 
adopted, and some were introduced in an amended form, the 
Report could be said to illustrate the political mood developing 
during the war. The report also illustrates the prevailing view at 
that time that a woman's place was in the home. 
Government assistance in the form of Family Allowance and t 
.,. 
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relief is detailed, followed by an overview of means-tested 
benefits, Supplementary Benefit and Family Income 
Supplement, and later Income Support and Family Credit. 
Section 3.3 describes benefits and the liability to maintain since 
1988. Details of arrangements for the collection and 
enforcement of maintenance are given in more detail, including 
a brief explanation of the current Agency formula. 
3 
.2 Benefits and the 
Liability to Maintain 1940-1988 
3.2.1 The Influence of the Second World War 
Ferguson and Fitzgerald in 'Studies in the Social Services' 
(1954) detail the treatment of unmarried mothers in the period 
1939-1945. They show that even before the war the average 
size of family was decreasing, with women bearing fewer 
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children. Although infant mortality figures improved greatly, 
there was still a definite change in the formation of families, 
with smaller family circles and relatives who could be turned to 
for help 
- 
brothers, sisters, aunties, etc. reduced in number 
(Ferguson & Fitzgerald, 1954, pp. 1-2). 
During the war years there was also a need to maintain as 
much as possible the morale of servicemen who were away from 
home. To hear that the state was failing to properly provide for 
their families in their absence would have added to servicemen's 
distress and the pre-war assistance services, which amounted 
to the Poor Law authorities and the workhouse, were seen as 
unacceptable (Ferguson & Fitzgerald, 1954, pp. 8-9). As 
Titmuss put it: 
"... soldiers could hardly be expected to fight with spirit 
when they knew that their families were breaking down 
under insupportable strain. " 
(Titmuss, 1950, p. 209) 
Evacuation procedures were necessarily elaborate, and the 
government set up very complex administrative procedures for- 
the recovery of costs incurred in evacuation. The authorities of 
the original place of residence of the evacuee were deemed 
responsible for costs incurred by the reception area, if such 
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services would have been provided in the evacuee's home town. 
The evacuating area would then, as in peace-time, be 
responsible for recovering, in appropriate cases, from parents 
and responsible relatives. Any extra costs incurred, over and 
above peace-time provision, could be recouped from the 
Treasury. Thus, there was an attempt to split the 'costs of 
peace' from the 'costs of wwar' (Titmuss, 1950, pp. 206-208). 
As far as the liability to maintain children was concerned, the 
government took on a new role. Parents of evacuated children 
were expected to contribute towards the costs of the 
maintenance of their children, if they could afford to. When this 
means test was introduced it was noted that the extent of 
poverty amongst those living in the cities was great and the 
actual amount recovered from parents was relatively small 
(Titmuss, 1950, pp. 159-161). 
The amount paid by parents who could afford it was set at 6s a 
week for the duration of the war (Titmuss, 1950, p. 399). 
However, the amounts paid to the billeting families were much 
more than this. In June 1940 the rates paid out by the 
Treasury were: 
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5-14 year olds 10s 6d 
14-16 year olds 12s 6d 
16 years or over 15s (from Titmuss, 1950, p. 397). 
Thus, the government could be said to be taking on 
responsibility for the costs of maintenance of children. It must 
be remembered though that these amounts, even though 
considerably higher than the contribution being made by the 
parents, were still considered inadequate by many. For poorer 
reception families, the amount was a major consideration; for 
better-off families, it was difficult to maintain the same standard 
of living as the rest of the family using this payment alone 
(Titmuss, 1950, p. 161). 
Local authorities were reluctant to provide services, at the 
expense of local ratepayers, which they considered were the 
result of the war and which they would not have provided (for 
some groups of people) during peacetime. Similarly, central 
government was keen to ensure that the evacuation scheme 
should not be used to solve social problems not directly 
connected to the war effort, for example lack of nursery 
provision by local authorities, or lack of services for unmarried 
mothers. There were inevitably huge amounts of inter-authority 
paperwork (Titmuss, 1950, pp. 210-212). As Crosby puts it, the 
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government thought in terms of war production rather than an 
extension of social services for the future. But, if temporarily, 
the government was forced towards creating a climate of opinion 
willing to accept an extension of state machinery (Crosby, 1986, 
p. 153). 
Children were thus labelled 'evacuee' or 'public assistance' and 
sometimes provision varied accordingly, depending on 
assumptions reached about the behaviour of the parents rather 
than according to need. Decisions were then taken as to where 
costs should be apportioned - to the parents, to the ratepayers 
or to the Exchequer (Titmuss, 1950, p. 213). Remnants of Poor 
Law administrative procedures were evident, with services 
sometimes delivered according to the behaviour of the parent 
rather than the needs of the child, it was clear that there was 
still a 'deserving' and 'undeserving' division with respect to some 
services. 
The number of illegitimate births rose during war-time, 
although it should be noted that the proportion of births outside 
marriage only reached one in ten in 1945 (see Social Trends 26, 
1996, p. 61). Arrangements were made to accommodate 
pregnant unmarried women in hospitals and hostels in the 
country wherever possible. Mother and baby would then be 
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billeted if a suitable family could be found. Voluntary bodies 
were utilised as much as possible, and inevitably services varied 
greatly from area to area. 
Problems of finance for unsupported women who were pregnant, 
which had been seen under the Poor Law, continued. Local 
authority boundaries were still in operation and battles of 
'settlement' remained, with country districts feeling 'burdened' 
by city destitutes. There were two cases reported of London 
'girls' and their babies being given the fare home (Ferguson & 
Fitzgerald, 1954, pp. 104-108). 
The government paid towards the hospital and post-natal care 
of unmarried mothers, but this was limited and not taken up in 
any large amount. Voluntary agencies were always seen as 
preferable to local authority provision, but hostels for unmarried 
mothers were established as part of the evacuation 
arrangements. The Treasury paid for these hostels, and they 
were particularly used by servicewomen who would otherwise 
have had to rely on the Poor Law authorities. The women using 
the hostels were expected to contribute towards their keep if 
they could afford to, but in reality such contributions were few 
(Ferguson & Fitzgerald, 1954, pp. 1 12-123). It would appear 
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that no effort was made to chase payment from fathers or other 
family members. 
Thus, a change of attitude came about because of the war. No 
longer was it assumed that the Poor Law was the right public 
service for unmarried mothers and illegitimate children 
(Ferguson & Fitzgerald, 1954, p. 128). Problems of finance 
undoubtedly continued but: 
"It was one of the social consequences of the war that the 
government accepted new responsibilities for the welfare 
of unmarried mothers and their babies. " 
(Ferguson & Fitzgerald, 1954, p. 138) 
No longer were poor unmarried mothers and their children 
entirely dependent on extended family, voluntary bodies or the 
Poor Law. 
Although change did occur, publicly provided homes for 
unmarried mothers still only accounted for 10 per cent of homes 
by 1949 and the emphasis remained on voluntary provision. 
However, social workers were provided and voluntary homes 
were subsidised and inspected to a greater degree than had 
occurred before the war (Ferguson & Fitzgerald, 1954, p. 139). 
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Post-war benefits introduced meant that reliance on the Poor 
Law was replaced by payment of maternity allowance and if 
necessary National Assistance. Unmarried mothers were no 
longer the same burden on their families and this enabled more 
to remain at home. Where unmarried mothers became 
homeless they became the responsibility of the local welfare 
authority and were guaranteed a place in a public or voluntary 
home at the authority's expense (Ferguson & Fitzgerald, 1954, 
p. 140). This was obviously a great improvement on the 
workhouse, and an improvement on "outdoor relier' available 
under previous legislation. 
3.2.2 The Beveridge Proposals 
Beveridge recognised the problems of maintaining a family and 
his proposals (in the Beveridge Report of 1942) included 
payment of benefits according to the size and age of your family. 
Payments suggested included funeral grants, maternity benefits 
and grants, marriage grants, guardian's benefit (see de 
Schweinitz, 1961, pp 232-237). 
Beveridge would have preferred inclusion of a child allowance 
under the insurance principle: 
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"It can be argued that 
.. 
children are a contingency for 
which all men should prepare by contributing to an 
insurance fund" 
(Beveridge quoted in Cutler, 1986, p. 16). 
But he recognised the limitations of funding and also the 
importance of maintaining personal responsibility: 
"When the responsible parent 
.... 
is earning, there is no 
need to aim at allowances relieving the parent of the 
whole cost of the children 
... 
it would be wrong to do so 
- 
an unnecessary and undesirable inroad on the 
responsibilities of parents" 
(Beveridge in Cutler, 1986, p. 16). 
Beveridge assumed that the country was, and would continue to 
be, made up of two-parent households with the wife engaged in 
the 'vital but unpaid labour' of child-rearing while the husband 
held a full-time job at wages adequate to maintain a couple and 
at least one child. Married women were assumed to be 
supported by their husband, and therefore in need of different 
treatment under the insurance system. Thus, a wife's 
dependency on her husband was built into the system (Finer 
(11), 1974,137-138). 
This led to the assumption that second and subsequent 
children would require a child allowance in any event, and the 
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first child would need inclusion in benefit entitlement when 
employment was interrupted (Williams, 1987, p. 51). 
As the abolition of 'want' was one of Beveridge's aims, it was 
clear that some adjustment of incomes was necessary if family 
needs were to be met adequately. It was clear that child 
allowances were essential if benefits payable during 
interruptions in earnings were to be adequate. It was also clear, 
therefore, that such allowances had to be paid when earning, 
otherwise: (a) substantial amounts of 'want' would remain for 
low-paid workers with large families; and (b) income could be 
greater during unemployment than during employment 
(Williams, 1987, p. 54). 
The Beveridge Report did, however, endeavour to keep a balance 
between state and parental responsibility. It was seen as 
important that: 
"the principle of social policy should not be to remove all 
responsibilities from the parents, but to help them to 
understand and to meet their responsibilities" 
(Beveridge quoted in George, 1968, p. 190). 
Beveridge saw the position of divorced women as being similar 
to widows: 
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"In divorce, legal or voluntary separation, and desertion, 
the general principle is that the termination of marriage 
should result for the wife in the same insurance 
arrangements as those that accompany widowhood, 
unless the marriage maintenance has ended through her 
fault or voluntary action without just cause. " 
(de Schweinitz, 1961, p. 237) 
Although Beveridge felt that women who were separated should 
be entitled to financial help from the government, this was 
limited to those who were 'blameless'. Thus, the old 
'undeserving' principles of the Poor Law were continued in 
Beveridge's proposals. However, in the event. this particular 
proposal was not taken up. 
Beveridge's proposals for the support of separated women came 
after much debate. It was finally concluded that to treat 
separation as an insurable event would be inappropriate, and 
that benefit should be under National Assistance. The 
insurance/ assistance debate hinged largely on fault. Although 
it was felt that women should be able to insure against loss of 
maintenance where it was not their fault, the over-riding 
conclusion was that husbands should not be able to insure 
against a contingency for which they may be responsible. This 
therefore led to the conclusion that any separation benefit paid 
must be temporary only, and should only be paid if the wife was 
S3 
not at fault. 'Guilty' wives, however, should not be able to 
claim maintenance from 'innocent' husbands. It was also 
stressed that such payment should not displace the husband's 
liability to maintain and that the Ministry would have the right 
to proceed against him, even without the wife's consent. The 
difficulties of such a scheme were acknowledged in the 
Beveridge Report and further examination of the problem was 
recommended. The findings were particularly inconclusive 
where unmarried mothers were concerned (Finer (Il), 1974, pp. 
137-141). 
As stated above, a further recommendation of the Beveridge 
Report was for a universal child allowance, paid by the Treasury 
regardless of need (though not for the first child). This was in 
recognition of the market's inability to set wages according to 
family size, and also as a measure aimed at preventing 
population decline. Beveridge felt it necessary to signal a 
national interest in children (de Schweinitz, 1961, p. 239). 
In the event, provision for lone parent families after the 
introduction of National Assistance in 1948 remained as it had 
been before the Beveridge Report, in that such families unable 
to earn their own living would be dependent on National 
Assistance (formerly the Poor Law) or on the support of 
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(ex)husbands. There were some changes in that the 'liable 
relatives' definition was restricted to husbands and wives, and 
parents and children. Thus, children were relieved of their duty 
under the Poor Law to support their parents, following the 
National Assistance Act 1948 (Finer (II), 1974 p. 148). 
However, the bulk of the benefits introduced by Beveridge were 
based on contributions whilst in full time paid employment, 
making them largely unavailable to lone mothers. Nevertheless, 
under National Assistance, lone parents would be entitled to 
payments from central funds, through the National Assistance 
Board, and no longer came under the jurisdiction of local 
officialdom. 
Under National Assistance Board regulations lone mothers had 
the right not to seek paid employment. However, Marsden's 
study of lone mothers in 1965-66 showed that Board officials 
could be judgemental in their approach and full information on 
rights was not readily available (Marsden, 1973, pp 247-251). 
The Marsden study concluded that in spite of statutory 
provisions for assistance for lone parent families, officials had 
not fully accepted that the mothers were entitled not to work 
(Marsden, 1973, p 307). 
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3.2.3 Family Allowances 
Family allowances were discussed in parliament for 25 years 
before their eventual introduction in 1945. There was concern 
at the declining birth rate, particularly amongst middle and 
upper classes. There was also concern at the high levels of 
poverty amongst the lower classes, especially those with large 
families (George, 1968, pp. 187-188). Thus it could be said that 
the burden of the liability to maintain which fell heavily on 
parents was seen as a contributory factor in preventing births 
amongst the upper and middle classes and in increasing poverty 
amongst the lower classes. (It has subsequently been disputed 
that payment of child allowances has any effect on reproduction 
rates 
- 
George, 1973, p. 126. ) 
Beveridge felt that child allowances were necessary to ensure 
that the level of a worker's income was sufficient to support a 
family. It was acknowledged that market forces could not be 
relied upon to take into account the number of dependants the 
worker was supporting. It was further acknowledged that the 
whole community, through general taxation, should share in the 
maintenance of children, but. not to the extent that parents were 
relieved entirely of their responsibility. This led to the 
8 
conclusion that the first child should be entirely the financial 
responsibility of the parents (Opus & Barendt, 1982, p. 421). 
Family allowances were introduced for the second and 
subsequent children under the Family Allowances Act 1945. 
The allowances were graded from 1956, i. e. differing amounts 
for the second or third child, etc. Family allowances were 
universal but taxable (George, 1968, p. 191). 
Prior to payment of a universal family allowance, tax allowances 
had been granted for some from 1909, and extended to all 
taxpayers from 1920 (Cutler, 1986, p. 49). These applied for all 
dependent children, including the first, were of more benefit to 
higher rate taxpayers, and continued alongside family 
allowances. From 1957 these became graduated according to 
the age of the child. 
The Child Benefit Act 1975 integrated the tax allowance and 
the family allowance into one payment, made to the main carer, 
usually the mother (Ogus & Barendt, 1982, p. 420). The 
advantages of this change were that: 
- 
it extended the whole benefit to poorer families who 
previously could not take advantage of tax allowances; 
it was payable for all children, including the first; 
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- 
the benefit was tax free; 
the whole of the benefit was paid directly to the main 
carer (Ogus & Barendt, 1982, p. 424). 
Pascall describes the change from a combination of family 
allowances and child tax reliefs to a single payment of child 
benefit as a redistribution from 'wallet to purse', but 
acknowledges that the continued low level of payment reflected 
women's poor bargaining position and government reluctance to 
undermine the male 'breadwinner' principle (Pascal], 1986, p. 
220). 
Extra child benefit was introduced for lone-parents in 1976, but 
this was at a very low amount and payable for the first child 
only (Ogus & Barendt, 1982, p. 443). The particular difficulties 
experienced by lone-parents were detailed in 1974 by the Finer 
Report, the main recommendations of which were not adopted 
by government, but which are detailed later in this chapter. 
From 1988 the previous link between child benefit and prices or 
incomes was broken, and child benefit was no longer 
automatically uprated annually (see Hill, 1990, p. 57 and p. 69). 
However, by 1992 the Conservative government had restated its 
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commitment to index-linking of child benefit (Lister, 1992, p. 
38). 
Child benefit continues in 1998 to be a universal benefit which 
is not means-tested. As a result, take-up levels are very high 
and administration costs are kept to a minimum. There has 
been a tendency since 1979 towards 'targeting' of benefits with 
increased use of means-testing. Even at its relatively low level, 
child benefit has perhaps done well to survive in its current 
form. 
The extra child benefit for lone parents available from 1976 was 
the subject of a controversial government Bill, before the House 
of Commons on loth December 1997. In spite of a number of 
Labour MPs voting against the government, the Bill became law 
and this extra payment for all lone parents was stopped for new 
claimants from April 1998. This measure is discussed further 
in Chapter 17 of this work. 
3.2.4 Supplementary Benefit and Family Income 
Supplement 1966 
- 
1988 
The National Assistance scheme set up in 1948 was replaced by 
Supplementary Benefit in 1966. It was hoped that the ne \k, 
A() 
scheme would simplify claims for means-tested benefit by 
reducing the number of additional payments for special needs, 
but this aim was not achieved (DSS, 1993, p. 27). Those 
paving sufficient contributions into the National Insurance 
scheme and meeting qualifying criteria, continued to be eligible 
for other benefits which were generally less stigmatising and 
often more generous. Lone parents, however, were still more 
likely to rely on means-tested, non-contributory benefits, which 
were from 1966 known as Supplementary Benefit and Family 
Income Supplement. 
The Ministry of Social Security Act 1966 set down the 
principle that a claim for Supplementary Benefit should be from 
a family as a unit, whether married or not. The claim for a two- 
adult household would normally come from the man, and only 
when he was not in full-time employment. Liable relative rules 
were clearly laid out: a man would be liable to maintain his wife 
and his children, and a woman would be liable to maintain her 
husband and her children. 'Children' were under 16 and 
included illegitimate children (although a separated mother did 
not become dependent on the father of her children except 
through marriage). It was also laid out that the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission could proceed against a liable relative for 
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the cost of any benefit paid out to his dependants (Finer (I), 
1974, p. 133). 
As had been the case under the Poor Law and National 
Assistance, those living as a household were usually taken to be 
inter-dependent, whether the adults in the household were 
actually married or not. Pascal] argues that the cohabitation 
rule, whereby women living with men were deemed to be their 
dependants, whether married or not, was particularly harsh for 
lone parents. She maintains that enforcement of cohabitation 
principles put lone parents at risk of instant social insecurity" 
(Pascall, 1986, p. 216). 
The Supplementary Benefits Commission established criteria for 
cohabitation which in practice, Pascall argues, made it difficult. 
for women living normal lives to avoid being suspected of 
cohabiting. An example given is taking in male lodgers. Women 
could thus be threatened with withdrawal of their benefit. 
Research suggested that in fact it was sexual relations with a 
man which were most likely to lead to withdrawal of benefits, 
rather than his financial support (Pascal], 1986, pp. 217-218 
and later Pascall, 1997, pp 216-218). 
() 
For those lone parents who did not work (or earned £6 a. week 
or less at 1.978 figures) and who genuinely lived without a 
partner, Supplementary Benefit was available for the woman 
and her children, with no necessity to seek employment. (The 
right to not work outside the home was established under 
National Assistance legislation but this was not. clearly 
recognised 
- 
see Marsden 1973. ) There was also no obligation 
to institute divorce or maintenance proceedings against her ex- 
partner (see below). 
The payments were means-tested, with amounts for each 
member of the household, varying with age. Rent and rates in 
full, or mortgage interest and an allowance for repairs and 
insurance, were added (see Heyes, 1978, p. 219). Additional 
weekly amounts could be obtained for special needs, such as 
extra laundry or heating requirements. Extra, one-off payments 
could be obtained for purchases such as beds and cookers, or to 
cover emergencies such as theft. 
Working parents could claim Family Income Supplement (FIS) 
- 
a means-tested benefit available to all families in full-time or 
nearly full-time employment with low wages. There were 
problems of low take-up of this benefit, and whilst making an 
important contribution for some lone parents, there were 
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significant difficulties. Importantly, F. I. S. exacerbated the 
poverty trap, with benefits being reduced as wages rose, but tax 
also being paid on earnings, meaning that increases in earnings 
were in effect of little financial advantage (Pascall, 1986, p. 221). 
3.2.5 Calculating and Enforcing Maintenance Liability 
Under Supplementary Benefit Regulations 
The Finer Report published in 1974, looked closely at the levels 
of maintenance available to lone parents. In examining the 
system which had been in operation since 1966, it was obvious 
to the Committee that the Supplementary Benefits system, upon 
which many ]one parents relied, was inadequate. 
The levels of maintenance fixed by magistrates courts were still 
rooted in the matrimonial offence, even though 'irretrievable 
breakdown' had become the basis of all divorce in 1969. There 
were two procedures for fixing amounts of maintenance - one 
through court assessment and one through the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission 
- 
both were based on separate statutory 
principles but with administrative discretion and case law also 
playing a part. It was also found that only about half of all 
maintenance orders made were paid regularly and in full (Finer 
(I), 1974, pp. 10-1 1). 
()-I 
Although women were nearly always better off on benefits than 
on maintenance alone, they were often 'encouraged' bN' 
Supplementary Benefit officials (Liable Relatives Officers) to take 
proceedings against their (ex)husband or the father of their 
children. It has been said that women were put under some 
pressure to do this, although such action was officially denied 
(see Finer (1), 1974, pp. 138-139 and Stevenson, 1973, pp. 137- 
138). It was possible for the Commission to take action on its 
own behalf, but supporting evidence would be required from the 
mother. However, from 1975 it was official policy that the 
Supplementary Benefit Commission would leave the decision to 
seek maintenance to the woman herself (see Heves, 1978, p. 
216). 
Stevenson maintains that Liable Relatives Officers could avoid 
awkward confrontations by accepting statements by the mother 
declaring that the whereabouts (or indeed the identity) of the 
father was unknown, but this was at the Liable Relatives 
Officer's discretion (Stevenson, 1973, p. 138). However, Ogus 8s 
Barendt point out the increased likelihood of pressure being 
brought to bear, considering the increase in numbers of Liable 
Relatives Officers and strenuous attempts being made to control 
()4 
what the Department considered to be an abuse of the system 
(Ogus & Barendt, 1982, p. 51 1). 
The Supplementary Benefits Commission allowed some 
discretion by its officers in the fixing of amounts of 
maintenance. Guidelines were available and a loose formula 
could be applied including allowances for any new family of the 
absent parent. This formula (set out in Finer (1) p. 137) was not 
available to courts and their assessments were made using 
different criteria. Courts could reduce both parties to 
subsistence levels whereas the Supplementary Benefit formula 
allowed the liable relative (the absent parent) to keep some of 
his earnings, leaving him slightly above benefit levels (Finer (I), 
1974, p. 144; Heves, 1978, p. 221; and Ogus & Barendt, 1982, 
pp. 509-510). 
Finer records that a Supplementary Benefits Commission 
enquiry into liable relatives showed that orders were frequently 
not complied with, and this was often due to inability to pay the 
full amount or because the absent father could not be traced. 
Where there was a liable relative, only 16°x, of the maintenance 
of ]one mothers on National Assistance came from them, in 
1965 and again in 1970. Even if maintenance orders had been 
paid regularly and in full, the liability to the taxpayer would 
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only have been reduced by a quarter. The conclusion is 
therefore that the problem is not so much one of unwillingness 
on the part of the absent father to support his first family, as an 
inability to support them due to lack of sufficient income (Finer 
(1), 1974, pp. 100-101). 
Under Supplementary Benefit regulations it was possible to 
make an attachment of earnings order to force the payrnent of 
maintenance. However, these attachments often failed when 
the men moved jobs, or because they had low incomes, and 
often had new families. The Attachment of Earnings Act 
1971 helped enforcement by enabling the movement of orders 
between employers and obliging men to notify the courts of their 
new employer (Finer (1), 1974, pp. 122-123). 
It was the National Assistance Act of 1948 which enabled the 
National Assistance Board to apply to the courts for 
maintenance and affiliation orders against men who neglected 
to maintain their dependants on assistance. In 1965 the Board 
prosecuted 594 men for failing to maintain their dependants. 
244 were sent to prison. The costs of doing this obviously far 
exceeded any contributions gained, but it was considered 
necessary to "bring home to the man his liability 
... 
also to deter 
other would-be offenders" (George, 1968, pp. 230-231). 
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Finer noted, however, that the Payne Committee had recognised 
the "inadequacy" of many debtors, their inability to manage 
their own affairs properly, and therefore the inappropriateness 
of prison sentences for default of maintenance in such cases 
(Finer (1), 1974, p. 127). The Finer Committee agreed with these 
observations and recommended the abolition of imprisonment 
for maintenance defaulters (Finer (1), 1974, p. 128). 
The reality was that in 1965,1970 and 1972, liable relatives 
contributed only about 17`% of the net benefits paid to lone 
parent families, and only one-half of this contribution resulted 
from direct collection by the Commission from the liable relative 
(Finer (1), 1974, p. 148). 
3.2.6 Finer Recommendations 
Throughout the Finer Report, it was clear that most men, even 
when in work, were unable to support two families adequately. 
Whatever the level of maintenance set for the first family, in the 
majority of cases there simply was not enough money to go 
around. Finer concluded: 
"Once it is conceded that the law cannot any longer 
impose a stricter standard of familial conduct and sexual 
morality upon the poor than it demands from others, it 
Q7 
follows inexorably that part of the cost of breakdown of 
marriage, in terms of the increase of households and 
dependencies, must fall on public funds. " 
(Finer (1), 1974, p. 84) 
The question was therefore which family should become a 
charge on the larger community, that is dependent on state 
benefits? This problem had been recognised by the National 
Assistance Board report of 1953. This report stated that it 
would be easier to let the man support his new family than to 
try to extract money for the first family's support, when there 
was clearly insufficient funds for both. It was necessary to 
accept low amounts of maintenance in view of the 
circumstances of both families (Finer (I), 1974, pp. 135-136). 
Finer expanded on this and recommended that the lone parent 
be separated completely from the procedure to recover, which 
under Finer's proposals would be a matter between the 
Commission and the liable relative only. An 'administrative 
order' would be fixed according to the liable relative's 
circumstances and paid directly to the Commission. The 
amount would not exceed the lone mother's entitlement to 
Supplementary Benefit, but below this level some discretion 
would be allowed. The system would be based on a guiding 
formula which would enable uniformity, and the amount 
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retained by the liable relative would usually 'exceed by a fairly 
generous margin' what would be his Supplernenlarv Benefit 
entitlement if he had to claim (Finer (I), 1974, pp. 153-160). 
The wife would be paid in full as if no maintenance was 
claimable, and assessment and enforcement of the liable 
relative's contribution would be regarded as entirely between the 
Commission and the liable relative (Finer (I), 1974, p. 153). This 
would only vary where a woman felt she should be entitled to 
more than Supplementary Benefit levels, in which case she 
would be free to go to court on her own behalf to obtain an 
order for a higher amount (Finer (I), 1974, p. 154). 
The Report recommended the introduction of a new benefit 
- 
the 
Guaranteed Maintenance Allowance (GMA). This would be a 
substitute for maintenance, and maintenance would be 
assessed and collected by a new authority, with any excess paid 
to the mother. Levels would be fixed relative to Supplementary 
Benefit levels, raising lone parents' income above this minimum, 
and would be reviewed regularly. All lone parents would be 
eligible and the scheme would be non-contributory. For those 
taking up employment, there would be an initial disregard and a 
gradual taper so that the allowance would not be totally lost 
until a reasonable salary is earned. Payments would be fixed 
()() 
for three months, enabling some security of income, even if 
cohabitation begins within that time. (See Finer (1), 1974, pp. 
285-333 for details. ) 
Finer described the following advantages of the scheme: 
(a) It would be for all one-parent families, including 
motherless families and widows. 
(b) The benefit would be designed to remove the vast 
majority of one-parent families from the need to 
claim Supplementary Benefit. 
(c) The benefit would be channelled towards children, 
who, the Report concluded, are likely to he deprived 
children. 
(d) The GMA would enable real choice of whether or not 
to work, without the problems of losing 
Supplementary Benefit. 
(e) The GMA would enable simplified contributions 
from absent parents. Calculations would be 
according to a laid-down formula and would be 
predictable, and regularly reviewed. (Finer (I), 
1974, pp. 14-15) 
3.3 Benefits and the Liability to Maintain 1988 
- 
1997 
3.3.1 Income Support and Family Credit 
Benefits available today in the UK continue to 1äl1 into three 
main categories: contributory benefits (e. g. National Insurance 
benefits); non-contributory and non-means-tested benefits 
(such as child benefit); and non-contributory means-tested or 
safety net benefits (such as Income Support and family Credit). 
Contributory schemes still operate largely along the lines 
envisaged by Beveridge. These schemes, based on National 
Insurance contributions and entitlements, inevitably exclude 
many lone parents as they are unable to work the qualifying 
number of hours, or earn the minimum wage at which 
contributions begin. The exception is where the main carer of a 
child can receive `home responsibilities' allowances whereby 
there is a guaranteed basic pension provision for the person 
claiming Child Benefit. Other contributory benefits are not 
available however. 
Some women will find that they do pay National Insurance 
contributions for part of a year, but due to changing pay or 
hours of work, will not pay enough contributions in any one 
year to qualify for benefits. In these cases their contributions 
are effectively wasted. As Pascall puts it: 
"Women have gained more 'independence' as contributors 
than as beneficiaries. " 
(Pascall, 1997 p. 21 1) 
Those ]one parents who have paid contributions may find 
themselves at a disadvantage when they try to claim 
unemployment benefit, as there is a requirement to show 
adequate child care arrangements and to accept a job which 
may not fit well with domestic commitments (see Lister, 1992, p. 
33). Indeed, only 2% of women were recipients of 
unemployment benefit in 1993 (Social Focus on Women, 1995, 
p. 36). 
Lone parents are over-represented at low levels of income: 
whereas over 60`% of married couples have £350 per week or 
over, less than 10% of lone mothers do. In fact, in 1994,47% of 
]one mothers had an income of £] 00 per week or less. The 
situation for lone fathers was not quite so had, with 27%1% of 
them having a gross weekly income of £100 or less, but. of lone 
mothers, 57% of those who are `single' (rather than divorced, 
separated or widowed) have such an income (General Household 
Survey, 1994, p. 18 and p. 32). 
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Other government statistics confirm the relatively low income of 
lone parents. The Family Expenditure Survey states that in 
1993,80% of ]one mothers were in the lower two quintile 
income groups (in Social Focus on Women, 1995, p. 35). (See 
Chapter 2 for a more detailed analysis of statistics relating to 
lone parenthood. ) 
Such low levels of income inevitably mean that a high 
proportion of lone parents, particularly lone mothers, rely on 
non-contributory benefits. Child Benefit and One Parent 
Benefit are available to all lone parents (One Parent Benefit 
being stopped for new claimants from April 1998), and are not 
means-tested. Payment is at a low level but numbers claiming 
these benefits are high: in 1994 there were 6,995,000 people in 
receipt of Child Benefit, at a total cost of £6,130 millions in 
1994/95 (Social Security Statistics, 1995, p. 4&p. 268). The 
number receiving One Parent Benefit rose from 381,000 in 1980 
to 941,000 in 1994, at a total cost of £289 millions in 1994/95 
(Social Security Statistics, 1995, pp. 4& 273). 
Non-contributory, means-tested benefits make up the bulk of 
family income for many lone parents. This consists of either 
Income Support or Family Credit, and for those in the rented 
sector, housing benefit. In 1993, whereas just over one in ten of 
iO 
all women were in receipt of Income Support, seven in ten lone 
mothers were (in Social Focus on Women, 1995, p. 36). 
Government expenditure on these benefits has risen greatly, at 
a much higher rate than total social security benefit 
expenditure: 
Benefits to lone parents 
Total benefit expenditure 
1980/81 1994/95 
£856 m£9,148 m 
£22,658 m £85,221 m 
(Social Security Statistics, 1995, p. 3) 
This calculates out as the proportion of total benefit expenditure 
paid in lone parent benefits rising from 3.77°%x, in 1980/81 to 
10.73%in 1994/95. 
Income Support, which replaced Supplementary Benefit from 
1988, is based on a personal allowance, which differs according 
to age, added to which 'premiums' reflect the specific 
circumstances of the claimant, eg fa. milies, lone parents, 
disabled. There are no additions for special needs over and 
above these `categoric' premiums. 
Those who are unemployed or working part-time can claim 
Income Support, although those with savings over a prescribed 
amount will not be eligible. Part-time work is defined as less 
than 16 hours per week and those earning through enploti'rnent 
have a small disregard before Income Support is reduced. There 
is no compulsion for lone parents to be available for, or seeking, 
employment under Income Support rules at the time of writing. 
However, all income coming into the household will be taken 
into account in full, including any maintenance received and 
Child Benefit and One Parent Benefit. 
For owner-occupiers, some housing costs are included, such as 
an amount for mortgage interest (but not capital repayments). 
For those renting, there is an automatic entitlement to local 
authority Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, which 
covers 100% of the rent and Council Tax less any non- 
dependants' contribution (see Social Security Statistics, 1995, 
pp. 13- l 4). 
Family Credit, which replaced Family Income Supplement in 
1988, is similarly based on personal allowance and premium 
calculation. Anyone earning less than they would be entitled to 
receive under Income Support should be able to supplement 
their income with Family Credit. 
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Initially, it was necessary to work 24 hours per week to claim 
Family Credit, but this was reduced to 16 hours in April 1992. 
For the calculation of Family Credit, up to £40 of childcare costs 
can be allowed in certain cases, and the first £15 of anv 
maintenance received is also ignored, as is Child Benefit and 
One Parent Benefit. [Chapter 17 gives details of the most 
recent changes under the Labour government coming to power 
in May 1997. ] 
Most other types of income are taken into account in full, but 
those allowances that do exist make Family Credit a useful 
benefit for lone parents. One disadvantage for owner--occupiers, 
however, is that the Family Credit scheme does not make 
allowance for mortgage interest payments, although those 
renting may still be eligible for Housing Benefit. Figures show 
that 56% of lone parents are in the rented sector (compared 
with only 19% of other families), and 28% have a mortgage 
(compared with 70%, of other families) (General Household 
Survey, 1994, p. 30). Thus, whilst it may be possible for the 
majority of lone parents to apply for Housing Benefit, 28%0 of 
lone parents will be potentially disadvantaged by the fact that 
the Family Credit calculation excludes mortgage interest. 
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Single payments which were available under the Supplementary 
Benefit scheme were abolished in the 1986 changes. These 
exceptional expenses are at the time of writing covered by the 
Social Fund, usually in the form of loans, repayable by weekly 
deductions from benefits. 
Other changes were also introduced, for example entitlement to 
free school meals was restricted to the children of Income 
Support recipients. This could represent a significant loss for 
lone parents on Family Credit. 
3.3.2 Calculating and Enforcing Maintenance Liability 
under Income Support Regulations and the 
Child Support Act 
Under the Social Security Act of 1986, if the social security 
authorities were paving benefit and the mother did not claim 
maintenance or child support from the absent parent, then the 
authorities were entitled to claim a contribution from him. 
However, a man could not be held responsible for a former wife 
or partner, only the children, unless a court order existed. 
From 1990 the law allowed an additional sum to be added to the 
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father's liability called a 'personal allowance element' (Eekelaar, 
1991, pp. 93-94). 
Following the Child Support Act 1991, lone mothers claiming 
Income Support or Family Credit are obliged to use the Child 
Support Agency unless they can show "good cause" not to, for 
example if the child was conceived as a result of rape or incest. 
Under the Child Support Act, parents who live apart from their 
biological children ('absent parents' under the legislation) 
continue to have a financial responsibility towards their 
children until they reach the age of 16, or up to 19 if in full-time 
education. The amount payable is based on a legislative 
formula, with amounts fixed by regulations. The formula was 
introduced with no discretion, although some subsequent. 
changes have permitted a limited amount of discretion and 
enabled some variation from the formula in exceptional 
circumstances. These changes and the Pressure which brought 
them about are covered in later chapters. 
The formula for calculating child maintenance 
The formula introduced in the Child Support Act has been 
criticised as too complex, and indeed involves a lengthy 
calculation which this thesis will only attempt to cover briefly. 
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[For more detail, see CPAG's "Child Support Handbook" which is 
updated annually. ] 
Forms obviously need to be completed by both parents. The 
first is the Maintenance Application Form (often referred to as 
the MAF) completed by the parent with care. This will be issued 
whenever a new claim for Income Support or Family Credit is 
made by the household in which the parent with care lives, or 
on request of either parent if there is no existing court order for 
child maintenance. 
The MAF asks for details of the children and their father(s) and 
for the parent with care's consent to seek maintenance. 
Withholding consent without valid reasons can result in a 
reduction in the parent with care's personal benefit allowance 
(this is covered in more detail at various points in this thesis). 
If details of the absent parent are known and consent is given 
by the parent with care, he will be sent a Maintenance Enquiry 
Form (MEF) which requests further details of his circumstances, 
and also gives the alleged absent parent an opportunity to 
dispute paternity. Further investigations will follow if paternity 
is denied, including if necessary DNA testing and/or court 
judgement. 
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If only sketchy details of the absent parent are known, and 
consent is given by the parent with care, the Agency has the 
power to make enquiries to trace the alleged absent parent. 
Once evidence of income, housing costs, etc has been obtained 
from both parents (and any new partners), the maintenance 
assessment can be calculated. 
Firstly, the "basic maintenance requirement" is calculated for 
the children concerned. This figure is based on Income Support 
rates, with additions equivalent to family and lone parent 
premiums, if appropriate. Also added in, somewhat 
controversially, is a figure for an adult personal allowance, 
representing the cost of caring for the child. Since February 
1994 this last amount has been reduced as the child gets older. 
Secondly, the "exempt income" is calculated. This is the 
amount that parents can keep for day-to-day living expenses for 
themselves and any of their own children living with them, and 
is again based on Income Support levels, calculated by adding 
together the adult personal allowance, reasonable housing 
costs, disability premium if applicable, and, if any of the 
parent's own children live with him/her, the child's personal 
allowance, family premium, and other premiums if appropriate. 
This calculation applies to both parents. 
Thirdly, "assessable income" is calculated. This is the amount 
which each parent has left after deduction of basic living 
expenses, and from which a contribution towards child 
maintenance can be paid. It is calculated by subtracting 
exempt income from the parent's net income (ignoring the 
income of any partner). Net income is obtained by averaging 
earnings over a period and deducting income tax, National 
Insurance and half of any pension contributions. 
Fourthly, the 'proposed' amount of child support to be paid by 
the absent parent is calculated. This is done by taking 50% of 
both parents' assessable income and comparing this with the 
maintenance requirement calculated first of all. If this figure is 
less than, or equal to, the maintenance requirement, the absent 
parent pays 5094 of his assessable income. If assessable income 
is high enough for the maintenance requirement to be met in 
full, an additional payment may be required, as a percentage of 
the remaining assessable income which varies with the number- 
of children, up to a fixed maximum. 
There is a built-in safeguard for absent parents, in the form of 
"protected level of income". This is the level of income below 
which a parent should not fall as a result of making 
maintenance payments. If the absent parent has a second 
family, everyone in the new family, including step-children, will 
be included in the assessment, which is again based on Income 
Support rates with an additional amount added, thus ensuring 
that no absent parent's family income falls below an amount 
substantially higher than Income Support levels. If disposable 
income would fall below the total protected income as a result of 
paving the proposed child support, the amount payable is 
decreased so that disposable income equals total protected 
income. The calculation to assess whether a family falls below 
the protected level includes looking at any income available 
from a new partner. (This explanation is based on CPAG's 
publications. ) 
To further complicate the formula, allowances have been 
changed and new regulations introduced. Also, the frequency of 
periodic reviews has been reduced from yearly to two-yearly. lt 
is therefore difficult to make a totally accurate calculation of 
what maintenance liability will be set at, and there are many 
factors which can subsequently change the amount 
- 
changes in 
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parents' income, housing costs, other dependants and their 
income, income Support rates, etc., etc. 
Payments by absent parents can be made directly to the parent 
with care, or through the banking clearing system or Post 
Office, or through the Agency-. If enforcement is necessary the 
Agency will seek a voluntary, regular means of collection for 
example through a bank. Failing that, the Agency will impose a 
Deductions from Earnings Order. This order requires an 
employer to make deductions from an employee's wages at 
source, to be paid to the Agency, and was designed to operate in 
a similar way to the Attachment of Earnings Orders set up 
under the Attachment of Earnings Act 1971. 
A Deductions from Earnings Order has two main components: 
- 
the normal deduction rate, ie the amount to be deducted from 
an employee's net earnings in a given period; 
- 
the protected earnings rate, which allows the employee to 
retain a minimum level of net. earnings. 
The calculation of the deduction is so designed that an 
employee cannot fall below his protected level of earnings, 
although if in any one period there is insufficient earnings to 
meet the full demand, the shortfall can be carried over to 
III 
another period and clawed back when possible. Thus, a person 
earning a low wage in any one week cannot avoid his payments 
to the Agency, merely postpone them to a future (late when his 
earnings improve. (Details in DSS leaflet CSA 2002 January 
1993). 
As discussed later in this thesis, the use of Deductions from 
Earnings Orders increased markedly, from 2,600 in 1993-94 to 
32,027 in 1994-95 (Social Security Committee 2nd Report 
1995-96, p. 7). 
lt is possible to appeal against an assessment in various was 
- 
a "second-tier" review can be carried out by another Child 
Support Officer, to check that the calculation has been correctly 
carried out. A new system, whereby a case can be examined by- 
an "Independent Case Examiner" was introduced in December 
1996 and operational from April 1997. Also, an appeal can be 
made to the Independent Appeals Tribunal and ultimately to the 
Ombudsman. 
Effect on other benefits 
For those parents with care remaining on Income Support, anY 
maintenance received is removed pound for pound frone their 
Income Support. As stated above, for those on Family Credit, a 
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small disregard is allowed, and lone parents receiving 
maintenance and working in low-paid employment stand to 
gain, if maintenance payments are reliable. However, there are 
other considerations, for example inadequate allowance for 
childcare costs and restrictions on the type of childcare costs 
included; other costs incurred on taking up paid employ-mew 
such as travel and clothing; loss of Income Support related 
benefits such as free school meals and some NHS treatments; 
and, for owner-occupiers, removal of assistance with mortgage 
interest. It has also been shown that lone mothers lose other 
help from their ex-partners once Agency payments are enforced 
(see for example Clarke, et a1,1996). 
Throughout the Conservative governments of the 1980s and up 
to 1997, expenditure on Family Credit. continued to rise. In 
1980/81, Family Income Supplement amounted to £42 million; 
by 1994/95, Family Credit expenditure totalled £l 
, 
480 million. 
Of the 577,700 families in receipt of Family Credit in October 
1994,239,800 were headed by a female lone parent, and 9,40() 
by a male lone parent. On average, those families headed by a 
female lone parent and claiming this benefit received slightly 
more than male lone parents: 
II5 
male lone parent £44.14 average per week 
female lone parent £52.28 average per week 
all families £49.54 average per week 
(Social Security Statistics, 1995, p. 9) 
Family Credit was seen as 'bridge' from Income Support to 
employment and prior to the introduction of the Agency, the 
number of hours of work necessary to qualify for Family Credit 
was reduced from 24 to 16, with £I S of maintenance 
disregarded for Family Credit, but no maintenance disregard at 
all for Income Support. Pascall argues that reducing the 
number of hours needed to qualify for Family Credit from 24 to 
16 
is then a highly significant change in terms of the benefit 
system: it represents a partial reconstruction of the 
system around women's working lives. " 
(Pascall, 1997, p. 221) 
Combined with the introduction of the Agency, Pascall goes on 
to sav: 
"These changes represent a significant shift in ideology 
about mothers in employment and a significant shift in 
the practice of support for lone parents. We have, for the 
first time, a benefit system designed to encourage mothers 
to enter paid employment, and to fit round women's 
working lives rather than round men's. " 
(Passall, 1997, pp. 221-222) 
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The Labour government elected in May 1997 sought to build on 
that encouragement into paid employment (see Chapter 17). 
3.4 Commentary 
Although the state has a strong vested interest in the stability of 
the family and the welfare of children, there is always an 
underlying fear that too much help will undermine parental 
responsibility and harm work incentives. Although filial 
responsibility now applies to a smaller family circle than under 
the Poor Law, there is still an expectation that family members 
will support each other before recourse to the state. '['his has 
been reinforced over the years, for example in the prosecution 
and jailing of maintenance defaulters whose partners were 
claiming Supplementary Benefit (George, 1973, p. 126). Now, 
the same values are being reinforced through the Child Support 
Agency. 
Nevertheless, benefits have continued to be paid to unsupported 
families and there is still (at the time of writing) no compulsion 
for a parent with care to actively seek employment as long as 
her youngest child is 16 or under. However, a parent with care 
claiming means-tested benefits in this way is compelled to use 
the Agency. The state's support is therefore limited. 
1 ii 
The application of the Child Support Act means that the 
absent parent cannot relinquish his financial responsibilities 
towards his children whilst the parent with care is in receipt of 
benefits. This also means that a parent with care cannot truly 
sever links with the absent parent unless she can become self- 
supporting. 
Also, Income Support and Family Credit are still worked out on 
the income of the household as a whole, including the income of 
a new partner 
- 
thus there is still an expectation that a new 
partner will take on responsibility for the whole family. 
Thus, a parent with care, along with the children in her care, 
can effectively be deemed ÜY the Child Suppo-, t ;o be the 
financial dependants of the absent parent. If, however, the 
parent with care sets up home with a new partner, she will he 
deemed by the Benefits Agency to be the financial responsibility 
of the new partner. For means-tested purposes, the parent with 
care can rarely claim benefits as an individual, but is 
predominantly treated as a parent with care or as a partner. 
This can also mean, where an absent parent is paving a 
substantial amount towards maintenance of his children, there 
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is a consequent over-lapping of financial responsibilities. For 
example, the household in which those children live rnay be 
taken above Income Support levels altogether by the payment of 
maintenance by the absent parent. This can mean that an 
absent parent's contribution is paying towards the household 
income where the parent with care has a new partner. Thus, 
the financial dependence of the children and the parent with 
care on the absent parent can affect the entitlement of the new 
partner to means-tested benefits. 
These issues are covered further in later chapters, wehere it is 
shown howw government ideology, particularly the concept of the 
"traditional" family and the desire to reduce public expenditure, 
have influenced the detail of the formula introduced under the 
Child Support Act. 
This chapter has shown that government support for lone 
parents and their children continued heyond the requirements 
of the Second World War and developed into a package offering 
a level of state dependency not previously witnessed. This life of 
state dependency was always maintained at a level which 
ensured that lone parent families remained amongst the poorest 
in society. The support was, nevertheless, delivered with no 
compulsion for a parent with care to seek employment in the 
11> 
labour market. Suggestions that this basic principle rnav be 
undermined were being discussed with the launch of Labour's 
New Deal programme introduced in 1997. At the time of 
writing, the government were neither confirming nor denying 
that compulsion to seek paid employment to qualify' for benefits 
as a lone parent may be a possibility in the future. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
About this study 
4.1 Introduction 
Early work in the study focused on the administration of the 
Child Support Act, with a view to looking at the administrative 
processes involved at all levels of the Agency and particularly 
those functions carried out at local offices. The study was 
originally proposed in early 1994, when the Agency had been 
operating for less than a year. It was intended to map the 
development of the new system over a one to two year period, 
looking at how the new systems evolved and how IheY compared 
with previous systems. 
A comparative study of two different local offices of the Agency 
was planned, and initial contact with management at local level 
was encouraging. However, the Child Support Agency as a 
whole experienced great difficulties during 1993 and 1994, and 
Kos Hepplewhite, the Chief Executive who had been in post 
I2I 
from the start of the Agency, was replaced in September 1994 
as work on this study began. The new Chief Executive, Ann 
Chant, was not prepared to allow any access to "people from 
outside", a decision confirmed to the researcher in Max' 1995. 
The finality of this decision led to a complete change of direction 
for the study. The administrative processes involved could not 
he studied without access to Agency offices. 
This setback forced a reassessment of the work done so far. 
Two options were then considered. One possibility was to 
examine the causes of the difficulties obviously being 
experienced by the Agency. That there were difficulties was 
evident, but without access to the Agency itself, work on this 
option could again have proved fruitless. 
The second option was therefore developed; the studs was re- 
designed as an investigation of the policv process which led to 
the Child Support Act and its subsequent amendments. The 
work therefore moved from looking at the transition of th(. 
administrative process to become a study of the evolution of 
policy. Such a study could be conducted without the direct co- 
operation of the Agency itself. 
ý? 
Thus, the purpose of the study is to look at how policy has 
evolved in the area of child maintenance. Specifically looking at 
the Child Support Agency and at two White Papers "Children 
Come First" in October 1990, and "Improving Child Support " in 
January 1995 
- 
the study explores the influences on change, 
that is, the factors which may have prompted the formation of 
the Agency in the first place, and what influences may haven 
guided subsequent changes. The study documents what 
pressure was brought to bear on politicians, and by whom, and 
assesses whether such pressure ultimately affected the policies 
introduced. 
Hall et al, 1975 
The work loosely follows the approach taken in I-lall (19 75). In 
that work six different case studies were carried out looking at 
changes in national social policies from the viewpoint of 
Ministers, MPs, civil servants and members of pressure groups. 
The studies were completed h researchers from social policy 
administration backgrounds. 
Hall's work considered the extent of consensus surrounding the 
introduction of policy and looked at whose interests were passed 
over and whose commanded enough power to wrest consent 
from a reluctant government (Hall, 1975, p. 9). Hall also 
i-) ; 
considered the balance between consensus and conflict and 
how the presence or absence of each affects the wa\ in which 
policy is or can be developed (Hall, 1975,1) 13). Looking at 
different groups who sought to influence policy, Hall said: 
"The questions to be asked throughout are where and how 
policies are initiated, brought. to the attention of 
governments, propelled forward to the point of 
commitment, or blocked and quietly buried. " 
(Hall, 1975, p. 86) 
This study begins with an examination of the period leading up 
to the introduction of the Child Support Agency and goes on to 
consider Ministers, MPs, civil servants and a selection of 
voluntary organisations and protest groups. The study links 
with work detailed in Hall by looking at how these various 
bodies sought to influence policy, the arguments put forward 
and the methods of protest adopted. 
Throughout the work, the ideology of the governments in power 
from 1979 to 1997 is illustrated by the fine detail of the 
legislation and regulations connected with the Agency. The 
effectiveness of backbench MPs and their constituents, civil 
servants, voluntary organisations and protest groups in 
influencing change shows (as Hall aimed to do) whose interests 
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were passed over and whose commanded enough power to wrest 
consent from a reluctant government. 
Waine 1995 
The title "Another Disaster Foretold? " is taken from Barbara 
Waine's work on pensions (Waine, 1995). Waine's thesis was 
that the actual effects of the personal pensions policy appear to 
be radically at variance with the underlying ideological 
objectives which exerted a considerable influence over the 
creation of the policy. This work on the Child Support Act and 
the Agency examines the ideology behind the original policy and 
looks at hoer changes subsequently introduced continued to 
reflect the ideological underpinnings. 
The actual practical effects of attempting to deliver the policy 
could be said to be secondarv to the overriding ideologies, with 
the result that the system very quickly began to fail. The 
political debate and the formula used by the Agency are 
examined in some detail and used to illustrate the rising and 
increasingly obvious contradictions between the ideology of the 
government and the aims of the policy and the practical delivery 
of a child maintenance scheme. 
I2 
Chapters 17 and 18 of this work return to the perspectives of 
both Hall and Waine. 
4.2 Data Collection Strategy and Fieldwork 
Qualitative data was collected by participant observation and 
semi-structured interviews. All interviews were fýlce-to-face 
except one which was conducted on the telephone. 
Comprehensive shorthand notes were taken and later 
transcribed. The interviews were supported by extensive 
documentary evidence gathered from a large number of sources. 
Hall detailed four different kinds of groups as `partisans'. These 
were the private citizen, pressure groups, the mass media and 
the political parties. Hall's case studies sought to examine how 
and to what extent these different partisan groups influenced 
government policy (Hall, 1975, p. 86). In this work the groups 
studied are voluntary organisations, protest groups, politicians 
and political parties, and civil servants. 
4.2.1 Interest Groups Studied 
Selection of Groups 
Given the importance of the legislative changes being examined, 
and the far-reaching effects on many people, it would have been 
possible to examine the viewpoint of a number of voluntarvv 
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organisations and pressure groups. Whilst it is recognised that 
other interest groups could have been justifiably included, it 
was felt that a reasonable spread of groups was covered, two 
concerned specifically with the interests of lone parents 
(National Council for One Parent Families and Gingerbread) and 
two more generally interested in benefit claimants and poverty 
(Child Poverty Action Group and the National Association of 
Citizens Advice Bureaux). The history of each of these 
organisations together with their present-day activities is given 
at the start of Chapter 8 to highlight their differing priorities 
and methods. 
For absent parents, one local group was examined. This was 
initially known as Absent Parents Asking for Reasonable 
Treatment, and later changed its name to All Parents Asking for 
Reasonable Treatment (referred to as APART). There were 
many such local groups in existence during 1994 and 1995 (in 
Leicester, Loughborough, Derby, Grantham and other to"wns 
and cities there were apparently similar organisations formed). 
There is no intention to imply that the Nottingham group is in 
any way representative of all such groups. Nottingham was 
chosen for practical purposes. 
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The 'umbrella' national group, the Network Against the Child 
Support Agency (known as NACSA) is also studied. Although 
other attempts were made to bring local groups together, the 
NACSA organisation was the most prominent and sustained. 
Evidence presented to parliament by Families Need Fathers over 
the relevant period was examined to augment the material 
gathered from these absent parent groups. 
It should be noted that evidence was given to parliament by 
representatives of the legal profession, through the Law Society, 
but this has not been included in the study except in a very 
minor wad-. The size of the study precluded coverage of every 
group involved with the relevant legislation. The work was 
therefore mainly restricted to voluntary bodies and protest 
groups representing parents, rather than those representing 
professionals. This decision was taken following preliminary 
work carried out which included both social administration and 
socio-legal perspectives. To have included the legal professions 
would have given the study a social-legal emphasis and 
extended links to legislative changes and debates on mediation, 
divorce, etc. The groups finally selected were seen as more 
relevant for a study of social administration and more closelti, 
linked to the work done by Hall (1975). 
12S 
Contact with groups and collection of evidence 
The National Council for One Parent Families was contacted by 
mail, with two interviews carried out with Head Office personnel 
involved with the Child Support Act and the Child Support 
Agency. Some NCOPF literature was available in the public 
domain, some was collected from government records, and some 
directly from the NCOPF office in London. 
Similarly, Gingerbread, National Association of Citizens' Advice 
Bureaux (NACAB), and the Child Poverty Action Group (CPAG) 
agreed to personal interviews after initial contact by post and 
telephone. Documents obtained on visits to these 
organisations augmented those more readily available. 
interviews with the national pressure groups were semi- 
structured in an attempt to draw out comparative information 
from all groups without stifling recollections of events and 
development of conversation on relevant issues. All these 
interviews were face-to-face except the one with the Child 
Poverty Action Group which was conducted over the telephone. 
Interviews were carried out during the period December 1995 
- 
June 1996. 
121) 
The local protest group, Absent/All Parents Asking for 
Reasonable Treatment (APART) was initially contacted in the 
waiting room of a constituency MP's surgery. Several members 
of the group were waiting to see their MP and a conversation 
was struck up. The purpose of the research was stated and the 
members of APART issued an invitation to attend the group's 
next meeting. 
Meetings at that time were held fortnightly in a private room of a 
public house. They were advertised in the local press and were 
open to anyone wishing to attend. 
At the first meeting attended (in August 1995) the researcher 
was introduced to the committee by one of the members already 
contacted. Subsequently, 5 meetings were attended and a 
separate interview was conducted with a co--founder of the 
group. Relationships with several members were built up with 
many 'phone calls and some other meetings. From this, the 
researcher was able to gather publications of the national 
group, Network Against the Child Support Agency (NACSA), and 
make contact with a leading member and co-founder of that 
group, who was interviewed in May 1996. Continuing 
correspondence was established, main1N- through e. mail. 
IIm 
Families Need Fathers, a group which was already in existence 
when the Child Support Act was introduced, gave evidence to 
Select Committees, including written submissions. These were 
examined and included to further illustrate the feelings of 
absent fathers being presented to parliament. However, FNF 
did not respond to approaches requesting their input into the 
studv. 
4.2.2 Political Debate 
Parliamentary debates and questions were examined using 
Hansard. A system of colour coding was developed to speed the 
location and analysis of points on a particular topic. Select 
Committee Reports, reports of the Parliamentary Commissioner 
for Administration (the Ombudsman) and the National Audit 
Office were also examined. 
As well as hard copy versions of these documents, use was 
made of the computer system available on the Westminster 
network, which details publications, Bills, parliamentary 
questions, etc. Use of this system was kindle made available by 
a local MP. 
1.; 1 
Party headquarters for the three main political parties were 
contacted for manifesto commitments and subsequent part, 
policy statements. 
Sixteen individual MPs, at ministerial and backbench levels, 
were selected and contacted. They were selected on the basis of 
locality or special interest in child support issues. Four MPs did 
not reply at all. Six replied but were unwilling or unable to help 
with the study. Five MPs were subsequently interviewed in 
person, two Conservatives and three Labour, including one at 
ministerial level. A detailed reply was also received from one 
Liberal Democrat with a particular interest in child support. 
Interviews were held at constituency offices during the summer 
of 1995, with MPs given advance notice of the areas for 
discussion. 
Three MPs agreed to allow access to their constituency files 
relating to child support. These were systematically analysed to 
give a broad illustration of the problems being presented to 
constituency MPs, which were catalogued by MPs' staff as 
related to child support or the GSA. This allowed analysis of the 
number of letters received or surgery consultations undertaken, 
the nature of the problems being presented, action suggested or 
taken by MPs, and subsequent outcomes. 
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This work was carried out at the offices of the MPs concerned, 
and no files were removed from those offices. To ensure 
confidentiality and anonymity MPs' staff produced a list of the 
files being accessed, and a code number was allocated to each 
file. The only record of which particular file each code number 
referred to was kept separately by the MPs office. No names or 
addresses of constituents were collected by the researcher. 
When a file needed to be referred to again, the case was referred 
to by number only. 
To assist with the analysis of the data, a simple checklist was 
produced. This was to give an overview of the correspondence 
being dealt with by MPs and was not designed to give detailed 
quantitative data with any statistical purpose. 
In all, 143 constituency case files were examined across the 
three offices. It should be noted that these, by their nature, 
only covered cases where some follow up was considered 
necessary. If, for example, advice was given by office staff over 
the telephone, this would not necessarily have generated a case 
file. Therefore it cannot he said that absolutely all cases coming 
into an MP's office have been studied, although it is likely that 
those coming to the attention of the MP in person will have 
1 ,.; 
generated a file and consequently been examined as part of this 
studv. 
A period of two weeks was spent in the constituency office of a 
backbench MP as an observation placement. This enabled the 
researcher to see how office staff dealt with problems presented 
by constituents, and the extent of the MP's involvement in those 
problems. It also gave an insight into the effects of mailshots 
and other concerted campaigns by pressure groups, and the 
extent to which an MP may or may not be aware of such 
attempts to influence. 
Early in 1997 the researcher was also involved in the analysis of 
99 replies from Labour MPs who had been asked by the then 
Shadow Minister for Social Security to comment on the Child 
Support Act and the Agency. The replies sent in varied from 
short, sharp comments on an overall feeling, to detailed 
explanations of particularly problematic cases encountered. 
The MPs also supplied information on the number of cases dealt 
with by their offices and, in some cases, what changes the-\, 
would like to see. The comments by the MPs were analysed and 
categorised in tabular form. The details of these letters broadly 
confirmed the findings from the three MPs' offices studied in 
depth. 
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4.2.3 The Civil Service 
There is a large amount of literature published on the subject of 
the changing role of the civil service. This was used to produce 
the section on why the Child Support Agency was set up as a 
Next Steps Agency, presented as Chapter 5 following. 
More specific matters relating to the operation of the Agency 
were illustrated in the study of MPs' postbags, and are covered 
in Select Committee evidence and Ombudsman's reports. 
Operational matters were also discussed when the researcher 
attended a meeting between a backbench MP and Ann Chant, 
then Chief Executive of the Agency. This meeting was held in 
the House of Commons in February 1996, with the researcher 
attending as an observer. 
4.2.4 Contemporary Literature 
Publications of various "think tanks" were examined, specifically 
the Institute of Economic Affairs, Demos, the Adam Smith 
Institute, the Institute for Public Policy Research. An interview 
was held with a contributor to the Social Justice Commission 
Report. Much of this data was presented in Chapter 2 above. 
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4.3 Telling the sto 
Chapter 2 above provided statistics relating to contemporary 
lone parenthood, including labour market participation and 
benefit dependency. The chapter gave a brief insight into 
contemporary attitudes towards lone parenthood with examples 
taken from a range of publications and pronouncements. 
Again, it should be noted that this work is from a social policy 
perspective and is not attempting to analyse such works from a 
political science viewpoint. Nor does the work claim any level of 
completeness in this area. The coverage is included for 
illustrative purposes, to give a "taste" of the points of view being 
expressed during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Chapter 3 of the study described the history of the liability to 
maintain in the UK since the Second World War and briefly 
describes the system introduced under the Child Support Act. 
Chapter 5 following looks at the civil service and how the 
evolution of its structure during the 1980s impacted on 
decisions relating to the Agency. This includes details of the 
"Next Steps" policies and the changing structure of the 
Department. of Social Security. The section on the Agency itself 
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briefly examines the initial structure and subsequent changes 
up to 1997. 
Chapter 6 picks up the story of child maintenance from the late 
1980s, looking at the government's dissatisfaction with the 
Liable Relatives Units of the Department of Social Security and 
the evidence presented in Children Come First, the White Paper 
of October 1990. The wav in which changes proposed in that 
White Paper linked to the dominant ideology of the late 1980s is 
briefly introduced. 
Chapter 7 then goes on to examine in more detail the design of 
the child support formula proposed, looking specifically at horn 
aspects of that design supported government ideology, 
particularly in relation to reducing government expenditure and 
promoting "family values". 
Chapter 8 starts by giving some background information on the 
voluntary organisations included in this study. This is foiloWWed 
by detailed examination of each organisation's position towards 
child support policy before the White Paper of October 1990 and 
then their reactions to the specific details of the proposals. 
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Chapter 9 links the government ideology examined in Chapter 7 
with the positions taken by the voluntary organisations 
explained in Chapter 8. This is done by analysing the fine detail 
of the proposed formula for calculating child support and each 
voluntary organisation's reaction to specific elements. 
Chapter 10 details the business plans and targets of the Agency 
and how these evolved between 1993 and 1997. This highlights 
the priorities being set by the government (tor example in 
measuring benefit savings achieved by the Agency and in 
deferring some cases where benefit is not involved) and how the 
Agency attempted to operationalise those priorities. 
Chapter 11 covers the impact of the introduction of the Child 
Support Act and the Agency on parliament. Fieldwork 
involving backbench MPs as well as official government records 
are used to demonstrate the strength of early opposition to the 
realities of the Act. 
Chapter 12 then goes on to examine how the government 
responded to that early opposition, with detailed analysis of 
changes introduced in February 1994 and January 1995. 
Study of the detail of these changes allows analysis of the policy 
i 
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in similar ways to those explored in Hall's (1975) work on other 
social policy initiatives. 
Chapter 13 provides a record of the establishment of protest 
groups specifically set up to fight the Child Support Act and 
the Agency. Details of the methods employed by these groups 
are set out, including modes of protest and attempts to 
influence parliament as well as public opinion. 
Analysis is included of how these groups formulated their ideas. 
Also given, to illustrate the cases seen within the groups, are 
brief case histories of a number of group members, as witnessed 
during fieldwork for this study. 
Chapter 14 covers the period April 1993 to June 1994, with 
analysis of the voluntary organisations' reports of the Agency's 
first year of operation. This includes details of monitoring 
systems set up by each voluntary organisation, reports 
produced and evidence given to the Social Security Select 
Committee in June 1994. 
These details and subsequent changes introduced by 
government can be used to analyse child support policy in a 
similar way to Hall (1975), that is to consider whose interests 
12O 
were passed over and whose commanded enough power to wrest 
consent from a reluctant government. This is done in chapter 
15. 
Chapter 16 looks at the period October l 99 5 until April 1996. 
Analysis of the detail of the Social Security Select Committee 
report published in January 1996 and the evidence given over 
the preceding 4 months is used to show where voluntary 
organisations and protest groups succeeded in influencing the 
Social Security Select Committee and subsequently the 
government response of April 1996, and where they failed. 
Chapter 17 begins by briefly outlining the findings of various 
research papers looking at the actual effects of the child support 
scheme. This is then used to consider Waine's hypothesis, that 
is, whether it seems that the actual effects of the policy are at 
variance with the underlying ideological objectives influencing 
the creation of the policy. 
Chapter 17 then compares manifesto commitments made by the 
three main political parties prior to the General Election of 
1997. The actual policies relating to lone parents and child 
support being introduced by the New Labour government 
coming to power are then analysed to compare the priorities 
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suggested by these policies with those of the previous 
administration. Suggestions for a possible way forward are set 
out in the last part of the thesis. 
The writing up of this work was being completed when the 
future of the Agency was under review. No final decisions had 
been announced on the plans of the New Labour government in 
relation to the Agency. Although it was suggested in the 
Sunday Times of 251" January 1998 that the Agency was to be 
replaced by an entirely new system, no further evidence of this 
emerged by April 1998. This thesis may prove a useful 
historical record of a short-lived and ultimately failed attempt to 
introduce a new child support system. 
Chapter 18 draws together the evidence presented to assess the 
relative influence of the different. groups studied. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Child Support Agency in an evolving Civil Service 
5.1 Introduction 
The first section of this chapter details the broader reforms 
taking place in the civil service. This includes an examination 
of the Next Steps Initiative. The decision to place the Agency 
within the Department of Social Security is considered in 5.3, 
and a more detailed account of the current structure of the 
Agency itself is included in 5.4. 
5 
.2 The Next Steps Agencies - 
Pressure for reform of the 
Civil Service 
The structure of the Child Support Agency reflected the 
Conservative government's desire to fundamen tall yy reform the 
civil service. This section briefly outlines that reform. 
The civil service has seen great changes in recent years. There 
has been a continual shift away from the traditional model of 
the 'Westminster' civil service with its hierarchical, bureaucratic 
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structures, life-long employment, promotions on seniority and 
political impartiality. 
This shift has been variously titled: 
'managerialism' (Pollitt) 
'new public management' (Hood) 
'market based public administration' (Lan & Rosenbloom) 
'entrepreneurial government' (Osborne & Gaebler) 
(see Hughes, 1994, p. 2). 
Under whichever title, the emphasis has been on economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness. The importance of proper 
management has been stressed with effective performance 
appraisal and efficiency measures seen as paramount. The 
influence of market forces has been seen as a major driving 
force, in terms of cost awareness, competition, contracting-out, 
and for personnel appointments. This is a break with the 
tradition of the civil service, which emphasised the use of fixed, 
bureaucratic procedures and life-long employment. 
Taking ideas from the private sector, the move towards 'new 
public management' saw a tendency to concentrate on 'core' 
activities with increased use of privatisation and contracting-out 
to reduce the functions carried out directly by government. 
Ifl 
Contracts are used constantly in the private sector to specify, 
exact obligations and rights between two parties. This is seen 
as effective in clearly defining relationships and accountability, 
with incentives for agents to act in the best interests of the 
principal. Where in the past the traditional model of the civil 
service could be said to lead to 'empire-building' with civil 
servants protecting and building-up their own at-ea not 
necessarily in the public or government interest, contracts could 
be used to ensure that agencies carry out their- activities in a 
way which achieves the outcome defined by government. Fixed 
term contracts of employment and target-related pay acted as 
incentives to perform well according to government criteria. 
There was also a shift towards performance measurement - 
looking at outcomes of government activity as well as inputs. 
Before agencies could be launched there had to be agreement on 
suitable measures of performance, with an emphasis on 
achieving targets. Outcomes were measured where in the past 
the emphasis may have been on the input of resources, not 
what was actually achieved with those resources. 
Agencies were therefore largely mission-driven. Their 
framework documents set out what they were expected to 
achieve and management were given a degree of freedom in how 
144 
they achieved the targets set within the given resources. There 
had been a definite move away from the traditional emphasis on 
rules, regulations and fixed procedures within the civil service. 
New technology had been applied to increase the amount of 
information available. 
The use of market mechanisms in preference to bureaucratic 
procedures can be seen in almost all government agencies. 
Even before an agency could be considered, it had to be 
established that privatisation or contracting-out were not 
possibilities, and use of internal markets was based on a belief 
in the supremacy of market forces. 
In order to effect the desired reform, the Prime Minister's 
Efficiency Unit launched the Next Steps Initiative in 1988. The 
aims of the initiative were to create improvements in 
management in government, to deliver services more efficiently 
and effectively, and to deliver services within available resources 
(Greer, 1994, p. 1). The ultimate aim was to have a small 
central civil service providing policy support to ministers and 
managing departments, with a range of semi-autonomous 
agencies carrying out the executive functions of government. 
The agencies would work within policy and resources 
frameworks set by the ministers of their parent departments in 
]-is 
consultation with the Office of the Minister for the Civil Service 
(later the Office of Public Service and Science) and the Treasury 
(Next Steps Initiative, HC41 Cl, 1988, p. 16). 
Next Steps was also aimed at reducing supply of services 
provided by government which it was felt may have previously 
been increased by civil service bureaucrats protecting and 
building up their own particular empires. This could be 
achieved by separating off the delivery function (Greer, 1994, p. 
16). 
It was noted by the Efficiency Unit that there were very few 
external pressures demanding improvement in the performance 
of civil service work. It was felt that the civil service was too big 
and too diverse to be managed effectively as a single entity, and 
that management at senior level was dominated by people who 
lacked experience of managing or working on service delivery 
even though some 95% of civil servants were thus employed 
(HC410,1988, p. 17). 
The Efficiency Unit's report highlighted five main issues: 
a lack of clear and accountable management 
responsibility; 
the need for greater precision about the results expected 
of people and of organisations; 
1 
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a need to focus attention on outputs as well as inputs; 
the unsuitability of applying uniform systems on an 
organisation of the size and diversity of the civil service; 
a need for sustained pressure for improvement 
(HC410,1988, p. 17) 
Next Steps recommended major structural changes in the civil 
service by creating executive agencies and this was adopted. By 
April 1993,89 agencies had been established, incorporating 
45% of civil servants; by the end of 1995 it was hoped to have 
over 90% of civil servants working in agencies (Greer, 1994, p. 
The basis of Next Steps was contractual relationships. These 
replaced previous reporting and control procedures. An agency 
was given the freedom to run as a'business', but had to deliver 
certain outputs or standards of service within budgeted 
resources. Contracts therefore specified the amount of freedom 
allowed, what money was available, and what ends must be 
achieved. 
Framework documents detailed the aims and objectives of an 
agency, its relations with significant others (Parliament, 
ministers, parent department if any, other departments, other 
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agencies), its financial responsibilities, how its performance was 
to be measured, what personnel responsibilities it had been 
delegated, etc. A yearly business plan was used to set out 
performance indicators and targets to be achieved, whilst future 
development was outlined in a corporate or strategic plan 
(Greer, 1994, pp. 67-68). 
The performance indicators decided upon (and agreed between 
the agency, the department and the Treasurv) could be a 
controversial issue. There could be areas were no measurement 
had been taken in the past, and whole new systems would have 
to be devised and set up. Where no measure had existed before 
it could be very difficult to agree suitable, realistic targets 
(Greer, 1994, pp. 68-74). Targets for amounts of maintenance 
recouped by liable relatives units working within the DSS had 
been put in place just prior to the Agency coming into existence 
and were welcomed by a Public Accounts Committee report 
(DSS: Support for Lone Parent Families, HC429,89-90, p. vi). 
The performance indicators included in the framework 
documents and annual business plans would therefore be 
reviewed in the light of experience, but agencies could 
encounter initial difficulties in meeting targets set. This 
problem arose with the Child Support Agency where the target 
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set for savings in benefit. payments was set unrealistically high, 
was subsequently reviewed, and then dropped altogether as a 
target. How targets evolved for the Agency is examined below, 
in Chapter 10. 
Theoretically, under Next Steps, the existing constitutional 
framework remained unchanged 
- 
ministers of parent 
departments remained accountable to parliament, and would 
determine the policy, objectives, targets and resourcing of 
agencies (HC410,1988, p. 13). However, Greer pointed out that 
Next Steps had introduced two main changes: 
Agency Chief Executives were accounting officers, and 
therefore were directh answerable to parliament for the 
operations of their agencies. Ministers and departments 
should have been concerned with policy issues whilst 
Chief Executives were accountable for operational issues. 
Chief Executives could be called to select committees and 
were responsible for answering parliamentary questions 
relating to operations. MPs' questions being answered by 
Chief Executives had led to claims that ministers were 
abdicating their responsibilities of parliamentary 
accountability. Also, it had been suggested that ministers 
could claim that a matter was operational if they wished 
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to divert it from the floor of the House (Greer, 1994, p. 
89). (See also Ditch, 1993, p. 78. ) 
2. More information was published and available to 
parliament and the public 
- 
framework documents, 
business plans and annual reports for agencies. These 
publications, along with the Citizen's Charter, had led to 
the assertion that external accountability of agencies was 
being shifted from parliament directly to the public or 
users of the service (Greer, 1994, p. 93). 
In contrast to this increase in information, it was possible that 
by changing accounting procedures some information was being 
withheld. Greer held that concern may be only with the final 
result, not with the method of achieving it. This is similar to the 
situation in contracting out and privatisation where there may 
be a reduction in the detail available to parliament. 
Privatisation removed parliament's right of access to a great deal 
of information, and it could be that altered accounting 
procedures used in agencies had a similar effect (Greer, 1994, 
pp. 84-87). 
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5 
.3 The Department of 
Social Security 
Within the Department of Social Security at the time of writing 
there were six agencies: 
The Benefits Agency 
The Contributions Agency 
The Information Technology Services Agency 
The Resettlement Agency 
The Child Support Agency 
The War Pensions Agency. 
This split had been carried out following two internal reports. 
The first, by Eric Caines, concluded that it was necessary to 
separate the computer specialism, not least because of the need 
to employ different types of people for whom existing uniform 
civil service pay and conditions were deemed inappropriate. 
The second study, known as the Hickey Report (set up in July 
1988), looked at benefit payments and the collection of 
contributions. It concluded that full-scale privatisation or 
contracting out would be inappropriate in view of the need for 
political accountability and the highly politically sensitive 
nature of the work, because of the problems of ensuring 
confidentiality of personal information, and because of a lack of 
suitable candidates for the job. lt was felt bti! Hickey, however, 
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that a single agency with a chief executive responsible for 
overall management of service delivery with delegated 
responsibility given to local offices and individual benefit units 
was the most appropriate model for the DSS. The push to 
separate contributions and benefits came from the Permanent 
Secretary at the time, Sir Michael Partridge (Greer, 1994, p. 34). 
The Information Technology Services Agency was launched in 
April 1990. The Benefits Agency and the Contributions Agency 
were both launched in April 1991, and the Child Support 
Agency in April 1993 (Greer, 1994, p. 37). 
5.4 The Child Support Agency 
The Agency's powers were outlined as: 
to collect information on incomes and obligations; 
to make legally binding assessments; 
to determine methods of payment; 
to monitor and where necessary collect maintenance; 
to enforce lapsed payments. 
The aims of the new system were: 
to ensure parents honour their legal and moral 
responsibilities, not taxpayers; 
to recognise a parent's liability for all his children; 
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to produce consistent and predictable results; 
to provide payments which actually related to the cost of 
bringing up a child; 
to allow automatic review of payments; 
to maintain incentives to work for absent parents; 
to enable caring parents to take up paid employment; 
to provide an efficient and effective service to the public; 
to minimise dependence on income support. 
An Act of Parliament created the Child Support Agency. Unlike 
many other agencies, the Child Support Agency was completely 
new, not inheriting organisational structures, personnel ot- 
procedures. Although taking over some work of DSS offices and 
the Benefits Agency, the Child Support Agency was created to go 
beyond the previous remit and to operate according to different 
criteria. 
The Agency initially operated from six regional centres: 
Hastings, Dudley, Belfast, Falkirk, Birkenhead and P1vmouth, 
with a head office in London, later moving to Dudley. At the 
start of operations there were also around 450 Agency field 
offices based in Benefits Agency offices. In 1993 the Agency 
employed almost 5,000 staff, about 3,000 of whom were based 
in the regional centres. By 1996/97 staff numbers had risen to 
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8,500 with 4,300 of those based in regional centres (CSA 2082, 
1996/97, p. 9). 
Systems were originally designed to be mainly postal, with little 
face-to-face contact between users of the service and the remote 
computer centres calculating the level of maintenance. Local 
offices and field officers were to be used for exceptional cases, 
for example where a parent with care was claiming "good cause" 
and seeking exemption or refusing to co-operate. The function 
of local offices has since expanded and information available on 
computer links in local offices has been increased (from April 
1995) to enable them to answer queries from parents more 
effectively. During 1996/97 it was expected that staff in the 
field would begin to complete some maintenance assessments 
locally (CSA Business Plan, 95/96, CSA 2091). 
However, an announcement on 1411, October 1997, published in 
The Guardian, suggested that local offices were to abandon 
routine work of the Agency, with staff losing their. jobs or being 
transferred to the regional centres. Benefits Agency staff were 
to be trained to interview parents with care making benefit 
claims, assisting them with filling in forms for the Agency. This 
represented a major change of direction in the operational 
activity of the Agency. 
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5.5 Summary 
This chapter has set out the changes being seen in the civil 
service generally and how these impacted on the DSS and 
ultimately influenced the structure of the Child Support Agency. 
The following chapter considers evidence of failure within the 
government department responsible for collection of child 
maintenance prior to the setting up of the Agency and the 
failures of the court system in this regard. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Need for Change? 
(The pressure for reform of the maintenance assessment, 
collection and enforcement arrangements) 
6.1 Changes to Liable Relatives Units 
By the late 1980s it was becoming clear that the number of lone 
parents was continuing to increase. It was also evident that 
more and more lone parents, particularly lone mothers, were 
increasingly dependent on benefit, whilst other sources of 
income, from both labour market participation and 
maintenance payments, were declining (see Chapters 2 and 3 of 
this work). 
As early as 1988 there was evidence of growing disquiet 
regarding these figures from within the Conservative party. In 
October 1988 John Moore (then Secretary of State for Social 
Security) made a speech at the Conservative Party Conference in 
which he expressed his fear that state provision for lone parents 
was encouraging the creation of lone parent families: 
o 
"is the knowledge that the state will provide a factor 
in fathers deserting their families? 
... 
What is to be 
done about the nearly half a million fathers who 
pay nothing at all towards the support of their wives 
and children? " 
(Speech by John Moore to 
Conservative Parte Conference, 12110/88) 
John Moore continued this theme in evidence he gave to the 
Social Services Select. Committee in June 1989 when he stated 
his determination to change the system (HC437,88-89, Q. 289). 
By September 1989 this desire for change began to reach local 
DSS offices, where instructions were issued requiring local office 
managers to give priority to liable relatives work. A National 
Audit Office report published the following April (1990) 
confirmed that liable relatives officers had sometimes been 
taken off their own duties to help local offices cope with 
increasing demands from other areas of work. This report also 
confirmed that there was clear evidence of officers directing 
their efforts towards those liable relatives most likely to be able 
to contribute towards their first family, with less emphasis on 
those with no or low earnings and those supporting second 
families (HC328,89-90, p. 24, p. 2 1). 
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Margaret Thatcher's interest in enforcing financial responsibility 
on absent parents was stated in a speech to the National 
Children's Homes George Thomas Society in January 1990. 
Although mainly concentrating on homelessness amongst Young 
people and the problems of child abuse, the need for improved 
financial responsibility from absent parents was stressed. 
"... when one of the parents not only walks away 
from marriage but neither maintains nor shows any, 
interest in the child, an enormous unfair burden is 
placed on the other. Nearly four out of five mothers 
claiming income support received no maintenance 
from the fathers. No father should be able to 
escape from his responsibility and that is why the 
government is looking at was of strengthening the 
system for tracing an absent father and making the 
arrangements for recovering maintenance more 
effective. " 
(Margaret Thatcher in speech to the National 
Children's Homes, 17/ 1 /90) 
By the end of January 1990, Tony Newton, having replaced 
John Moore as Secretary of State for Social Security, confirmed 
in a House of Commons debate that there was an intention to 
improve payment of maintenance, although detailed proposals 
were not available at that stage (Hansard, Vol 166,30/ 1/90, cc. 
196-8). 
In April 1990 Tony Newton, in a speech to the Industrial 
Society, expressed his attraction to a formula-based 
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maintenance system. Obviously plans were being finalised and 
by July 1990 Margaret Thatcher, in a speech to the 300 Group, 
was able to announce that an agency would be set up, and that 
a formula-based administrative system would be put in place 
following a White Paper to be published in the autumn 
(Pankhurst Lecture, 18/7/90). 
Meanwhile, changes were taking place in liable relatives work by 
DSS offices in the number of cases pursued, in the amounts 
sought, and in the methods used to trace absent parents. 
Although there was no connection between receipt of benefit by 
the parent with care and co-operation in identifying the absent 
parent, during the first half of 1990 guidance was sent out to 
local DSS offices confirming that "the normal expectation should 
be that the lone parent will co-operate in establishing where 
responsibility lies and in obtaining maintenance" (Hansard, Vol. 
170,28/3/90, c. 570). 
In April 1990 amounts of maintenance to be recovered from 
absent parents by liable relatives units were increased. The 
calculation used for voluntary agreements, where cases did not 
go to court, was altered to reduce the amount retained by the 
liable relative from 25°iß of net earnings over and above Income 
Support levels plus housing costs, to 15% over and above 
lS') 
Income Support levels plus housing costs (announced in 
Hansard, Vol. 166,30/l/90, cc. 196-8). 
In May 1990 disclosure of information by the Inland Revenue 
for use by liable relatives units was increased to cover addresses 
of absent parents and the names and addresses of their 
employers. Prior to this, only details of National Insurance 
contributions were disclosed. 
Further extensions were made to the powers of liable relatives 
units in October 1990 when changes in social securitv- 
legislation enabled recovery of maintenance for both parent with 
care and child, even where the couple had divorced or indeed 
had never married (S. 8, Social Security Act, 1990). Changes 
in the legislation also extended the ability of liable relatives 
units to transfer court orders obtained by the DSS to the parent 
with care when she came off benefit, and to enable the DSS to 
enforce a court order made to the parent with care, if this was 
not being paid. These changes reduced the need to return to 
court for new orders when the entitlement to benefit of the 
parent with care fluctuated, for example through taking up or 
leaving paid employment. 
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The Public Accounts Committee, reporting in October 1990, 
confirmed many of these points, re-emphasising the need for the 
DSS to ensure that liable relatives units worked effectively. The 
Committee stressed the expectation that the DSS would monitor 
closely the achievement of the new targets which had been set 
for liable relatives work, securing year-on-year increases both in 
the amount of maintenance paid by liable relatives and in the 
number of lone parent families on Income Support receiving 
maintenance (HC429,89-90, p. xii). 
In various government reports, debates and evidence to 
committees, during this period, reference is made to research 
being carried out into the systems for calculating, collecting and 
enforcing maintenance payments, not just those concerning 
liable relatives units, but also court systems and private 
arrangements. The findings of this research were detailed in 
volume 2 of Children Come First and a brief summary, of the 
main findings is given in the following paragraphs. 
Also, it was noted that the Prime Minister had set up a working 
group to consider lone parent maintenance (Maclean, 1994, p. 
151), although it appears that this group did not produce any 
papers available to the public, or to parliament. 
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6.2 Justifying the Child Support Agency? 
Volume Two of Children Come First details the growth in lone 
parent families, the reasons for lone parenthood and the extent 
of employment by lone parents. It then proceeds to explain the 
different routes to obtaining maintenance, ie magistrates' 
courts, High Court and county courts, Scottish courts, 
voluntary arrangements and arrangements through liable 
relatives units of DSS offices. This shows the diversity and 
complexity of the various methods of assessment, enforcement 
and collection as well as the extent of discretion allowed in the 
assessment procedures. 
The report goes on to detail the amounts of maintenance 
received by lone parents, comparing these amounts amongst 
different categories of lone parents, and comparing them with 
the amounts received in benefits or from earnings. The overall 
conclusion was that: 
"The contribution made by maintenance to the 
income of lone parent families therefore remains too 
low. The Bradshaw/ Millar study found that 
maintenance formed less than 10 per cent of lone 
parents' total net income compared with 45 per cent 
for Income Support and 22 per cent for net 
earnings. " 
(Cm 1264, vol 2, p. 12) 
Ih2 
Chapter 2 of volume 2 describes detailed survey work carried 
out in different courts and DSS offices to assess how the 
systems actually worked in practice. There were 4 major 
studies and details are given in Appendix 1. 
6.3 Ideology Rules OK? 
The extent of dissatisfaction with the systems in place in the 
1980s has been shown. It is clear that, from the late 1980s, 
there was a significant desire on the part of the government to 
change the system for collecting maintenance. The following 
paragraphs link that desire to the dominant ideology of the 
time, particularly how attitudes to "family values" and rising 
government expenditure influenced the direction of the changes 
introduced. 
Figures given in Volume Two of Children Corse First (Cm 1264), 
show a rising percentage of families with children being headed 
by a lone parent: 
1961 5.7°%ý 
1971 8.0% 
1981 13.0% 
1987 14.0% (Table 1, Vol 2, page 1) 
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These social changes were taking place despite the fact that the 
party in power since 1979, the Conservatives, promoted itself as 
"the party of the family". 
Coote (1990) maintained that the Conservative Party made three 
main assumptions in its approach to family policy: 
1. There is one true and natural 'family' type (breadwinning 
father, caring, home-based mother and children); other forms of 
family are, by and large, imperfect and problematic. 
2. The family is set against the state; it is the main defence of 
individual freedom against the alleged menace of collectivism. 
3. The family is an important site of social control, in 
particular, paternal control: families without natural fathers are 
seen as the main cause of social problems such as juvenile 
delinquency and crime (Coote, 1990, p. 10). 
Yet the evidence available in the form of divorce and illegitimate 
birth statistics showed social changes taking place apparently 
beyond control of the government. (See, for evidence, Social 
Trends 24,1994, Charts 2.1 and 2.19. ) 
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If basing policies on assumptions as detailed above, of one true 
family form, these developments represented a real threat to 
Conservative foundations. Despite ideological reluctance to 
interfere in private family matters, it could be argued that it was 
necessary to take action to restore the importance of 'famih 
values'. 
Family policies of modern Conservative governments have been, 
in some regards, rather contradictory. On the one hand, there 
was an emphasis on non-interference, for example the Children 
Act 1989, whilst firmly placing children's rights on the agenda, 
advocated a "hands-off' policy wherever possible. This is 
contradicted though by the over-riding by the CSA of voluntary 
agreements between parents. As Smith points out: 
"Parents, it seems, CAN be trusted to reach 
voluntary agreements about the care and 
upbringing of their children, but CANNOT 
necessarily be afforded the same trust to come up 
with responsible arrangements for meeting the 
costs of bringing up the same children. " 
(Smith, 1995, p. 309) 
Smith went on to suggest that the government's concern may in 
fact have been with controlling what it considered 'deviant': 
The link with the government's concern to generate 
additional income is clear. Perhaps, too, this 
approach is underpinned by a belief that parents on 
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benefit are somehow inherently less 'responsible' 
and thus merit a more coercive approach. " 
(Smith, 1995, p. 306) 
"Perhaps maintaining the symbolic distinction 
between the deserving and the undeserving does, 
indeed, remain a critical and defining feature of 
government policy towards the family. " 
(Smith, 1995, p. 309) 
Family policy could also be viewed as part of a broader aim to 
"privatise". Johnson described one of the main aims of 
Conservative social policy as: 
"Privatisation, at its most basic, means a reduction 
in the role of the state and the transfer of some of 
its functions to private institutions.... [these may 
be] informal networks of families, friends and 
neighbours" 
(Johnson, 1990, p. 7) 
The Child Support Act was an example of such "privatisation". 
Financial support was shifted for many lone parents, 
particularly lone mothers, from the state to a former partner. 
However, this could only be achieved by increasing state 
involvement. Johnson's description of general changes between 
1980 and 1990 fitted well: 
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"Thus, we have experienced increased private 
provision, increased private finance and increased 
regulation. " 
(Johnson, 1990, p. 14) 
Policies relating to mothers as workers have been stated to he 
"neutral" (see for example the arguments put forward in Willetts, 
1991, the Centre for Policy Studies "Happy Families"). This 
represented a major dilemma for the Conservative government, 
particularly with regard to lone parents. The idea of one true 
family form with a male breadwinner and a female carer 
prevented all-out pursuance of policies encouraging 
employment amongst mothers. On the one hand the 
government wished to support policies encouraging labour 
market participation. On the other, they did not wish to see 
policies which resulted in children being inadequately cared for 
at home. Unless a government was prepared to ensure full and 
proper provision of adequate and affordable childcare for all 
ages of children, it could not be seen to over-emphasise the 
need for mothers to work in the labour market. Thus, 
unsatisfactory though the level of income may have been, the 
entitlement to benefit for lone parents with a child under 16 
years of age continued without a compulsion to seek paid 
employment. There was, however, in most circumstances, a 
compulsion to seek support from the absent parent. 
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Meanwhile, given the government's commitment to the one 
"true" family form, there was a reluctance to offer help to lone 
parent families which could not also be offered to two-parent 
families. It could be argued that such help would have 
"encouraged" lone parenthood. 
The White Paper, Children Come First, clearly stated its aim to 
help lone parents join the labour market. This was a major 
shift in thinking when compared with arguments put forward in 
the 1950s and 1960s about maternal deprivation and the 
importance of "a mother's love" (see Bowlby, 1953). Alongside 
the maintenance changes were adjustments to Family Credit 
regulations designed to encourage labour market participation, 
particularly in part time employment. These were detailed in 
chapter 3 above and included the introduction of a £l5 
disregard for maintenance for families on FC, Housing Benefit 
and Community Charge Benefit, and a reduction in qualifying 
hours for FC for all parents from 24 hours or more of work to 16 
hours or more of work per week. 
Pressure to increase maintenance payments and employment of 
]one parents came too from the rising costs to the Treasury of 
supporting the increasing number of lone parents on benefit. In 
1980 there were 330,000 lone parent families dependent on 
dos 
Supplementary Benefit. By 1989 the number of lone parent 
families dependent on Income Support had risen to 770,000. 
Less than a quarter of lone parent families on Income Support 
were receiving maintenance in 1989 (Cm 1264, vol 2, p. i). 
Between 1981 /2 and 1988/9 real expenditure on income- 
related benefits for lone parents rose from £1.4 billion to £3.2 
billion (Cm 1264, vol. 1, p. 3). Given the strong commitment of 
successive Conservative governments to reducing direct taxation 
and government expenditure, this sustained increase in 
dependency represented an intolerable burden. Linked to the 
assumptions of family responsibility (particularly financial 
responsibility), this burden on the taxpayer was clearly 
ideologically unacceptable. To enforce the payment of 
maintenance by absent parents was seen as a way of controlling 
the costs to the Treasury of lone parenthood, whilst at the same 
time emphasising the importance of family responsibility, 
Provision of welfare had shifted from the "rights" envisaged by 
Beveridge to more "targeted" benefits and increased use of 
means testing. 
Along with means testing had come a return of stigma attaching 
to benefit claimants, which had been exacerbated by a 
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government emphasis on fraud. Such policies had developed 
the image of benefit dependants as scroungers, cheats and a 
drain on taxpayers. The government, in its creation of the 
Agency, was explicit in its desire to reduce the "burden" of lone 
parents on taxpayers, placing responsibility for their welfare 
firmly in the hands of absent parents. As will be discussed later 
in this chapter, such thinking could also be said to lay behind 
decisions relating to the formula to be applied by the Agency. 
The extent of means testing, low level of benefits and re- 
introduction of stigma for benefit claimants represented a 
change of direction to government action regarding lone 
parents. As Maclean stated: 
"The economic problems of one parent families in 
the UK had, throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, 
been discussed in terms of improving public 
provision 
... 
children in one parent families were 
seen as a special case of children for whom extra 
provision should be made. " 
(Maclean, 1994, p. 148) 
lt should be noted, however, that more "targeting" and means 
testing inevitably resulted in more paperwork 
- 
checking of 
detailed information such as income, housing costs, savings, etc 
of all members of a household was essential if benefits were to 
be restricted to those able to demonstrate "need". This again 
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represented a contradiction with the Conservative aim to reduce 
state involvement. A large bureaucracy was created where 
perhaps universal non-means tested benefits could have been 
paid using a much reduced administration. Thus, the ideologvv 
of reducing state dependence and increasing means testing was 
to some extent countered by the subsequent increase in 
administration. This was, however, dealt with by other 
Conservative policies 
- 
to contract out where possible and to 
create semi-autonomous agencies to deliver state benefits using 
"business" principles as detailed in the previous chapter. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the failings of the system for 
maintenance assessment, collection and enforcement in place 
through the 1980s. These failings were used by the government 
to justify the introduction of the Agency. 
The ideology of the Conservative governments with regard to 
lone parenthood is examined briefly. The following chapter will 
show how this impacted on debates regarding policy and the 
details of the formula being considered. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Designing a Child Support Formula to Support 
Government Ideology 
Details of the formula used by the Agency were briefly described 
in Chapter 3 of this work. The White Paper "Children Come 
First" issued in October 1990 gave the outline of the formula 
which was then debated in more detail during the passage of 
the Child Support Bill through parliament, and the Child 
Support Agency became fully operational in April 1993. The 
following paragraphs look at some of the detail of the formula 
and at the issues debated in parliament during this period. 
7.1 Reducing Government Expenditure 
7.1.1 Putting the Treasury First 
Although the White Paper's title was "Children Come First", it 
has been argued that, in fact, the Treasury stood to be the main 
beneficiary of the new maintenance arrangements, with savings 
to the taxpayer of paramount importance. Indeed, the White 
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Paper was unambiguous in its desire to reduce the dependence 
of lone parent families on Income Support, whilst: clearly 
pointing out 
"parents must honour their legal and moral 
responsibilities to maintain their own children 
... 
it 
is not right that taxpayers, who include other 
families, should shoulder that responsibility instead 
of parents who are able to do it themselves. " (Cm 1264, Vol 1, p. 5) 
7.1.2 The Benefit Penalty 
In order to ensure this financial responsibility of parents, it was 
decided that all those lone parents seeking means tested state 
benefits should be obliged to co-operate with the Child Support 
Agency. This was because. 
"If the caring parent and the children are receiving 
IS or FC, then the taxpayer has an interest. If 
maintenance is not paid, taxpayers, which include 
other families, have to finance the social security 
benefits which are a substitute for that 
maintenance. " 
(Cm 1264, Vol 1,1). 38) 
Others, not claiming benefits, could continue to make voluntarv 
arrangements or to have no maintenance arrangements at all. 
It could be argued, therefore, that it was not children who came 
first, but other taxpayers, through the Treasury. 
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Although acknowledging that most mothers co-operated with 
liable relatives units in the past (75`ßo according to Tony Newton, 
HC277-II, 90-91, p. 1), in naming the father of their children, 
government decreed it necessary to build this co-operation into 
the formula. (It should also be noted that "naming the father" 
actually referred to co-operating in establishing and obtaining 
maintenance 
-a wider definition - see HC277-I1,90-91, p. xix. ) 
It was therefore decided that any parent with care failing to 
name the father of her child, or failing to co-operate with the 
agency, could face a benefit reduction. Exemptions were 
discussed briefly in the White Paper, with cases of rape and 
incest given as examples (Vol 1, p. 39). Parliament expressed 
great concern over proper questioning of parents with care 
seeking exemptions and how guidelines might be drawn up and 
subsequently implemented to define "good cause" (eg. Hansard 
vol 181,19/11/90, col 4; vol 187,4/3/91, col 78; vol 192, 
4/6/91, col 198; vol 192,4/6/91, col 207; vol 222,1/4/93, 
cols 714-718). 
Both the "benefit penalty" and "good cause" were discussed at 
some length in parliament during the passage of the Bill. 't'here 
were calls for the use of a positive incentive for those on Income 
Support to co-operate in the form of a maintenance disregard, 
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but this was rejected on the grounds that it would exacerbate 
the benefits trap, increasing the amount a parent with care 
would need to earn to replace state benefits (see for example, 
HC277-II, 90-91, p. xii and Hansard vol 192,4/6/91, cols 209, 
217,220; vol 212,19/ 10/92, col 170; vol 215,30/ 11 /92, col 
5). 
Again, it could be argued that imposing a benefit penalty on a 
lone parent, inevitably reducing the income of the household as 
a whole, could never be said to put children first (Hansard, vol 
192,4/6/91, cols 209,220,222; vol 195,18/7/91, cols 568-9; 
vol 210,30/6/92, cols 766-767; vol 222,1/4/93, col 713). 
7.1.3 Encouraging Paid Employment 
Tied in with Treasure desires to reduce Income Support 
dependency were changes in the regulations for claiming Family 
Credit detailed earlier. These were aimed at encouraging more 
lone parents to take up paid employment, along with a 
maintenance disregard for Family Credit, which enabled 
working parents with care to see a clear advantage from 
receiving maintenance. Nevertheless, the government continued 
to support the choice of a parent with care to stay outside the 
paid labour force (Tony Newton defended this, for example, in 
HC277-11,90-91, p. 4). This choice was, however, becoming 
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inextricably linked to the requirement to become dependent on 
the absent parent rather than the state. 
For the absent parent, the desire to keep government 
expenditure as low as possible led to a glaring inequity for some. 
Those absent parents who were themselves earning a low wage 
and were eligible to claim Family Credit, found that any 
maintenance they had to pay out to their first family was not 
taken into account. in calculating their own entitlement to 
Family Credit. This could lead to a situation where two similar 
families, on low wages topped up by Family Credit, actually had 
a very different disposable income. 
Although the "protected level" regulations should have ensured 
that the absent parent's current household did not. go down to 
Income Support levels, there could still be a disincentive to work 
for the absent parent where Family Credit does not take into 
account maintenance payments he made, as well as other 
disadvantages such as loss of passported benefits for the family 
and loss of mortgage interest payments. Income Support took 
into account interest on mortgage (lebt whereas Family Credit 
did not. This could be a disincentive for either the absent 
parent or the parent with care to seek paid employment if they 
are owner-occupiers rather than tenants. Therefore, the 
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government desire to keep Family Credit. payments low could 
have the effect of pushing people back on to Income Support, 
which in terms of cost to government was likely to he counter- 
productive. 
7.2 Family Values 
When examining the government's ideological stand, a desire to 
stress "family values" and "privatisation" was shown. The 
approach to the benefit penalty and enforced co-operation for 
benefit claimants illustrated the government's use of the 
formula to emphasise family responsibility, at. least in financial 
terms. Forcing parent with care households to become 
dependent on the absent parent was stressing filial 
responsibility and privatising the family, rather than necessarily 
acting in the best interests of children, or seeking to meet their 
needs effectively. 
Encouraging self-reliance or dependency on an ex-partner also 
served the government desire to reduce its own expenditure 
whilst encouraging participation in the labour market.. The 
introduction of a benefit penalty for Income Support claimants 
who were parents with care and failed to co-operate with the 
Agency, but a maintenance disregard for those parents with 
care who worked and claimed Family Credit, is a useful example 
177 
to illustrate how government ideology can be translated into 
policy and regulation. 
7.2.1 Shifting the emphasis from "second" to "first" 
families 
Also illustrating the government. support of the "traditional" 
family was the shifting of emphasis from absent parent support 
of his current household to that of his "first" family. (NB. See 
definition of the terms "first" and "second" family at the start of 
the thesis. ) 
A protected level of income, it was argued, would have ensured 
second families did not go below Income Support levels by 
supporting first families. This represented a change of direction 
over previous thinking. Court decisions and those of liable 
relatives units had seen it as practical to allow absent parents 
to support second families primarily and first families only 
where income of the absent parent allowed. The formula 
introduced for use by the Agency deliberately set out to 
"equalise" treatment of "natural" children in both families. in 
cases where an absent parent had a new partner making a 
contribution to the household income of the second family, the 
total income of the absent parent household could effectively 
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mean extra support for the first family (see Hansard, vol 210, 
30/6/92, cols 768-9). 
Support of the "traditional" family and the desire to minimise 
government expenditure, also led to the decision that step 
children would not be included in the essential expenses of an 
absent parent. Step children remained the responsibility of 
their "natural" parents and should have sought maintenance 
from their own absent parent first. Interestingly, any 
maintenance (or other income) received by step children could 
be included as income for the household as a whole, perhaps 
keeping the second family above the protected level of income. 
Similarly, new partners' housing costs could not be included as 
exempt income, but any income received from them into the 
household could be seen as available to the household as a 
whole for the sake of "protected income". In this respect 
government ideology of responsibility for one's "natural" family 
was tempered by a desire to assess a household rather than an 
individual for means testing purposes and to minimise 
government expenditure. Whilst stressing the need to treat all 
of an absent parent's biological children equally, step children 
were not considered the absent parent's responsibility in quite 
the same way. 
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722 Property. Settlements / Clean Breaks 
Another example of the government's attempts to re-emphasise 
"family values", particularly relating to first families, came in the 
attitude to property settlements. In the past it was considered 
reasonable to "trade" during divorce or separation negotiations, 
with equity in the family home often being passed to the parent 
with care in exchange for lower or nominal child maintenance 
as well as removal of spousal maintenance. Courts sanctioned 
this as part of the "clean break" strategy. 
It was never intended that absent parents should have "clean 
breaks" from their children, but financial arrangements and 
living arrangements could be inter-twined to produce a 
satisfactory outcome for both partners and the children, but 
often resulting in on-going financial dependence of the parent 
with care on the state for regular income. Such property 
settlements, whilst often seen as sensible and workable and in 
the best interests of the children involved, clearly went against 
government ideology which required on-going support. by both 
parents, with no facility for parents to walk away from the 
financial responsibility of children. However, Children Come 
First did acknowledge that it may be sensible to take previous 
property settlements into account (Cm 1264, Vol 1, p. 30) and 
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this was discussed in parliament (eg Hansard, vol 192,4/6/91, 
cols 216-217,236,245; vol 222,1/4/93, col 719). 
The Social Security Select Committee were so concerned about 
this aspect of the formula that they produced a separate report 
recommending proper consideration should be given to divorce 
settlements involving capital settlements made in lieu of child 
maintenance (HC277-I, 90-91). 
Despite mention of this in the White Paper, the government 
were unconvinced by the continued argument and remained of 
the opinion that the housing costs element of the formula was 
sufficient to reflect the resulting circumstances following such a 
settlement. Emphasising continuing support as well as 
maximising maintenance payments (and therefore minimising 
state income support for the parent with care) could be said to 
have been the driving forces. It is difficult to argue that the best 
outcome for children was the major factor behind this 
contentious element of the formula, as it seems fair to presume 
that future divorce arrangements are much less likely to allow 
children to remain in the family home. 
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7.2.3 Contribution by absent parents on Income 
Support 
Stressing continuing parental support was also behind the 
decision to make absent parents who were themselves 
dependent on income Support contribute a minimum amount to 
their children. Whilst acknowledging the amount was small, 
government, in the White Paper, emphasised the need to uphold 
the principle of responsibility (Vol 1, p. 23). A small amount 
would not help children, nor would it represent any substantial 
saving for the Treasury, but it could be seen as supporting the 
principle of family responsibility not being transferable. The 
government argued it would enable more effective reviews of 
changes in circumstances in the future (Vol 1, p. 23), stressing 
the importance of liability being established (see also Hansard, 
vol 210,22/6/92, col 85; vol 210,30/6/92, cols 762-3). 
In the past, liable relatives units faced with high workloads and 
limited resources, may well have seen it as cost-effective to 
"shelve" a similar case. The government was clearly saving that 
this was not a satisfactory state of affairs. It should be noted, 
too, that a high proportion of absent parents were on a relatively 
low income, so such small claims for maintenance could have 
been quite common. The government obviously felt the 
principle was one worth emphasising. (But see later references 
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to the Agency targeting those absent parents who were already 
established payers in order to meet its targets. ) 
7.2.4 Access 
The issue of access to children was also debated during the 
passage of the Bill. In this respect, it was felt that the courts 
were the most suitable place to deal with disputes and that 
there should be no link between payment of maintenance and 
access. Members of Parliament expressed concern that parents 
with care may feel obliged to agree to renewed contact between 
the absent parent and the child because of the financial 
commitment being enforced by the Agency. Some felt this was a 
good thing 
- 
for example Frank Field speaking in June 1991 
stated that by removing maintenance from the argument, it may' 
be easier for parents to agree access and that contact with both 
parents was in the best interests of the child (Hansard, vol. 192, 
4/6/91. col. 218). Others felt fathers would pursue contact fier 
the wrong reasons, because they felt it was their right if they 
were being obliged to pay (vol. 192,4/6/91, cols. 212-213). 
Concern was also expressed that enforcing payment of 
maintenance could jeopardise existing contact arrangements, 
for example where care is shared between the parents rather 
than having payment of maintenance. The Agency would 
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overturn such agreements by enforcing formal payment to the 
parent with care (see vol. 192,4/6/91, col. 236 and vol. 195, 
18/7/91, col. 556). This may not be in the child's best interests 
and could create animosity where previous arrangements were 
amicable and settled. 
From the absent parent's point of view, it was also argued that 
whilst maintenance was pursued with rigour, he would not be 
able to insist on his rights to access so effectively or with the 
same backing (vol. 210,30/6/92, col. 770). Government 
concern at family responsibility nevertheless remained at a 
financial level only. Disputes over access were to remain the 
province of the courts. 
7.3 Summary 
This chapter has shown that details of the formula were 
designed with government ideology in mind. 
In summary, the desire to reduce government expenditure was 
seen in policies: 
to encourage take-up of employment by parents with care; 
with an emphasis on benefit claimants; 
which enforced the co-operation of parents with care, and 
imposed the benefit penalty; 
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designed wherever possible to remove the parent with care 
household from benefits, including the loss of important 
passported benefits. 
The desire to promote "family values" was seen in policies: 
emphasising financial support of "natural" children; 
leading to second families supporting first families; 
emphasising financial responsibilities over other parental 
responsibilities; 
enforcing minimum payments by poor absent parents. 
In spite of the title of the White Paper, Children Come First, 
many of these details of policy were potentially harmful to 
children, for example: 
"A benefit penalty imposed on a parent with care would 
inevitably harm the child/ren too. 
" Loss of "extras" or treats from absent parents forced to pay 
directly to the Agency. 
" Loss of passported benefits if removed from Income Support, 
with free schools meals particularly important for children 
from poor homes. 
" Lack of allowance in the formula for an absent parent to fully 
support his step children. 
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" The potential loss of the marital home for the parent with 
care and therefore the child/ren. 
" Lack of recognition of shared care arrangements. 
" Possible reduced contact with an absent parent because of 
the expense of access. 
" Possible renewed contact with an absent parent where this 
may be damaging for the child. 
These issues are examined further in the next chapter, when 
voluntary organisations' reactions to Children Come First are 
looked at in detail. This brief exploration has been to show how 
government ideology can dictate the fine detail of policy, even in 
the face of strong opposition within parliament. Support for the 
over-riding principle, that parents should continue support of 
their children even when they live apart, was not disputed. 
However, the fine detail of the formula introduced to enforce 
that responsibility was the subject of a great deal of debate. 
Nevertheless, few changes were made to the original government 
plans. By gaining support for the general principle, the 
government managed to pass through legislation which 
conformed to its ideology in many ways. Conservative 
backbenchers, as well as opposition parties, argued about the 
detail, but found it impossible to dispute the principle 
supposedly behind the Child Support Act. 
180 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
Early Warnings 
8.1 Introduction 
The chapter begins with details of the outside bodies included in 
this chapter, covering briefly each organisation's remit, history, 
funding, structure and constitution. The protest groups formed 
after the Agency came into being are described in Chapter 13. 
8.3 looks at whether these organisations consider the Child 
Support Agency to be an appropriate solution to the poverty 
being suffered by many lone parents. Alternative strategies put 
forward by these organisations are considered. This part deals 
with the idea of an agency as appropriate or not, whilst specific 
points relating to the formula are covered later. 
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8.2 The Voluntary Organisations examined in the Study 
8.2.1 National Council for One Parent Families 
The National Council for One Parent Families (NCOPF) was 
formerly known as the National Council for the Unmarried 
Mother and her Child (NCUMC) founded in 1918 to help lone 
mothers find employment and also to keep mothers and babies 
together after the birth. The NCUMC was established as a, 
result of a gathering together of a number of voluntary 
organisations concerned with "rescue work with fallen women" 
and with providing homes. It was set up with two simple aims: 
"1 To obtain reform of the existing Bastardy Acts and 
Affiliation Orders Acts. 
2 To secure the provision of adequate accommodation to 
meet the varying needs of mothers and babies throughout 
the country; such provision to include Hostels with Day 
Nurseries attached where the mother can live with her 
child for at least two years, whilst continuing with her 
ordinary work. " 
(Macaskill, 1993, p. 9) 
Changing public attitudes was high on the agenda, with the 
NCUMC calling for realism as well as humanity. It continued to 
fight for support for lone mothers, and to provide help where 
possible, for example through its employment agency and 
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through small grants. It also fought for changes in the law with 
regard to affiliation orders, legitimacy and adoption. 
The need for recognition of the role of fathers was a major 
concern from the beginning and this proved particularly 
problematic following the 1939-45 war when the birth rare 
soared and men were moved away from home. 
Campaigning continued through Beveridge and Finer, with 
particular emphasis on affiliation orders, housing and 
employment. 
The NCUMC changed its name in 1973 (to NCOPF) to show that. 
it was concerned with all lone parents, whether unmarried, 
divorced, separated or widowed. That year it. stated its befiel', 
regarding lone parents: 
"that social policy should be geared by positive 
discrimination in their favour, to compensate them for 
their disadvantages" 
(Macaskill, 1993, p. 34) 
Whilst still pushing for child support from fathers (indeed 
extending what it saw as the role of fathers beyond the merely 
financial) by the 1970s the NCUMC saw an increasing need for 
state help. 
Ký) 
However, by the late 1980s, the NCOPF were on the defensive. 
Faced with comments continually being made by politicians that 
lone parents were deliberately becoming pregnant in order to get 
state help, the NCOPF commissioned research which 
subsequently found no evidence to support such claims. The 
NCOPF defended lone parents' rights to benefits, but at the 
same time sought to end the marginalisation of lone parents 
and to enable their participation in the "mainstream". 
Access to the labour market became more important as benefits 
were eroded through the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the 
NCOPF became more involved in training programmes helping 
mothers to return to work. In 1991 they secured a government 
grant to fund the Return to Work Initiative and courses went 
nationwide. 
The NCOPF continued its battles with successive governments 
over tax relief for childcare costs, provision of childcare, and 
regulations relating to the Agency, as well as benefits for lone 
parents. 
Other work carried out included preparing publications to 
provide information to lone parents and the professionals who 
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work with them. They have been heavily involved with Agency 
work, campaigning for change with practical proposals for 
improving the service and attempting to get the voice of lone 
parents heard. 
Funding was from government grants, donations from trusts 
and companies, statutory bodies and individuals. Overheads 
were kept low by the use of volunteers. 
Lobbying and media work at the time of the introd uctiorn of the 
Agency was restricted by the size of the organisation. Staff 
could not dedicate enough time to Agency issues and were 
continually frustrated with the attitudes of the press, 
particularly once the absent parent lobbyists became organised. 
In contrast to the absent parent lobby, the NCOPF föund that 
few lone parents with care were prepared to put their own case 
forward, aware of the damage that could he done to their 
children and themselves. 
To gauge the opinions of the lone parents the NCOPF 
represented, research was carried out in the form of 
questionnaires to members and note was taken of opinions 
expressed at the AGM and workshops, as well as monitoring of 
the advice being sought by lone parents. However, there was nc) 
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direct link between lone parents and the policies put forward by 
the NCOPF. Links were indirect, with staff at the NCOPi and 
particularly the director putting forward ideas to an elected 
Committee of Management on what policy should be. Whilst 
members (at the time of writing around 600 in number) could 
influence policy, they did not vote on it. Nor was there any 
attempt to gauge whether those contacting the NCOPF were in 
any way representative of lone parents as a whole. However, an 
Agency monitoring project was set up which recorded problems 
being presented by those contacting the NCOPF, which 
produced information subsequently used in lobbying for change. 
8.2.2 Child Poverty Action Group 
The CPAG was set up in 1965. It grew from discussions among 
Quakers who were concerned about the extent of poverty 
amongst children. It was initially set up with the expectation 
that the campaign for improvement would be a short one, but 
by 1969 it had appointed its first director after which further 
expansion continued. 
At the time of writing CPAG were providing training courses on 
welfare rights, running a Citizens' Rights Office, and producing 
a number of publications every year. 
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CPAG were active in discussions on poverty, equality, parenting 
and related issues, attending All Party Parliamentary Group 
meetings and Party Conferences of the major political parties. 
On child support issues, the CPAG set up a monitoring scheme 
and provided information from this for journalists, MPs and 
Peers. As well as policy, lobbying and campaigning work, the 
CPAG also helped advisers to accurately inform their clients. 
CPAG also maintained contact with the Agency itself. 
Local CPAG branches campaigned on specific issues, and have 
been active on child support issues. Meanwhile, the Citizens' 
Right Office offered advice, support and advocacy for 
professionals and volunteers working in the field of welfare 
rights. The CPAG also produced an annually updated Welfare 
Benefits Handbook and Rights Guide and a Child Support 
Handbook. The organisation also supported test cases where it 
felt this was necessary and maintained links with the legal 
profession. 
Finance for the CPAG came mainly from membership 
subscriptions, grants, donations, sales of books, and payment 
for courses. Membership at the time of writing was around 
5,000. 
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In order to lobby MPs, CPAG worked on raising issues and 
educating MPs. It provided briefing documents and drafted 
suggested amendments to bills. The CPAG was a recognised 
outside body which was respected by MPs who trusted its 
competence. CPAG also engaged in grassroots lobbying, with 
involvement in conference debates and fringe meetings, and 
links with research departments of the major political parties. 
At the time of writing there were around 25 people on the staff 
of the head office of the CPAG, half working on welfare rights 
and publications and the other half working on the campaigning 
side. There was an Executive Committee, one-third of whore 
were elected by the membership, one-third elected by local 
branches, and one-third co-opted to ensure a balanced mix of 
people. The Executive Committee laid down broad principles for 
the organisation, and was largely informed by the staff. Staff 
got feedback from the welfare rights team and monitoring 
programmes. This feedback was not systematic research, but 
gave an indication of the problems being presented. 
8.2.3 National Association of Citizens' Advice Bureaux 
The Citizens' Advice Bureau service was founded in 1939 and 
provided free, confidential and impartial advice. Over the Fears 
it has used evidence gathered from client problems to suggest 
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where improvements could be made to local and national social 
policy and services. In 1996 there were 721 main bureaux with 
another 1006 outlets linked to them. The National Association 
offered support from a central office, a divisional office in 
London, area offices in England and Wales and the Northern 
Ireland Association of CABx. 
At the time of writing, there were 27,000 people involved in the 
CAB service, 90%, of whom were volunteers. Funding was 
primarily from local authority grants, although NACAB also 
received a grant from the Department of Trade and Industry. 
Other sources of income include donations from the private 
sector and charitable trusts, as well as some funding from 
public sector bodies such as health authorities. 
The number of clients visiting CABx in 1994/95 was 5.388 
million. This was the number actually seen and there was 
acknowledged to be a number of people who could not wait the 
length of time necessary to get help, or who could not get 
through on the 'phone. Statistics were gathered on the nature 
of the clients' problem, the largest category being social security 
issues. 1,845,615 social security problems were dealt with l)v 
CABx in 1994/95.79,067 of these were classified as child 
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support issues and evidence from these cases was used in 
drawing up suggestions for improvements to policy or delivery, 
The main aims of the CAB service were: 
to ensure that individuals do not suffer through lack of 
knowledge of their rights and responsibilities or of the 
services available to them, or through an inability to 
express their needs effectively, 
and equally 
- 
to exercise a responsible influence on the development of 
social policies and services, both locally and nationally" 
(NACAB, 1995) 
The policy of NACAB was decided by the staff in consultation 
with the Chief Executive, and was based on evidence collected 
from the experiences of clients. Local offices completed forms 
when they felt a particular case was of interest or importance 
and, from these, statistics were gathered and it was possible for 
head office to gauge the size of a problem and the types of 
problems being seen most commonly. This was all carefully' 
collated, catalogued and stored, and fed into the decision- 
making process of the national organisation. 
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8.2.4 Gingerbread 
Gingerbread was formed in 1970 by a lone parent experiencing 
housing difficulties. By 1996, the national organisation 
supported a network of over 200 local self-help groups. 12 
regional committees linked the local groups with the national 
organisation, supporting new and existing groups and running 
forums and training events. Gingerbread also provided 
information and advice to lone parents and associated 
organisations and campaigns on behalf of lone parent families. 
The local groups sought to give lone parents support and 
friendship as well as help and advice. They offered practical 
help in the form of, for example, somewhere to meet with others 
in similar circumstances, social events and holidays, 'skill 
sharing' such as mutual babysitting, decorating, etc. Groups 
varied in size, some with as few as from 5 to 10 members while 
others exceeded 200. The national organisation also arranged 
training for volunteers, grants to local groups, advice lines, links 
with other organisations, campaigns on behalf of lone parent 
families, etc. 
The Gingerbread Advice Line kept a record of the types of 
enquiries it. received. Between April 1994 and March 1995, the 
subject of child support became the most frequent enquiry to 
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the Gingerbread Advice Line, closely followed by other benefits 
issues and queries relating to contact or residence matters. 
Gingerbread received some financial support from the 
government, but relied heavily on fund-raising and donations. 
Private sector sponsorship also played an important part. 
Although there was a national council, a management 
executive, a Board of trustees and a policy sub-committee, the 
formation of policy within Gingerbread was often "on the hoof". 
Because of resourcing restraints, Gingerbread tended to 
respond to the parliamentary timetable and press deadlines 
rather than reacting to its membership. The organisation also 
recognised that many lone parents were reluctant to be 
politically active or to put their own case forward, for fear of the 
damaging effect this may have on their family. Gingerbread 
sought to offer direct services and emotional support to lone 
parents and acknowledged that policy came as a lower priority,. 
8.2.5 Families Need Fathers 
Families Need Fathers is a voluntary self-help society vAwitlh 
Registered Charity status. It was founded in 1974 by a group of 
divorced or separated parents who had unwillingly lost contact 
with their children. 
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In 1990, its objectives were said to be: 
"Reduce the damage to children from parental separation 
and divorce. 
Ensure that the problems faced by non-custodial parents 
are understood and viewed sympathetically by the legal 
and welfare professions. 
Provide practical advice and support to parents who 
experience difficulties maintaining a relationship with 
their children. " 
(Appendix to HC277-I I, 90-91) 
Work was by volunteers who are unpaid. Finance was mainly 
by donation by members. } lelp was offered to parents through 
meetings and publications, and the charity was committed to 
shared parenting. 
8.3 The voluntary sector's view: is an agency the answer? 
8.3.1 Before the White Paper 
Alongside the largely academic debate covered in Chapter 2, 
various voluntary organisations were concerned with the reality 
of problems faced by parents who do not live together. These 
voluntary organisations held differing views on the best wav to 
help those parents, and this section outlines some of the vle%%Ws 
expressed before publication of Children Come First, followed hv, 
views expressed between the White Paper and enactment of the 
O() 
Child Support Act. Points specifically relating to the formula 
for use by the Agency are covered in Chapter 9. 
NCOPF 
The policy of the NCU MC/ NCOPF since 1918 had been that 
maintenance should be paid at a rate which reflected the reality 
of bringing up a child (see Macaskill, 1993). By the late 1980x, 
the NCOPF was vividly aware of the failings of the court system 
and in 1989 produced a report suggesting an alternative 
system. This report did not go as far as to put forward an 
administrative system, which was at the time still felt to be too 
radical to be accepted by government. 
This was prior to Margaret Thatcher's famous speech, and the 
NCOPF was pleased with the announcement that there would be 
adjustment to the system. NCOPF saw change which improved 
the court system and reduced areas of discretion as a positive 
step. When an administrative system was announced, the 
NCOPF uwas happy in principle. 
lt should be noted, too, that another founding aim of the 
NCUMC was to help lone mothers find employment. Until 1970 
it did this by acting as an employment agency, matching those 
seeking work with employers willing to accept lone mothers. It 
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then became clear that provision of day care services was a 
more appropriate way of enabling a return to work by lone 
mothers and the NCOPF concentrated more energy into this 
campaign. 
In 1988, with Sue Slipman as director, the NCOPF launched a 
"Back to Work" strategy, including Return to Work Courses. By 
providing information and delivering training programmes, the 
NCOPF aimed to help lone parents gain worthwhile 
employment. In 1991 it successfully negotiated a major 
government grant to expand this initiative, working nationally 
with large employers and training agencies (Macaskill, 1993, pp. 
49-50). 
The NCOPF was therefore already involved with the government 
in encouraging lone parents to become independent of benefits. 
It had experience of working with ministers and civil servants on 
schemes concerned with employment. Those working fier the 
NCOPF felt, at the time of announcement of the changes to 
maintenance, that social security benefits to lone parents were 
constantly and increasingly under threat, and that improving 
maintenance was a way of reducing the potential damage to 
lone parents, which could productively work alongside the 
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employment strategies. The NCOPF gave the CSA a cautious 
welcome. 
Prior to publication of the White Paper, NCOPF staff were invited 
by the civil servants involved for an informal chat. 
Subsequently, however, they felt that they were put at a great 
disadvantage by the speed with which the White Paper was 
brought out, with no Green Paper, and very limited time for 
further consultation. 
CPAG 
The CPAG, on the other hand, was not contacted at all by 
anyone involved in the White Paper, and played no part in the 
initial consultation process. Although the organisation had 
worked on issues involving the liable relatives system, and had 
been involved in some low-key lobbying about procedure and 
the running of the liable relatives units, there had never been a 
properly focused campaign dealing with the issue of 
maintenance, nor had it been a high priority. 
CPAG routinely met ministers to discuss a broad range of 
topics. Child support would have been mentioned as part of the 
general discussion, but no specific discussion took place with 
ministers. As Garnteam & Knights commented, past attempts to 
'l)2 
persuade the government to conduct a wide-ranging review of 
the child maintenance system as part of a larger child support 
system had failed (Garnharn, 1994, p. 2). 
Although aware of an unpublicised working party appointed by 
the Prime Minister to look at the issue of maintenance, senior 
workers at the CPAG were not contacted by this group. 
Also, contact with DSS staff had been limited to discussion on 
liable relatives work and had never expanded to cover 
alternative systems. Nor had the CPAG been contacted by 
anyone from the Lord Chancellor's office. 
The CPAG vie", was that "child support" should not mean 
private responsibility alone, but that an adequate system of 
child support would actually include far wider issues than 
simply maintenance from absent parents. The Finer Committee 
was held up by the CPAG as an example of proposals which did 
indeed look at wider issues and did have the poverty of lone 
parents as its central remit. 
CPAG, whilst obviously concerned with the issues affecting lone 
parents, was primarily concerned with the eradication of ftamilv, 
poverty, which it believed could only he achieved by introducing 
-1 O3 
a whole package of child and family support measures in 
addition to a reformed system of child maintenance (Garnteam, 
1994 pp. 174-176). 
CPAG continued to fight for higher rates of benefit for all 
families in poverty. It attempted to calculate the costs of 
children at various ages and to show how inadequate levels of 
benefit were if claimants were to participate fu1IY in society. 
Whereas the Agency was designed to ensure children shared in 
the wealth of the absent parent, the CPAG believed all children 
should share in the wealth of society as a whole. It called irr 
policies to help all parents meet the full costs of a child, with 
improved employment opportunities for all parents, a minimum 
wage, provision of childcare, improved rights for part-time 
workers, reduced hours of work to enable men to participate 
more in family life, training, and taxation polices to help the low 
paid. 
The CPAG was also a firm believer in Child Benefit as a non- 
taxable, non-means tested benefit for all families with children, 
and advocated increasing the amount. 
In the long term, CPAG supported more non-means tested 
benefits to prevent poverty, with individual entitlements rather- 
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than household ones. This, together with wide-ranging policies 
such as a minimum wage and improved childcare would help all 
families (Garnham, 1994, pp. 177-185). 
NACAB 
NACAB produced a report in July 1989 covering benefits and 
incentives for lone parents to work. This was a detailed report 
also covering childcare provision, part-time work, maintenance, 
employment training schemes, community care grants and 
specific problems facing young single mothers. NACAB used 
evidence from cases which had been brought to local CAE3 
offices over the period preceding its report. 
The report highlighted the factors preventing lone parents from 
taking up paid employment as: 
"- the 'poverty trap' which exists when transferring from 
Income Support to Family Credit 
- 
lack of childcare available at a cost which lone parents 
can afford, and which is both of a quality and flexibility to 
make working a viable option 
- 
inadequacy of maintenance both in terms of the level of 
awards and the regularity with which it is paid 
- 
lack of jobs which accommodate the flexibility of hours 
needed by a parent with sole responsibility for children 
- 
low wages into which lone parents are often trapped. " 
(NACAE, 1989, p. 2) 
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The report concluded that the interaction of benefits operates to 
produce a substantial disincentive to work, even though it was 
the express intention of the Family Credit system to overcome 
the poverty trap inherent in the pre- 1988 benefit system. The 
erratic, unreliable and limited source of income offered by 
maintenance was seen as another disincentive to leave the 
relative security of Income Support. Other barriers such as 
time taken to process Family Credit claims, and difficulties with 
rules over hours worked, discourage employment still further, 
and therefore prevent independence and self-sufficiency. 
The wide-ranging report went on to look at difficulties of 
childcare provision for those wishing to work, including 
problems following 1986 changes which removed allowable 
expenses including childcare costs from Income Support, 
replacing them instead with an overall disregard of earnings. 
Presenting evidence of cases seen in CAB offices, the report 
detailed the problems of maintenance seen in the late 80s. It is 
significant, and should be noted, that there was no distinction 
in the report between spousal maintenance and child 
maintenance. Nan-payment, even where there was a court 
order, was described as "very common", with ineffective 
enforcement procedures and a reluctance on the part of the 
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courts to apply Attachment of Earnings Orders. The need to go 
back to court again and again to enforce an order was described 
as time-consuming and expensive, with Legal Aid often refused. 
For those lone parents claiming Family Credit, the irregularity of 
maintenance caused particular problems, highlighted by NACA13 
as "a great source of insecurity". When Family Credit was 
calculated on the basis that maintenance was paid regularly 
and in full, with amounts of Family Credit fixed for six months 
at a time, if maintenance was subsequently not paid, the 
amount of Family Credit could not be quickly reassessed to take 
this into account. Even when making a subsequent claim, 
NACAB pointed out that lone parents could have diffieualty 
satisfying the Family Credit office of what was normally received 
by them. 
For those lone parents on Income Support, problems arose if the 
DSS office did not collect maintenance payments directly. 
Where collection was made by the DSS, the lone parent received 
a guaranteed amount each week, regardless of the amount of 
maintenance actually collected that week. Where the DSS did 
not collect the maintenance but this was paid directlti, to the 
lone parent, if maintenance failed to arrive, the lone parent had 
to apply each time a payment failed to arrive, and make a 
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signed statement to that effect in order to receive increased 
Income Support. This increased Income Support would be 
recouped if maintenance arrears were paid up at a later date. 
The report expressed concern that the collection service ýý as 
under threat at the time. It stated the view that maintenance 
was more likely to continue to be paid where: "there is an 
element of authority and detachment about collection by the 
department, which militates in favour of continued regular 
payment, whereas fathers may be less diligent in payment 
straight to the mother" (NACAB, 1989, p. 13). This opinion was 
later put forward in support of an agency for the collection and 
enforcement of maintenance. 
Examples of inappropriate action by liable relative officers 
highlighted the problems for lone parents who were reluctant to 
seek a court order for maintenance. 
NACAB offered no solutions in this report. Although clearly 
laying out the problems faced by many lone parents in the late 
1980s, NACAB made no attempt to suggest alternative policies. 
The contents of the report suggested that maintenance was not 
seen as being as relevant to the income of lone parents as the 
benefits system and employment opportunities. The importance 
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of improving the benefits system to allow for the inadequacies of 
maintenance was given more emphasis than improving the 
maintenance itself. 
Problems with the social security system of benefits were again 
highlighted by NACAB in a briefing written in response to the 
Social Security Bill in April 1990. NACAB expressed the opinion 
that the Bill failed to address the problems of childcare costs, 
interaction of benefits, the poverty trap, but concentrated on 
public expenditure reductions only. This did not present a 
genuine choice of whether or not to take up paid employment. 
NACAB also pointed out that the introduction of powers to claim 
maintenance for an unmarried mother on benefit, and for the 
DSS to enforce orders taken out by mothers with or without the 
mother's consent, went against the "clean break" strategy 
encouraged by the government. The Eirll also failed to atlclress 
the problems of lone parents who were not on benefit and not 
receiving maintenance. The briefing concluded that publi(. 
expenditure could be far more substantially reduced if lone 
parents had a genuine choice about returning to work, but that 
pursuing maintenance in the way proposed was not enough 10 
overcome the combination of barriers to work experienced by 
lone parents. 
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8.3 
.2 Between the White Paper and the Act: 
Once Children Come First had been published, voluntary 
organisations were able to formalise their positions. This 
section outlines the response of the voluntary sector to the idea 
of a new Child Support Agency. Responses to specific parts of 
the formula are covered in the next chapter. 
Between the White Paper and the Act, a lobbying group was 
formed by the voluntary sector. This consisted of CPAG, 
Barnardo's, Church Action on Poverty, Law Society, Legal Action 
Group, MENCAP, National Children's Bureau, NCOPF, NSPCC, 
Spastics Society, Stepfamily, Save the Children Fund, Women's 
Aid Federation England and the Children's Society, and was 
largely serviced by NACAB. Most of these organisations were 
opposed to the Act, with the exception of the NCOPF (Garnham 
& Knights, 1994, pp. 36/37). This part of the chapter covers 
views expressed by a cross-section of these organisations, as 
well as Families Need Fathers. 
NCOPF 
As already stated, the NCOPF had, throughout its history, 
fought for higher and more reliable maintenance. The modern 
NCOPF was in favour of encouraging the move away from 
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benefits towards independence, particularly as benefits to lone 
parents came more and more under threat. This organisation 
had always seen employment as the way forward for lone 
parents, with maintenance a welcome addition. The NCOPF 
was in favour of an administrative system and although critical 
of some of the detail of the formula, was concerned to give its 
full support to the principle of an administrative system with 
limited discretion. Reservations were expressed about the 
extensive use of regulations rather than legislation, limiting the 
extent of debate possible (see Monk & Sliprnan, 1991). 
In evidence to the Select Committee, NCOPF stated its 
preference for a system run by the Inland Revenue (oral 
evidence in HC277-iii on 26/3/91, also in Monk & Slipman, 
1991, p. 6). This was seen as a way of ensuring that the Agency 
was not viewed solely as a poor person's agency, and a way of 
bringing about an acceptance of responsibility for one's 
children. It was put forward that paying maintenance should 
be automatic in the same way as paving tax is automatic. 
NCOPF was in favour of the Agency as part of a larger package 
including training and employment opportunities. The ideas 
put forward in the White Paper were seen as better than the 
court system, but the NCOPF was concerned to stress the need 
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to implement a positive employment strategy. These ideas were 
published in March 1993 as "From the Margins to the 
Mainstream". This was used as a submission to the 
Commission on Social Justice and argued that savings to 
benefit achieved through the Agency should be used to pay for 
training and childcare investment for lone parents. 
CPAG 
lt is important to note that the CPAG was concerned with the 
eradication of poverty for all families, not 
_just those 
headed by a 
lone parent. This influenced its response to Children Come 
First, which was published in December 1990 as "The Poverty of 
Maintenance". 
Whilst supporting the principle that absent parents should 
contribute to their children's maintenance where they are able 
to do so, the CPAG stated the belief that a policy on 
maintenance can only be a small part of a wide-ranging policy 
to tackle poverty, which should include childcare and training. 
CPAG pointed out that the White Paper proposals were narrow 
and dominated by Treasury considerations. There was concern 
that an emphasis on private financial responsibility for children 
should not be allowed to detract fr-orn the case for a mot-c 
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adequate public contribution towards the costs of children in 
both two-parent and lone parent families. 
With little evidence as to why the proportion of lone parents 
receiving maintenance dropped sharply during the 1980s, CPAG 
argued that setting specific, higher targets for recovery of 
maintenance payments by the liable relatives units in 89/90 
and 90/91 could have resulted in undue pressure being placed 
on parents with care. Children Come First still did not properly 
address vy lone parents were not receiving maintenance. 
It was also argued by CPAG that the poverty experienced bry 
many lone parents was in fact more related to their gender than 
their marital status, and that a coherent strategy to benefit 
children in low income families was what was required, not all 
emphasis on lone parent families. 
Further concern was voiced regarding the status of the Agency 
as a Next Steps Agency. In the view of the CPAG, there was a 
danger that Next Steps Agencies would be less accountable to 
the public and to parliament than government departments. It 
also sought assurance that the creation of the Agency as a Next 
Steps Agency within the DSS would not adversely affect the 
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number of staff available for the administration of benefits 
(Bennett, 1990, p. 19 and in oral evidence HC277-iii, 26/3/91). 
CPAG went on to draw attention to comments by the Justices' 
Clerks Society raising the question as to whether using the CSA 
for child maintenance but the courts for spousal maintenance 
was a sensible approach when the courts could equally have 
applied a formula for assessing child maintenance. CPAG went 
further and pointed out that lone parents had to deal with a 
multitude of agencies and/or departments already and that 
additional appeals procedures would also have to be put in 
place (Bennett, 1990, p. 19). 
CPAG concluded with a call for government to assist a return to 
work by lone parents through help with childcare provision and 
costs and training. It stressed that enforcing private 
responsibility for children should not be allowed to obscure the 
debate about appropriate public support for all children. Doing 
this through child benefit increases would help lone parents 
and two-parent families alike and would put a proper emphasis 
on the public responsibility of the wider community to invest 
more in children (Bennett, 1990, p. 22). 
Zia 
Before the Act was up and running, the CPAG formed the view 
that it was difficult to see clearly what the outcome of the 
legislation would be. CPAG produced documentation to support 
its objections, but found that MPs approached during the 
lobbying stage had difficulty understanding the formula and 
without real cases to back up the explanation, it was even more 
difficult to get ideas across. The CPAG found that members of 
the Lords had a greater grasp of the detail of the While Paper. 
More specific points were discussed with civil servants, 
although not to a large extent. Content of regulations was 
discussed with civil servants. The extensive use of regulations 
was criticised by the CPAG - the Child Support Bill had a lmost 
100 regulation-making powers whilst the Act itself contained 
only the 'bare bones' of the scheme. When regulations were put 
to parliament MPs had a very limited time to consider them 
(CPAG, 1992, p. 1). 
NACAB 
NACAB published its response to Children Come First in April 
1991. NACAB was concerned for both lone parents and abseilt 
parents, with a broad client base. This was reflected in its 
approach to the White Paper. The response document 
recognised the need for change, agreeing with the government 
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that the current system was "woefully inadequate". Whilst 
giving general support to the main principles of the White Paper, 
NACAB went on to highlight areas of concern with the formula 
and sanctions proposed. No comment was made on the 
appropriateness of a Next Steps Agency. Emphasis was instead 
placed on difficulties experienced with the administration and 
delivery of Family Credit. 
NACAB again expressed the opinion that it was in parents' best 
interests to have an "official" collection of maintenance. NACAB 
also expressed its approval of the recognition of the mother who 
decided to stay at home to care for her children. 
Gingerbread 
Gingerbread made a decision in 1990 to support the principle of 
the Child Support Act. Their media comment on 30/ 10/90 
was to give the Agency a cautious welcome, but. expressing 
concern that the formula was "punitive" on poorer men but 
"extremely easy" on richer men (Th(, Times, 30/ 10/90). 
Families Need Fathers 
When Children Come First was published, in October 1900, 
Families Need Fathers wrote in The Times: 
'_lb 
"The White Paper is another expression of unqualified 
sympathy for the feminist lobby. " (The Times, 30/ 10/90) 
They went on to opine that more often than not it was the 
woman's responsibility that the relationship had broken down, 
and vet the law was stacked in women's favour. However, given 
time to reflect on the contents of the White Paper, their reaction 
was refined to include expansion of the proposals. In evidence 
to the Select Committee, given in March 1991, FN F expressed 
the vie" that the Agency proposed did not go far enough 
(HC277-iii, 26/3/91). They wanted to extend the powers of the 
Agency to cover responsibilities beyond the purely financial. 
They felt the Agency should have other parental responsibilities 
built into its terms of reference, with unmarried fathers given 
full parental responsibility too. For example, FNF criticised 
Children. Come First for not giving the full picture of how many 
cases of non-payment were because of access restrictions. In 
their opinion, access rules and other settlements on divorce had 
to become the concern of the Agency too. 
FNF went so far as to suggest extending the role of the Agency 
to include investigating whether income was being spent 
properly on behalf of the children (in evidence given on 
26/3/91). They also suggested gradually paying income to 1lw 
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child himself as he gets older 
- 
suggesting that up to a 
maximum of 15%, could be paid directly to the child. FNF also 
put the idea to the Select Committee that the Agency could be 
used to provide information, addresses, et. c and to act as a 
"postbox" for absent parents and their children. 
Beyond the Agency, FN F also made a call for more conciliation 
services. They expressed the view that parents should be 
encouraged to share the care of their children, and that the 
proposed Agency would not easily allow for that. 
8.4 Commentary 
Broad areas of concern at the planning stage covered the proper 
role of government in respect of families. The CPAG was 
concerned that government should take on a degree of 
responsibility for all children, with proper recognition of t he cost 
of raising them and the state's involvement. On the other hand 
the NCOPF expressed the view that. only through greater 
(financial) responsibility being taken on by both parents woulkl 
society at large accept its role in assisting lone parents in 
addressing their additional difficulties. Thus, whilst the NCOPF 
saw some advantages in making lone parent families "a special 
case" the CPAG emphasis was on all families living in poverty' 
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and reducing inequalities between all families, whatever their 
type. 
All groups expressed some concern at the apparent lack of 
recognition of other parental responsibilities. NCOPF seemed to 
be the group most in favour of the financial emphasis given in 
Children Come First. CPAG were at pains to stress government 
financial responsibility for all children and particularly for those 
in low income households. 
The major concerns of the voluntary organisations can be 
summarised as: 
" Striking a balance between parental and state responsibility. 
" Acceptance by society of all family types. 
" Problems of equity between family types. 
Recognition of parental responsibilities beyond the financial. 
" The record of poor administration of FamilV Credit and tl, e 
low take-up rate of that benefit. 
" 
The inflexibility of benefits and maintenance proposals. 
" 
The advantages and disadvantages of a discretionary or an 
administrative system. 
9 The potential impoverishment of the absent parent and the 
second family 
. 
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0 The problems of enforcing co-operation and particularly the 
benefit penalty. 
These themes are continued in the following chapter ediere 
voluntary organisations' responses to specific formula proposals 
are considered. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
The Voluntary Sector grapples with the detail 
9.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 7, it was argued that government ideology influence(l 
the detail of the formula proposed for use by the Agency. The 
formula illustrated the government's over-riding desire to reduce 
public expenditure, to encourage participation in the labour 
market, and to emphasise family responsibility. This section 
now examines how outside organisations responded to specific 
elements of the formula, their responses reflecting the remit of' 
the organisation concerned. The section is organised to reflect 
government ideology already identified, and the voluntarv 
organisations are mainly presented in the order previously used, 
that is NCOPF, CPAG, NACAB, FNF. (NB Gingerbread were not 
involved in the consultation process at this stage. ) This is 
merely for clarity and implies no particular emphasis. 
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9.2 Reducing Government Expenditure 
9.2 
.1 Putting the Treasury 
First 
NCOPF, as a group concerned specifically with the problems of 
lone parent families, was in favour of emphasising the particular 
difficulties faced by lone parents compared with two parent 
families. There was also a recognition that all lone parents were 
likely at some time to require assistance from the state, he it 
benefits, or childcare, training or employment opportunities, if 
they were to become financially independent. 
NCOPF stressed, in evidence to the Select Committee, that lone 
parent families had specific, extra problems compared with two 
parent families. Further, it expressed concern that the balance 
between state and private responsibility had to be right, if ý-j 
backlash against lone parents was to be prevented. Taxpayers 
would resent high amounts of state finance being paid to lone 
parents, therefore the NCOP[+ was in favour of the Agency's 
remit to encourage private responsibility. NCOPF stressed the 
need to settle the private contribution so as to Will support irr a 
state contribution, to help gain independence. This contrasts 
with the CPAG view. 
CPAG, as a group concerned with the eradication of povertti, for 
all families, disliked the emphasis on private respofSibility', 
ýý, 
preferring more emphasis on state support for all families with 
children. It expressed concern that targets had been set for 
benefit savings, from the point. of view of both parents 
- 
lone- 
parents losing benefits, and second families being put into 
poverty. In oral evidence CPAG argued that redressing the 
balance between state and private responsibility should mean 
more support from the state for all families. Financial 
responsibility for children should not be all private. 
Concern was also expressed by, CPAG that other parental 
responsibilities should be taken into account, and the effects on 
second families 
- 
stating the view that increasing conflict was to 
the detriment of wider parental responsibilities. 
On encouraging employment with the help of Fami1v Credit for 
the low paid, CPAG and NCOPF agreed on the need to include 
mortgage interest in all Family Credit calculations, the need to 
cover the loss of passported benefits such as free school meals, 
and the need to guarantee maintenance payments to thee parent 
with care if they have been included in the calculation of Family 
Credit for that parent. CPAG pointed Out that examples given in 
the White Paper do not include one where the parent with care 
has a mortgage (Bennett, 1990, p. 12). 
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The NCOPF was in favour of extending the disregards available 
on Family Credit, for example to include either maintenance OR 
income, or a combination of the two. It also advocated a greater 
disregard for income Support earnings, to cover expenses 
(although lone parents already enjoyed a greater earnings 
disregard than two-parent families on Income 'Support). NCOPF 
stressed the need to recognise childcare costs, either through an 
extension of the personal allowance, through greater disregards, 
or through inclusion of these expenses in the exempt income of 
the lone parent. It should be noted however that it also called 
for inclusion of work expenses in the absent parent's exempt 
income. 
NCOPF stressed, as it has done throughout its existence, that 
whilst maintenance at higher levels would undoubtedly enable 
many to escape the benefits system, there was a real need for 
childcare, training and employment opportunities. 
CPAG expressed concern that the changes designed to 
encourage moving from Income Support to Family Credit would 
leave some worse off through loss of mortgage interest and 
passported benefits, but also because take up rates for Family 
Credit were lower than those for Income Support. The take-up 
figures for Family Credit suggested that only half of those 
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entitled to claim did so, with other research showing a high level 
of ignorance of the benefit. Conversely, Income Support had an 
almost 100%> take-up rate (Bennett, 1990, p. 1 1). 
On disregard of maintenance payments for those claiming 
benefits, CPAG, in contrast to the position taken by the NCOPF, 
preferred only a small disregard of maintenance payments, it 
was against exacerbating the differences between groups of lone 
parents 
- 
those who were Younger and had never-married were 
less likely to get maintenance 
- 
as well as between one and two 
parent families. It pointed out, for example, that whereas a £25 
earnings disregard on housing benefit for lone parents was 
introduced in October 1990 together with the proposed ,C15 
maintenance disregard, no such help was available to two- 
parent families on Family Credit. CPAG also objected in 
principle to payments which acted as a subsidy to employers 
who were encouraged to employ a specific group of people and 
enabled to pay them low wages. Such disregards also further 
complicated an already over-complex system (Bennett, 1990, 
13-14). pp. 
The concern for equal treatment of all families arose again when 
the CPAG highlighted the lack of work expenses in execrmpt 
income and in the protected income of the absent parent. 
ý, ý 
NACAB gave examples of problems which had been brought to 
of Family its offices concerning the administration and deliveº_Y 
Credit. It also expressed concern at the closure of. job centres 
and how this may affect ]one parents seeking employment. 
NACAB gave examples of poor payment of maintenance acting 
with the inflexibility of Family Credit, to create a disincentive to 
continue working or take up work in the first place. It also 
illustrated problems of passported benefits, housing costs, 
travel and childcare costs, and the lack of flexibility when a 
worker had to take a cut in hours, or a parent with care 
experienced a cut in maintenance. 
From the absent parent's point of view, NACAB was concerned 
that the absent parent could not allow maintenance paid as an 
expense. This contrasted with the fact that maintenance 
coming into a household did count as income. 
9.2.2 Guaranteed amount of maintenance 
NCOPF stressed the need for a guaranteed payment to 
encourage the take up of work by the parent with care. It was 
suggested that the state should guarantee payment even ýý'here 
the parent with care was not in receipt of benefit. If the state 
I 
stood the loss, it was suggested, this would encourage the 
effective collection and enforcement by the Agency This was 
reminiscent of the finer recommendations on guaranteed 
maintenance payments whether working or claiming benefits. It 
also linked with the NCOPF's belief that maintenance payment 
and receipt should become as automatic as payment of income 
tax through the PAYE system. 
Concentrating on those claiming benefits, the CPAG called for 
an extension of the guaranteed payment available with Income 
Support to cover Family Credit claimants as well. It pointed out 
that attempting to enforce payments in difficult circumstances 
or from low paid absent parents may lead to more cases of 
fluctuation or non-payment. Where in the past the DSS could 
use discretion to not chase such cases, the Agency would be 
attempting to recover maintenance, possibly to the (letrimc"nt of 
the parent with care who consequently suffers poor payments, 
particularly difficult for those on Family Credit which is fixed for 
six months (Bennett, 1990, p. 13). 
NACAB gave examples of the inflexibility of Family Credit and 
the need for guaranteed payments. Also, the problems of the 
loss of passported benefits, allowances, etc. were again 
highlighted. 
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9.2.3 The benefit penalty 
The NCOPF stated its objection to the benefit penalty (to be 
imposed on parents with care who refused to co-operate without 
good cause) on the grounds that it would inevitably harm the 
child, and could lead to children being taken into care. A small 
disregard of maintenance for those on Income Support w. vas 
preferred, as an incentive, with the likely outcome that only 
those with pressing reasons would decline to co-operate (Monk, 
1991, p. 4). 
On the government claim that reducing the personal allowance 
of the parent with care in this way does not affect the child 
directly, the NCOPF pointed out the contradiction with the 
Social Security Act 1990 where the personal allowance is said 
to reflect recognition of the costs of caring for a child. The 
NCOPF questioned how withholding an element of the child's 
care cannot in effect punish the child (Monk, 1991, p. 15). 
CPAG had three main reasons for "serious concern" about th(. 
proposal to enforce compliance with a benefit penalty for non- 
cooperation: the principle, the likely practice and the likeh 
effects. 
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The principle being upheld, that a child had an unconditional 
right to maintenance, was said to be flawed if to uphold that 
right may threaten the child's emotional or financial security, or 
both. CPAG argued that to impose a benefit penalty for non- 
cooperation could in fact be penalising a parent with care who 
was actually acting responsibly. CPAG also expressed concern 
that liable relatives units were increasingly forcing co-operation 
and putting undue pressure on claimants. Given that the 
benefit penalty would bring little income to the Treasury, its 
enforcement was described as symbolic, to show that the 
government was serious about enforcing the private financial 
obligations of absent parents. CPAG, on the other hand, was 
keen to stress public responsibility for helping all families 
experiencing poverty. 
CPAG doubted if the proposal was practical in reality, 
particularly when the government kept grounds for exceptions 
secret, and it expressed concern that discretionary systems with 
confidential rules tended to be more open to discriminatorv' 
practices and a lack of natural justice (Bennett, 1990,1ý). 5). 
On the effects of this proposal, CPAG pointed out that those 
suffering as a result of enforced co-operation could well he two- 
parent families, who might be considered a priority of the 
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government. For example, where a child was fathered by 
someone who was married to someone else, or had 
subsequently married or started cohabiting with someone else, 
the emotional as well as financial stability of both family units 
could be disrupted if the parent with care was forced to identify 
the absent parent, who was subsequently pursued regardless of 
the circumstances of the case. 
NACAB felt that the benefit penalty, imposed to penalise the 
non-cooperation of parents with care, would inevitably harm 
children, both financially and emotionally. Seen as an 
unreasonable reduction, this would in fact only involve a small 
number of cases but would necessitate a large administration. 
NACAB was also concerned that access claims may be restarted 
by absent parents, and that this would not necessarily be in the 
child's best interests. 
The fact that no time limit to the benefit penalty had been 
announced was seen by NACA[3 as unsatisfactorrv, as was the 
fact that there were no published criteria for exemption. For an 
advice agency, these aspects would make giving accurate 
guidance more difficult. 
2. i l) 
In evidence given to the Select Committee, NACAE3 gave 
examples which had previously been presented to its local 
bureaux of fear of violence from ex-partners and pressure being 
unduly applied to parents with care by liable relatives officers. 
It also detailed cases where inappropriate methods had been 
used by liable relatives officers. Such difficulties highlighted the 
problems likely to present themselves if the benefit penalty was 
imposed. 
FNF were in favour of a 50`YO maintenance disregard as an 
incentive for both parties. This was by tar the highest figure 
quoted. Curiously, this was not seen as an incentive to create 
lone parent families, although in evidence on property matters, 
FNF expressed concern that moving away from clean break 
settlements could act an in inducement for women to "go It 
alone". 
9.3 Family Values 
9.3.1 Shifting the emphasis from "second" to "first" 
families 
The formula included an amount for the 'personal allowance' of 
the parent with care, in recognition of the 1)ractical linmitatiMns 
to employment placed on anyone with the care oi`chilciren. 
CPAG was against this, as it was likel, \to increase tfension and 
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did not appear to be wanted by either side (Bennett, 1990, p. 9). 
However, the NCOPF was in favour of extending the principle, to 
continue payment of the personal allowance when the parent 
with care started work and came off benefit. 
Although generally supportive of parents with care, the NCOPH 
did recommend changes in allowances in favour of absent 
parents. However, it was in favour of a greater share of 
increasing income of the absent parent being passed to tyre 
parent with care, as well as the introduction of a disregard to 
continue the personal allowance element into Family Credit. 
NCOPF felt that there should be less emphasis on Income 
Support rates in the formula, with more weight placed on the 
income and standards of living enjoyed by ! both parents and the 
children. However, it was acknowledged by NCOPF that the lint: 
with Income Support rates was useful for uprating purposes. 
In contrast to the CPAG, the NCOPF saw no problems in 
extending inequalities between families or tvIaes cif lone. parent. 
The fact that some, particularly children of young, never- 
married lone mothers, may be helped only to a small degree, 
was not a good reason to prevent those children fortunate 
enough to have an absent parent with considerable wealth from 
sharing in that wealth. Equalising the living standards of the 
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children (and therefore the parent with care) with that of the 
affluent absent parent was more important than a concern to 
equalise outcomes for all lone parents (or indeed all parents). 
In calculating the amount to be paid, NCOPF was unhappy with 
the regressive nature of the formula. It stressed, however, that 
it was very much in favour of removing any debate or 
negotiation from parents themselves, by the introduction of air 
administrative procedure. It, had formed the view that in order 
to get a general acceptance that maintenance was payable in 
most cases of separation, a straight-forward administrative 
system was necessary. 
NCOPF didn't mention step children in its evidence, but (lid 
acknowledge the need for better protected income for an absent 
parent's current household and the need to include 
maintenance paid out in any Family' Credit ralcc. ulation of the 
absent parent. 
CPAG was particularly against the personal allowance 
continuing where the parent with care was not a lore parent, 
but had re-partnered, pointing out that there was no allowance 
for any new partner of an absent parent, even if there were 
natural children in the new partnership (I ennett, 1990, p. 9). 
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CPAG was keen to reduce inequalities between different familti, 
formations and this aspect had the effect of producing 
inequality between different two-adult households. 
Both the CPAG and the NCOPF were concerned that there 
would be no allowance for maintenance paid out by an absent 
parent in calculating Family Credit entitlement of the second 
family. Yet the absent parent: could not avoid this cornmit. rnent, 
and not allowing this as an essential expense could act as a 
disincentive to work for the absent parent or any new partner. 
Again, the concern of the CPAG would be that this would create 
inequality between families, with similar two-adult households 
with children having different outgoings. A household 
containing an absent parent who was paying out maintenance 
and claiming Family Credit would have less disposable income 
for his present family than a similar household with troth 
'natural' parents and no maintenance commitment. 
CPAG detailed its concern at the effect of the legislation on re- 
partnering, for both parents, as well as at the increasing conflict 
and pressure it placed on relationships. CPAG was concerned 
that there may be a backlash if second families were resentful, 
or two parent families felt lone parents were J)e'jig rýýýº t. iý ularlý 
advantaged. There was a fear that the legislation roul(i (lisrUa})t 
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the formation of second families, or reconciliations between the 
parents. To help alleviate this, the CPAG was in favour of 
introducing a time-lag after separation, before imposing anv 
maintenance assessment. 
NACAB expressed concern that there was no allowance for a 
new partner of an absent parent to be a parent with care too, in 
that no 'personal allowance' was applicable to them. It was 
concerned that this may act as a disincentive for the absent 
parent to work, and could foresee problems of debt. NACAB 
was concerned that shifting the emphasis in calculating 
maintenance from an absent parent's need to support his 
current household to enforcing obligations to his first fianiil ' 
may discourage the formation of new relationships, and that 
issues may be forced prematurely. It gave examples cif cases 
where the cohabitation rules applied by liable relatives officers 
have hindered a reconciliation or formation of a new 
relationship, and advocated a delay in any change In bellet , its to 
enable new arrangements to settle (NACAB, 1991 
, 
1). 9), 
FNF pointed out the contradictions with social security 
cohabitation rules. They also predicted that the personal 
allowance which they referred to as "Spoiºs, al m aintenance" 
would cause a backlash amongst absent parents. 'They 
2zß 
highlighted the possible disincentive to work for the absent 
parent and any new partner, and were particularly against 
payment of a personal allowance to a parent caring for children 
over the age of S. 
932 Property Settlements / Clean Breaks 
NCOPF and CPAG agreed that the formula should not he 
applied retrospectively. NCOPF saw the provision of suitable 
housing as one of the most important elements in the wtelfare of 
the child and therefore strongly supported the parent with care 
keeping the family home where possible. Its view was that this 
may in many cases over-ride the child's need for cash 
maintenance. The White Paper, on the other hand, Was said to 
encourage the sale of shared property, with implications fror 
public sector housing requirements as lone parents become 
homeless. Problems could also have arisen if Mesher or Martin 
orders were re-introduced in large numbers, with sales of 
houses forced once the youngest child reached 16, again 
creating homelessness (although at this point the mother max 
have limited call on public housing as she would techriicallý no 
longer be the parent with care). 
The consideration of property transfer's should also recognise 
the importance of foregone pension rights, according to the 
ý. ih 
NCOPF, who pointed out that these were usually retained by the 
man. 
To ensure the continuation of the transfer of property, where 
this was in the best interests of the child, the NCOPF 
recommended that provision should be made whereby cash 
maintenance could be foregone in favour of property 
maintenance. Failing that, it should be stressed to tim courts 
that the best interests of the child were of paramount 
importance in decisions regarding property (Monk, 1991, p. 13). 
NCOPF failed to comment on disruption to past scettlemmments, 
but, in evidence to the Select Committee, the NCONF suggested 
three alternatives: 
1. That in the case where there was a property settlement, 
reached before the existence of the Agency, this could give 
grounds for exemption. 
2. Another alternative would be to write into the legislation 
that where a clean break settlement had already peen 
achieved that would over-ride the Ag en<-vv ci airmm to 
maintenance. 
3. The third suggestion was that the Child Support Act 
Should not be applied retrospectively at a11,11cit only- to 
new cases (11C277-11,90-91, p. 87). 
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CPAG's response to the White Paper did not cover property 
settlements or the issue of 'clean breaks'. 
NACAB did recognise the implications for property settlements, 
and expressed concern that there was no allowance for property 
transfer: 
"The importance of property arrangements should be 
recognised. Settlements that encourage, albeit indirectly, 
the loss of the family home should be avoided". 
(NACA13,1991, p. 2) 
However, NACAB did not mention the problems of old 
settlements being overturned. 
FNF felt strongly that it was unreasonable to expect the 
personal allowance, what they considered to be spousal 
maintenance, as well as property settlements. They offered the 
opinion that this would be an incentive to give up on marriage, 
allowing women to go it alone" and increasing the divorce rate. 
In a memorandum to the Select Committee, FNF initiativ 
suggested that for "existing splits based on a clean break 
- 
where the house has been traded for tens of years of 
maintenance" there was a need for transitional arrýýn 
'(ýjjj(. jjts 
(HC277-I I, 90-91, p. 96). Later in the same memorandum, 
however, they made the over-riding recommendation that 11 the 
2; x 
legislation must not be retrospective in respect of clean breaks" 
(HC277-I I, 90-91, p. 103). 
9.3.3 Minimum Payments 
NCOPF, although generally seeking to support the parent with 
care, nevertheless felt that enforcing payments by absent 
parents who were themselves on Income Support was unfair, 
and that in such circumstances assessments should he zero- 
rated, in the same way as some products were zero-rated for 
VAT. NCOPF was explicit in its view that the Agency s role 
should be seen as getting more money paid irorn absent parents 
to parents with care, therefore it formed the view that 
concentrating time and effort on making ideological points for 
minimal return would be a waste of the Agency's resourccfes. 
NCOPF felt that, to be successful, the Agency needed to get 
money out of those fathers who could afford to pay. 
CPAG saw this requirement is reminiscent of the Poor Law's 
judgemental attitude to the "undeserving poor", in that 
minimum payments would apple to the unemployed laut not to 
the sick or disabled. It also stated its concern at the possibility 
of various deductions being made from an absent parent's 
Income Support at one time, for example for rennt or fuel, with 
no guaranteed minimum income remaining. This could be a 
_iýl 
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particular problem for those with accumulated arrears (Bennett, 
1990, pp. 15-16). 
NACAB was also concerned at this deduction and drew 
attention to difficulties for those paying off debts, as well as 
those fathers under 25 and living on reduced benefit, and those 
leaving prison or long-term care (NACAE3,1991, p. 14). 
Although the White Paper put forward the notion that a 
minimum payment would help instil a sense of responsibility, to 
establish a pattern of payment however small, FNIý believed this 
aspect would not encourage responsibility but would instead 
encourage hatred and non-cooperation. 
9.3.4 Access 
The White Paper explicitly separated the issues of maintenance 
and access to children, clearly allocating decisions on access to 
the courts. (NB. `Access' refers to 'coºltact' under t}ie Children 
Act 1989. ) 
NCOPF agreed that this was correct, but did make a case for 
allowing access costs of the absent parent, where they were 
particularly high, to be included as exempt income, and 
". I() 
stressed the importance of continued contact between child and 
absent parent (in most cases) (Monk, 1991, pp. 10-1 1). 
CPAG pointed out that absent parents were more than two-and- 
a-half times more likely to pay maintenance if they saw their 
children. In one piece of research with absent parents, none of 
those interviewed saw the payment of maintenance as 
unconditional (see Garnharn & Knights, 1994, p. 16). 
CPAG also mentioned the costs of having suitable housing to 
allow overnight visits and whether this would be allowed] in 
"reasonable" housing costs (Bennett, 1990, pp. 16/17). 
On the costs to absent parents of continuing a relationship with 
their children, NACAB was concerned at the fact that the 
formula made no allowance for access costs and the costs of 
accommodation for overnight stays. An amendment was 
recommended to allow for absent parent access costs irr exempt 
income, so the relationship between the absent parent and his 
child could continue. 
The Law Society felt, however, that, even if mistaken, threrce was 
a link between the payment of maintenance and access rights in 
people's minds. They warned the government to anticipate 
ai 
pressure on the courts for contact orders when enforcement of 
maintenance became more effective (HC277-11,90-91, p. 123). 
Similarly, the CPAG whilst agreeing access and maintenance 
should be completely separate, recognised that in practice a lot 
of absent parents did not agree (HC277-I I, 90-91, p. 86). 
FNF stressed the need for access enforcement to he taken just 
as seriously as maintenance enforcement. In a memorandum 
submitted to the Select Committee, FNF stated: 
".. if the government wants the Agency to he perceived as 
operating fairly and to enjoy the co-operation of those 
subject to its authority, it must recognise that access and 
maintenance are linked. " 
(1HC277-f1,00-9 1, p. 91) 
In oral evidence, they clarified their position and emphasised 
that it was enforcement of access arrangements (where a court 
deemed these appropriate) that FNF felt should be linked to 
payment of maintenance. It was not a direct link whereby 
payment of maintenance gave rights of access, but a rc, r()gllition 
that aspects of parenting beyond the financial (Ornºnit went 
should be equally valued, and equally enforceable (I IC27 7-II, 
90-91, pp. 109-110). 
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FNF stressed that access costs could be considerable if "well- 
conducted access" was to be achieved. They were concerned too 
about other inescapable financial commitments, such as legal 
debts, life assurance and pensions. 
Related to access, the possibility of shared care was raised by 
some groups. The Law Society believed the formula should not 
apply when residence was shared between the parents. FNF 
expressed concern that shared care arrangements did not form 
part of Children Come First. CPAG also mentioned this 
oversight, claiming that it illustrated the impression of ýa too- 
rigid formula and a lack of appreciation of some of the 
complexities involved in many lone parents' lives" (Bennett, 
1990, p. 17). 
The lack of inclusion of shared care at-ran ements also 
illustrated the contradiction with previous legislation, 
specifically the Children Act. 
9.4 Summary 
Chapter 7 detailed discussions within parliament during the 
passage of the Child Support Bill. This chapter has shown that 
detailed advice was also provided by the organisations 
considered here. The planned design of the formlila was 
-a ; 
analysed in depth and potential problems were clear-11N, 
identified. These are summarised as: 
Major concerns relating to the formula: 
" The benefit penalty for non-cooperation would make poor 
families even poorer. 
9 The link to benefit levels and the regressive nature of the 
formula was criticised. 
" 
The potential discouragement from re-partnering was 
highlighted. 
" Problems were anticipated with the personal allowance for 
the parent with care. 
" 
Problems were anticipated with retrospective cases. 
" Housing difficulties / loss of the marital homey were 
highlighted. 
0 Minimum payments demanded from poor absent parents 
xvould achieve little in reality laut could he very 
" Access related issues were seen as likely causes Of conflict 
exacerbated by the Agency's involvement. 
Family Credit related concerns: 
" Lack of inclusion of mortgage interest. 
" Loss of passported benefits. 
" No guaranteed maintenance paynment. 
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" Poor take-up rates. 
9 Lack of flexibility within the six-month claim period. 
" No account of payments of maintenance made by absent 
parents who are themselves on Family Credit. 
General concerns relating to other- policies: 
" 
The need for good quality and affordable childcare. 
" 
The need for education and training for parents with care. 
" The lack of employment opportunities. 
The government largely ignored the concerns being expressed 
and, as shown in Chapter 7, managed to design the formula to 
support its own ideology. 
Chapter 14 returns to NCOPF, CPAG, NACAB and Cýiiý ; erhrc: acl 
to examine how these organisations responded once the Agency 
became operational. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
The Unfolding Disaster 
-A Management Problem? 
10.1 Introduction 
"... when the history of all this gets written, as it clearly 
will do, it will be quite a storS, not only how did it get set 
up in the way it was and so on, but how did it get 
changed 
... 
history will say amendments came through 
politics. They came not because of ministerial wisdom or 
ministerial energy but because it was politically 
unacceptable for the system to continue in the form that 
it was and, despite interventions from the Social SecuritvSelect 
Committee, they did not come from Ministers. " 
(Dr Toni' Wright ME', I IC199,94--95, p. 30) 
Chapters 10 
- 
16 look at the impact of the Agency between April 
1993 and April 1996. This includes examination Ofthe 
legislative and regulatory changes which were intros uweci during 
this period and the background which led to those changes. 
Soon after the start of its operations, it became obvious that the 
Agency was having major difficulties. As the quote above 
suggests, the changes which were Sulbsequent]) introduced ýýen' 
' 1) 
not necessarily brought about through ministerial wisdom, laut 
were forced by the adverse impact the Agency was having and 
the lack of support developing. Change was necessary because 
the system quickly became politically unacceptable. 
In order to assess the successes and failings of the Agency, cncf 
how those in government, parliament and in the civil service 
responded, it is necessary to give an overview ofthe initial aims 
and objectives of the Agency, of targets set l)v the ; overnmerýt 
and of achievements and failings of the Agency. This chapter 
sets out to do that. 
10.2 The Framework Document and Business Plan 1993/94 
The Child Support Agency began operating as a Next Steps 
Agency in April 1993. As with all such semi-autononmous 
government agencies, a broad outline of operational plans and 
targets was laid out in a series of documents 
- 
in this case a 
Framework Document (CSA 2025) and a l3usiness Pan (CSA 
2026). 
10.2.1 Aims and Ob ectives 
The Framework Document for the Agency set out the aims and 
objectives as: 
:I 
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The Agency's primary aims are to deliver on behalf of 
children a consistent, effective and efficient service for the 
assessment, collection and payment of child maintenance, 
so as to ensure that parents maintain their children 
whenever they can afford to do so. 
2 The Agency will also help people with care of children to 
make informed choices about whether to take up 
employment. 
3 To achieve these aims, the Agency's objectives are to: 
3.1 implement sucxessfully the Child Support Act 
under agreed plans for the phased take-on of 
clients, ensuring that maintenance assessments 
and payments are accurate and regular; 
3.2 in keeping with the principles of the Citizen's 
Charter, to provide a service to clients which is 
accessible, courteous, prompt, consistent and 
efficient and seen by them as such, 
3.3 provide clear and accurate information to clients 
and the public about the child support system and 
services and benefits available to clients who are in 
work; 
3.4 establish and maintain an effective working 
relationship with the courts, advice agencies anti 
other organisations with an interest in the Agency's 
business, 
3.5 contribute effectively' to the Department's evaluation 
and development of policy and ensure the Agency 
can respond effectively to change; and 
3.6 make the most efficient and effective use Of 
available resources. 
The document went on to (U, Utline the function,, of the Agency' 
- 
such as "contacting absent parents 
... 
passing on payments it 
has collected". No detail of how this might be achie veýf was 
_' 
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attempted. Slightly more detail was provided on accountability 
and reporting, where areas of responsibility were noted for the 
Secretary of State, the Permanent Secretary 
, 
the Chief 
Executive, and the Child Support Officer. Whilst the document 
outlined, in very broad terms, areas of responsibility, there was 
no attempt to describe how such responsibilities would be 
carried out, nor to put in details. Phrases such as "to agreed 
limits", "subject to Treasury approval", "subject to overall 
Departmental approval" littered the description of what the 
Chief Executive was able to do. 
The Business Plan went into a little more detail, although the 
document was still trief in view of the huge task being assigned 
to the Agency. It outlined the programme for 1()()3/(), 4,1>ut 
stressed the fact that the organisation itself was in its infäricy, 
With unique procedures to provide a new service to an expanded 
range of clients. The Agency's commitment to client satistaction 
and to Citizen's Charter principles was noted. 
10.2.2 Targets for 1993194 
The Secretary of State's initial targets for the Agency were laid 
out in the Business Plan as: 
60%, of people with the care of children making eligible 
applications to the Agency to have maintenance arranged 
annual benefit savings of £530 million 
to manage the Agency's resources SO as to deliver its 
Business Plan within a total budget of £1 15 million 
65% of clients to regard the service as satisfactorv, as 
measured by an independent national survey 
to meet a set of milestone targets which relate to major 
initiatives. 
The milestone targets related to opening of accorrmmodation, 
take-on and training of staff, start-up of computer Systems, anti 
future planning. 
It was acknowledged that, without historical data on which to 
base performance targets, this range of targets was somewhat 
limited, but should be added to in future tears. To enable 
future targets to be set effectively, monitoring of acctivitvv was set 
out, for example to measure the speed at which applications are 
cleared, the accuracy of assessments made, and the t itlne taken 
to pursue defaults of payments. 
Further commitments were made in the Business Mn to 
answer enquiries from MI's and the I'arliarnentarv 
Commissioner for Administration (the I'CA): 
- 
responding to 
parliamentary questions within 24 hours; replying to letters 
from MPs within an average of' 20 working days from the date of 
i`ju 
receipt (at least with a progress report, if not a full response); 
responding to the PCA on all new complaints within 0 weeks, 
and responding to draft reports on investigations within 3 
weeks. 
The targets laid out in the first Business Plan proved, in some 
ways, controversial, and in subsequent years the targets were 
changed to reflect a different emphasis. This is detailed later in 
the chapter. 
The lack of detail attached to the publication of these targets 
was highlighted by the Select Committee during its first 
investigation into the actual operation of the Agency. In 
November 1993, the Select Committee asked Alistair Burl MP 
(Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social Security at 
the time) how the target for benefit savings had been calcuulý-jtecl. 
They also asked Ros Hepplewhite (then Chief Executive of the 
Agency) how benefit savings were calculated. Neither answer 
gave a clear explanation, and the Committee's final report 
recommended that the DSS give a full explanation of the 
calculation of benefit savings as soon as possible (I-IC69,93-94, 
pp. ix-x). The government's response, issued in Fý'ebruýirv 1994, 
did attempt to clarify how these figures were arrived at, but ill 
outline form only (Crn2469, Feb 94,1). 1). This calCulilt iOf was 
returned to later in evidence given by Ann Chant (second Chief 
Executive of the Agency) in October 1995, where it was finally 
clarified that benefit savings are calculated on the assumption 
that a lone parent removed from benefit Would have otherwise 
been likely to have continued claiming that benefit fib a further 
51 weeks (HC781-i, 94-95, p. 1 1). So the first week's saving in 
benefits is multiplied by 51, making the figure for benefit 
savings, which was used so much in discussions about the 
Agency, at best a very rough estimate and at worst a purely 
hypothetical figure. 
Within six months of the operation commencing, it was put to 
the Chief Executive that the emphasis on achieving particular 
targets had influenced the operations of the Agency. 
Specifically, it was suggested that the business was being driven 
by targets and the application of target-related pay. I iowever, 
evidence given to the Social Security Select Committee showed 
that only the Chief Executive's pay could be affected in this was. 
Although all civil servants had pay reviews which were affected 
by performance reviews, the only Agency employee whose salary 
had a direct link to the achievement of targets was the Chief 
Executive. Senior management's pay reviews related only to 
their own performance in their post, not to the perlormrarice of 
the Agency as a whole. (I-1C69, o)3-94, p. 20). 
_ý ý. _ý 
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The success of the Agency in meeting its original targets was 
detailed in the Annual Report 1993/94 (see later in this 
chapter). 
10.3 Phased take-on of cases 
Because of the large potential work-load of the Agency, it was 
agreed by Ministers that there would be a phased take-on of 
cases, and this was set out in the first Business Plan. From 5th 
April 1993, the Agency became responsible for maintenance for 
all new cases, that is where there was no existing maintenance 
agreement, whether or not a Social Securit_v benefit was an 
issue. Such cases could previously have been dealt with by the 
courts or bye voluntary agreements with the parent with care or 
with the Liable Relatives Unit if benefit was involved. From the 
beginning, the Agency became involved where there was a claim 
(by a household containing a parent with cared for Income 
Support, Family Credit or Disability Working Allowance on or 
after 5th April 1993, whether or not there was an existing 
maintenance agreenicnt. Thus, all new claims for these 1)encfits 
made by parents with care, or their current partners, wtiwouldi 
automatically involve the Agency. 
ýrý 
New cases which did not involve the claiming of benefit no 
longer had the choice of using a court to decide maintenance for 
the child; from April 1993 the choice for them was between the 
Agency or a purely voluntary (and non-enforceable) 
arrangement. 
As part of the phasing-in, those cases where one of the relevant 
benefits was already being paid would be taken on between 
April 1993 and April 1996. However, for cases involving Family 
Credit, which are reviewed every six months, the Agency would 
become involved at the time of review (effectively each "reviewed" 
claim for this benefit is treated as a new claim). 
Significantly, no mention was made in the Business Plan of 
those cases where there was an existing court order, but where 
benefit was not an issue. These cases remained in the 
jurisdiction of the courts, with those seeking to have these 
orders reviewed continuing to use the legal sy stern (Cm 1264, 
October 90, p. 47). 
Initial plans for the Agency had predicted that these cases 
would come under the. jurisdiction of the Agency from April 
1996, again with a gradual take-on of cases. Although use of 
the Agency would not be rompuIsorv for such cases (as long as 
L4 
benefits were not an issue) either parent Would he able to apply 
for assessment and if required make use of the collection 
service, upon payment of the appropriate fees. 
It is also significant that no mention was made in the Business 
Plan of the intention to take on first those cases where benefit 
was being claimed by the parent with care household and some 
maintenance was already being paid by the absent parent. This 
was, however, clear in January 1993 in early Agency literature 
(CSA 2001, p. 4). The decision to prioritise in this way ('caused 
controversy as the Agency began its operations. Althouglh 
dealing with those absent parents who were already paving 
some maintenance was a clear intention, this was not accepted 
as justifiable or reasonable by many who felt the proper role for 
the Agency was to actively pursue those absent parents ýý ho 
paid nothing (see, for example, Hansard, 3/ 12/93, col. 1298). 
Further to this phasing-ire, over 300,000 cases were cleferre<i it, 
December 1994 for operational reasons (see details of Annual 
Report 1994/95 later). Then in January 1995, Ministers 
decided to postpone indefinitely the take-on of cases where 
there was an existing court order and benefit was rfbt an issue 
(Cm2745, Jan 95, p. 23). The take-on of these cases was due to 
commence in 1996, and poteiltiýally Would have re-fuelled the 
Lr 
outrage of absent parents, as cases considered to have been 
settled several years ago could be revisited and could have the 
formula applied. Although access to the Agency was withheld, 
the option to apply to the court remained, and perhaps left open 
the opportunity for consideration of factors which the formula 
would not take into account. As well as relieving the Agenc)v of 
a further intake of cases, this served to diffuse a potentially' 
difficult situation for the government. It also cost the 
government nothing as these cases, by definition, would not 
involve the claiming of benefits. 
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.4 Annual Report 
1993/94 and Business Plan 1994f 
This document (CSA 2066) was published in July 1994 and 
acknowledged that the Agency had had a "challenging first 
year", and that "overall the standard of service did not reach 
acceptable levels". 
lt was noted that enquiries from parents, the media and 
Members of Parliament had been exceptional and that respO7ns(. 
times of the Agency were unsatisfactory. The report also noted 
that changes introduced by the government in Iýehruýirý 19x)4 
had further added tu the workload of the Agency. Ho", ever, it 
was acknowledged that clearance times were poor, with a large 
number of outstanding applications; , WCLaracV WAS also at i loXi, 
. 
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level, although many of the errors were considered small; a large 
proportion of the monies collected would have been collected 
anyway without Agency intervention and that there was still an 
unacceptable number of assessments which were not being met 
in full. 
On the number of enquiries received, the report stated that 
centres were receiving 850,000 calls a month, and that the 
Chief Executive had received 5,000 letters from MPs over the 
Year. The target of 20 working days to respond to these, as set 
out in the Business Plan, had not been met. 
The report continued by detailing achievements against the 
other targets and attempted to explain the shortfalls. The target 
of 600iä of applications to have maintenance arranged was 
missed resoundingly, at 31.5", ""). Annual benefit savings were 
reported at £418m, against a target of £530m. The target of 
delivering the Business Plan within the set budget cif 
.£1 14Tr1 
was said to be achieved (although given the failure to achieve 
other targets the definition of 'delivering' could be questioned), 
Also, the client satisfaction survey was almost met (61", '() against 
a target of 65`%x) and all the milestone targets nlerntione<1 in the 
Business Plan were achieved. 
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Examining performance against standards set out in the CSA 
Charter (CSA 2027), there had again been spectacular 
shortfalls, perhaps the greatest of which was the 30"x% achieved 
for the standard requiring an assessment to be made within 5 
days of receiving all the information needed from loth parents. 
The second section of the report, "The Year Ahead", considered 
how this poor performance might be improved for 1994/95, 
including details of improved links with local offices, lt was also 
proposed to delay take-on of some benefit cases, where benefit 
was being claimed prior to April 93, to enable the backlog to be 
cleared. 
It was further proposed to take on 700 additional staff during 
1994/95, and it had been agreed to increase the budget 
allocated to the Agency to £184 million (; l 14x71 in 93/94). 
10.4.1 Targets for 1994/95 
On this basis, and in view of the results achieved, targets for 
1994/95 were agreed with Ministers, as follows: 
- 
50`%% of parents with care making eligible applications to 
have maintenance arranged (previously Set -It 00"o, bUt 
only 3 1`%, was achieved in 93/94). 
65° score on an index of client satisfaction (previotus 
target was also 65%; 6 1°%, was achieved 93/94). 
21,1'; 
Annual benefit savings of C460 million (previous target 
£530 million; £418 million achieved 93/94). 
Agency budget of £184 million (previously £1 14 million, 
achieved). 
By March 1995, no more than 40°iß of outstanding 
maintenance applications to be over 13 weeks old; no 
more than 15%, over 26 weeks Al no more than 1%, over 
52 weeks old. 
10.5 Annual Report 1994/95 and Business Plan 1995/96 
Ann Chant took over as Chief Executive of the Agency in 
September 1994 and there was a clear change of direction in the 
work of the Agency. 
The Annual Report of 1994/95 showed a marked increase in 
activity within the Agency. Enforcement was given ,a higher 
priority, with 32,027 Deduction from Earnings Orders applied 
in the year, compared with only 2,600 in 1993/94. The 
collection service took in £76.40 million (compared with £12.57 
million in 1993/94) and an estimated £1l1 million was 
assessed to be paid directly between parents. There was a 
distinct switch in the Agency's operations from taking on new 
assessments to a concentration on more effective collection of 
those assessments already made as well as more efficient 
servicing of enquiries. 
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As part of this switch, it had been agreed with Ministers that 
some cases would be deferred. This was done in December 
1994 and involved approximately 300,000 eases where the 
parent with care was receiving benefit before April 1993, and 
approximately 16,000 cases where the parent with care had not 
returned application forms issued prior to J ulv 1994 or had riot 
supplied sufficient information. However, it was stressed that 
anyone in these categories who felt theti- wanted to he takers on 
could request that the Agency consider their case. 
10.5.1 Targets for 1995/96 
In assessing the success of the Agency against the targets set, it 
was agreed with Ministers that there were more appropriate 
measures of the Agency's work. The Select Committee on So ci, 
-al 
Security had recommended, in its report of October 1994, t hat 
targets for the Agency should concern the pperformance of the 
Agency, not the level of benefit savings (HC470,9: 3-94). Targets 
had also been referred to by the Select Committee on the PCA. 
Their report concluded that targets for benefit savings had led to 
an emphasis on quantity of assessments made rather- than 
quality of those assessments and of the service given (IIC 1 999 
94-95, p. viii). 
., 
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The benefit saving target for 1994/95 of <L; 460 million was in fäct 
achieved (E479 million), but was dropped as a target for the 
following year. Also dropped was the target fier the number of 
cases resulting in assessment, as this figure was being 
adversely affected by old cases, and it was sometimes beyond 
the Agency's control to ensure a case reached an assessment. 
Instead, a target for collection and speed of payment was felt to 
be more appropriate. Nevertheless, the measurement niad e did 
show some improvement on the previous year, although not 
reaching the target: 50°'() of eligible applications to the assessed 
was the target; 40.71 `%O was achieved in 1994/95; 31.5 was 
achieved in 1993/94. 
The satisfaction survey result dropped to 44"ý%%, against a target 
of 65"/x. This target was retained for 1()()5/96. 
Targets for improving the speed of dealing with applications 
were not met. This was partly due to inclusion ref difficult long. 
- 
standing cases in the figures, and the target was replaced with 
one measuring the speed of clearance of new assessmeents. 
Delivery of the service within budget was chieveýd. 
Charter standards for the Agency were also seen as unsuitable 
by 1995. Thus, targets agreed with Ministers for the ear 
1995/96 were: 
- 
£300 million maintenance to be collected OR arranged for 
direct payment; 
90%> of payments to the parent with care to he made 
within 10 days of receipt from the absent parent; 
750/o accuracy in the amount of assessment; 
Reviews to he cleared: 50`) in 13 weeks, 80% in 26 weeks, 
no more than 20%, to be older than 26 weeks. 
New cases: 60°i%% to be cleared in 26 weeks, no more than 
10% to be 52 weeks old. 
- 
65`%o client satisfaction rating. 
To be delivered within budget (in the Business Plan as 
£lß3 million). 
Milestone targets were also set: 
to commence the take-on of defer-redl cases; 
to look at the characteristics of outstanding cases; 
to inform the wider evaluations of child support policy 
through statistics. 
These targets represented an emphasis can quality of service and 
a concentration on the effective management of curreent cases, 
with less emphasis on measuring benefit savings. Ann Chant 
was clear in her intention to move the emphasis of the Agency. 
10.6 Operational Matters 
In December 93, to address criticisms of operational matters, 
Ros Hepplewhite wrote to all MPs with details of changes she 
Evas making to the Agency's service to MPs. She Evas drafting in 
additional staff to deal exclusively with their enquiries, and also 
setting up a special telephone service, the numbers for which 
remained strictly confidential to MPs' offices. This was in 
addition to the changes outlined to the Social Security Select 
Committee in November 1993, involving the increased role of 
local offices. 
The Chief Executive had explained to the Committee about the 
"Closing the Gap" project, embarked on when it became clear 
that difficulties were emerging. The changes introduced 
included transferring activities from regional centres to local 
offices. This resulted in mann more Dorms being completed anti 
an eight-fold increase in the number of assessments being made 
in the second 3-month period, compared with the first three 
months of operation (FHC69, Dec 93, p. xiii). 
When the Agency was set up, it was envisaged that most cases 
would be dealt with through the post, bv remote offices. In 
practice, this proved much more problematic than atiticipate(l, 
., h t 
with form-filling and the provision of evidence (eg of income, 
mortgage payments, etc) taking much longer than planned. 
Meanwhile, the role of local offices was minimal, with staff there 
under-utilised. It was decided to transfer the initial part of the 
process to local offices and this did show a marked 
improvement in throughput (t-IC69, Dec 93, p. 16). 
This devolvement of work to local offices continued and by 
October 1995, Ann Chant was reporting to the Select Committee 
on Social Security that the computer network was being 
extended to field offices, to enhance customer service. She 
further reported that in October 1994 local offices (referred to as 
"the Field") had taken on responsibility for "good cause" work; in 
May 1995 all paternity work was transferred to the Field; and in 
June 1995 all new pre-maintenance assessment work was 
moved from the Centres to the Field (110781-i, 94-95,1_). 5). 
In discussions with a backbench MP (in February 1996), Ann 
Chant confirmed that local offices were to be used more, with 
improved computer access. This would enable local offices 10 (10 
a complete assessment in some cases. One advantage of this 
was seen as that parents can deal with the Agency face-to-face. 
Although this was not considered to be necessary in the 
planning stage, it became obvious that the opportunity to have 
., 
t; =] 
face-to-face discussions was important to many parents. Ann 
Chant compared this to a day in court for those parents 
unhappy with their assessment. It was also proving useful to 
involve local offices in cases of disputed paternity, and it was 
anticipated that their role would be extended further once the 
departures system was introduced. 
During this discussion, Ann Chant confirmed that she saw a 
comparison with the organisation of building societies 
- 
where a 
local branch deals with day-to-day queries, sets up forms, etc, 
but actual mortgage applications are made to a head office. 
This model was what the Chief Executive envisaged for the 
Agency, with parents able to maintain contact with their local 
office, who would have complete access to all details. 
10.7 Achievements of the Agency from April 1993 to April 
1997 
An important statistic to emerge from the evidence given to the 
Select Committee in November 1993 was that in a quarter of the 
cases so far assessed, it had been necessary to apply in Interim 
Maintenance Assessment (IMA) (HC69,93-9.4, p. 15). This is 
applied where information is not supplied i)v the absent parent 
within a reasonable time, or where he delil)erýatelydoees not co 
operate, and is fixed at one and a hilf times the maintenance 
requirement (which is itself more than the maintenance bill in a 
large proportion of cases). Out of 527,000 forms issue(] in the 
first 6 months of operation, only 36,500 had reached the stage 
where an assessment had been made, and of these 9,000 were 
punitive interim assessments. 
Performance in making assessments had improved enormously 
by 1994/95, with 250,836 cases cleared from 398,584 forms 
issued. Of these cleared cases, 63,616 were I MAs and 187,220 
stiere final assessments. 
By 1997 the Agency had 579,200 `live' cases on its books. Of 
these 498,500 had final assessments. 80,700 live cases had an 
interim assessment in place. (gor "private" cases, where the 
parent with care is not in receipt of relevant beretits, the Agency, 
can offer a real advantage over the old court system. Regular 
reviews mean amounts are adjusted without the need to apple 
to a court; collection and enforcement is avail able; costs, at the 
moment, are suspended. This represents progress over tlhe ()1(i 
court system. But in Februar, v 1997, only 12",, of "live" (' 's 
were non-income Support or Family Credit cases, representing 
just over 58,000 parents with care (GSA Quarterle Sunimarvi of 
Statistics, Feb 97). 
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There has also been a continued rise in the number of 
Deduction from Earnings Orders issued. In the first Year of' 
operation, there were only 2,600 DEOs applied. I lowever, there 
were some problems with the legislation which meant that until 
February 1994 it was not possible to put a DEO on an IMA. 
Given the high proportion of IMAs issued, this was a significant 
disadvantage for enforcement. 
By 1994/95 the number of DEOs applied had risen to 32,027. 
By January 1996 they were being applied at the rate of over 
5,000 a month. This reflected the Agency's change of emphasis 
to enforcing those assessments already made. Between April 
1996 and March 1997 there were 57,898 DEOS made hý the 
Agency (CSA Statistical Information, March 97). 
IMAs, on the other hand, reduced as a proportion of total 
assessments. The peak for IMAs was reached during the first 
year, with 55`%, of all assessments being I MAs. This 
undoubtedly partly resulted from non-cooperation campaigns 
being organised by absent parent groups at the time and by the 
belief held by some that sustained non-cooperation would lead 
to the Agency's demise. By January 1996, only 1l%, of 
assessments were I MAs. This corresponds with the weakening 
campaign of disruption and the general (if reluctant) acceptance 
of the Agency's activities. 
The problems anticipated before the legislation came into force, 
of parents with care being reluctant to pursue the father 
because of fear of violence or harm, had in fact not materialised 
in large numbers. In the first year, compared with the 9,000 
cases where absent parents were deemed to he failing to co- 
operate (and therefore had IMAs applied), only 22 parents will, 
care had had benefit reduced because it was felt they were 
unreasonably withholding their co-operation (IHC69,93-94, p. 
18). This was out of 6,600 cases where the parent with care 
had applied for exemption under "good cause" provisions. 
The number of parents with care applying for exemption under 
"good cause" criteria did increase, particularly as more parents 
with care became aware that they' (lid not in feiet have to co 
operate with the Agency, and as forms were altered to ensnare 
that parents with care were aware of their rights in this respect. 
However, as numbers increased applying for exemption, the 
proportion of cases disallowed also increased. In 1993/94, 
31,800 claims for exemption were accepted; 18,900 claims were 
rejected. In 1994/95,41,700 claims for exemption were 
accepted; 38,600 were rejected. In 1995/6, ufp to August, there 
ff 
had been 15,000 claims accepted and 20,200 rejected, with 
12,000 benefit penalties applied (HC50,95-96, p. 6). 
In 1995/96 as a whole there were 27,478 parents with care 
suffering a benefit penalty although this reduced to 19,447 in 
1996/97 (from CSA Statistical Information, March 97 and I IC 
Deb 26/6/96, col 79-80wß). 
10.8 Commentary 
Achieving benefit savings was clearly a driving force behind the 
setting up of the Agency. In many ways, this has been c uiite 
successful. Figures presented in the 1996/97 accounts show 
that the Agency had arranged payment of almost £400 million 
in that year, a large proportion of which would have represented 
savings to the Treasury. Of course, it is impossible to gauge 
just what proportion of that money would have been paid over 
under the old system. 
Early targets and measures attempted to calculate what the 
saving to the Treasury was, although there was criticism of the 
method of calculation. There was also criticism of having; 
benefit savings as a target for the Agency and indeed this was 
dropped. 
:: 't. ýýl 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on benefits continued, with phased 
take-on of cases and deferment of particular types of case, 
specifically those which would be classed as "private" and which 
would have involved overturning an existing court order. If the 
government had originally intended to provide a service for all 
separated parents, this was quickly sacrificed in the light of 
operational realities. 
It could be argued that the Agency had in fact been given an 
impossible task. Given the complexities of the formula and the 
sensitivity of its business, difficulties were perhaps inevitable. 
The decision to attempt to handle most of the business by post 
and over the telephone quickly ran into problems, and local 
offices were developed to provide a human face to the service. 
Team working was also introduced to help efficiency. 
Successive Chief Executives and changes of emphasis made 
slow improvements. These were to some extent hindered by 
further legislative changes and new systems introduced to 
placate the vociferous critics of the Act and the Agency. 
In many respects the Agency was criticised unltrirly. The 
complexity of the formula and the way it impacted on families 
were the government's doing. The Agency was undout)tVdIv 
?n 
guilty of mal-administration in mann cases, but the bulk of the 
problems were the result of the government's incompetence, not 
the Agency's. The following chapter looks at the impact of the 
Agency's operation on backbench MPs and how they sought to 
influence the government, although it is clear MPS were also 
sometimes guilty of wrongly apportioning blame to the Agency 
itself. 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
The Unfolding Disaster 
-A Political Dilemma? 
11.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the impact of the Agency on the }louse caf 
Commons. The impact on backbench MPs is detailed, as are 
various strategies ernploved to deal with the problems being 
presented by constituents. The growing impact of tlhe Agencv 
on the House of Commons was aired in Social Securit\, Select 
Committee evidence and reports, and these are also examined 
in this section, although detailed matters involving the formula 
are mainly covered in the next chapter. 
The positions of the Labour and Liberal Derrrocrat parties cluuring 
the early months of the Agency's operation are esarnined. The 
election manifesto pledges for 1997 relating to lone parents and 
the Agency are covered in Chapter 17 of the thesis. 
11.2 Backbench MPs 
MPs soon became aware of the problems being experienced by 
their constituents in relation to the Agency. Gradually, 
questions were raised in the House. For example, on 29th June 
1993, it was asked how long the forms used by the Agency were 
(36 pages each) and how long it might take to complete these. 
On 12th July 1993, it was queried how a new partner's income 
is relevant in assessing an absent parent's ability to pay 
maintenance to children of an earlier relationship. The fees 
being charged by the Agency were queried as early as 7th June 
1993, 
After the summer recess of 1993, questions continued to show a 
steady rise, covering both policy and operational matters. 
Hansard also records that references were made on the floor of 
the House to press stories al)out the Agency 
. 
An Early Day Motion, tabled on 25th November 1993, read: 
"That this House regards the Child Support Act 1991 as 
a failure; believes that its effect upon single mothers on 
income support and on second families is injurious, that 
many women on income support have been left worse off 
through loss of passported benefits and that single 
mothers have been intimidated to authorise the Agency to 
pursue fathers upon pain of losing benefit; further 
believes that the imposition of new, high bills on fathers of 
second families is grossly unfair and a serious poverty 
, 
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trap and that the overwhelming amount of rnonev paid 
over to the Treasury instead of to families is grossly 
immoral and is in fact a secret tax; and therefore calls tor 
the abolition of the Child Support Act and Agency, and 
for a simpler replacement system to be instituted which 
will ensure that court maintenance orders are enforced 
and actually benefit women and their children. " 
On 1st December 1993, Alice Mahon (MP for 1{alifax) presented 
a petition to the House putting forward the vies , that the Child 
Support Act and the Agency should be abolished 
- 
less than 
eight months after it had become operational. 
An Adjournment Debate was secured on 2nd December 1993, 
shoving the nature of the problems which had been brought to 
MPs' attention. Matters raised during the debate included: the 
lack of financial benefit to parents with care in receipt of 
Income Support; shared access arrangements 
- 
where neither 
parent considers themselves "absent"; "easy" targets - thc: lact 
that the Agency was pursuing those who had already been 
patting something, rather than chasing those absent parents 
who had in the past made no contribution; problems of the 
retrospective nature of assessments over-riding previous 
settlements; the costs of travelling to work and to visit children; 
pension contributions not being fully allowed for; the effects on 
the income of second families. 
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All of these issues were being raised by constituents and MPs' 
surgeries were being filled with queries about the new AgencY, 
in the majority of cases from absent parents. It should be noted 
that these early queries were by and large relating to policy 
decisions, all of which had been passed through parliament. 
Although the Agency was apparently being criticised, it was in 
fact the policy which was deemed to he at fault. 
Some of the areas of dispute highlighted differences between the 
original contents of the White Paper, Children Come First, and 
the reality of the legislation and operations of the Agency,. 
Children Come First had stressed as a priority the desire to 
establish payment from absent parents who were not paving 
anything: 
"Priority will be given to those who need the Agenc- y''s 
services most. This is likely to be those people who have 
no child maintenance at all and are dependent on Income 
Support. " 
(Cm 1264, Oct 1990, Vol. 1, p. 49) 
The reality was that those who were ýýlreýlciý p' v'int Were licýin 
contacted first, leading to the conclusion that the government 
`ýýý 
felt "those who need the Agenc-v's services most" were in fact 
taxpayers, through the Treasurv. 
Another example was the mention in Children Come First of 
consideration being taken of past settlements with an 
explanation of how this might be achieved (Cm 1264, Oct 1990, 
vol. 1, p. 30). The final formula in fact took no account ofsuch 
settlements and MPs were being inundated with absent parents 
who felt it could not be right that a previous court agreement 
was now being ignored. 
A group of MPs became so concerned at the number of 
complaints being raised that they set up a CSA Monitoring 
Group to which MPs could submit examples of their 
constituents' problems. The All Party Parliamentary CSA 
Monitoring Group included Mildred Gordon, Sir Peter Ivry, Liz 
Lvnne, Jean Corston, Ian Bruce, Anthony Steen, LIin Golding, 
James Arbuthnot, Neil Gerrard, Joan Lestor, Bill Olner, Greville 
Janner, Alan Simpson, F3rvan Gould, John Fraser, although any 
interested members were free to attend and membership of the 
group varied over time. The group initially met fortnightly and 
produced summaries of cases brought to MPs by constituents. 
It also sought the opinions of voluntary organisalions on 
specific issues, as well as meeting with the ministers involved. 
MPs attending these meetings stated that they t'Ound it a useful 
way to exchange information and improve their own knowledge 
of the issues. 
By 22nd December 1993 with less than 9 months of operation 
of the Agency, Peter Lillev (as Secretary of' State for Social 
Security) announced changes. These included a revised 
phasing-in programme; substantially increased protected 
income for absent parent households (from, -C8 to £30 above 
Income Support levels, as well as a decreased percentage lake of 
any remaining income); reducing the amount payable towards 
the cost of caring for the child, once the child reaches the age of 
11, and reducing it again at 14. These changes were 
incorporated into the government's response to the Social 
Security Select Committee Report of December 1993. The 
government's response was published in Februare 1994 and the 
changes planned were the subject of a debate in the [lou. use on 
2nd February 1994. 
The changes were generally supported and it was clear that all 
MPs were receiving mari. v complaints from constituents, 
particularly on the details of the formula and the lack of 
flexibility. 
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? 11.2.1 Shooting the messenger 
One of the main principles of Children Come First was that all 
parents should shoulder responsibility for their own children 
wherever possible, but the practice was proving more difficult 
than anticipated. Another main principle was that maintenance 
should be assessed according to a set formula, removing areas 
of discretion which had previously led to inconsistent and 
unpredictable assessments, and had resulted in maintenance 
payments taking a lower priority than other commitments. The 
Child Support Act was intended to put child maintenance on a 
firm footing, removing discretion and forcing a change in 
priorities. In practice, this was resulting in a lack of flexibility 
for which the Agency was often being blamed, but in fact was 
the result of decisions agreed in parliament. 
The bulk of complaints to MPs were from absent parents, 
though some were from second partners, parents with care, and 
even grandparents. Analysis of letters received by one of the 
MPs who agreed to take part in this study showed that, of 
letters regarding the Agency received between November 1993 
and Juli' 1995,61 per cent were from absent parents or their 
new partners. Eighty-two per cent of those letters were 
complaints relating to the amounts absent parents were 
expected to pay under the new rules. 
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However, MPs also received many letters concerning the 
running of the Agency. Reports by the PCA confirmed this, gis 
he would only examine cases of alleged maladministration (not 
policy complaints) but reported having more complaints about 
the Agency than about any other department or agency of the 
government. This was despite the fact that he had informed 
MPs that he would only investigate cases which were clearly 
different from previous ones he had looked at, or where actual 
financial loss had resulted for the complainant (t IC 135,94-95 
and HC20,95-96). 
Cases of poor administration were also aired on the floor of the 
House, along with growing dissatisfaction at the quality of the 
written responses received from both the Agency and the 
Minister. There was a particular dislike of standard responses 
which did not address the problems raised. 
As part of the fieldwork in this study, several rises of mal 
administration or poor set-vice by the Agency were e amined. 
Delays of over a year were not uncommon, even Where both 
parents were co-operating and supplying information quickly. 
Cases of thousands of founds worth of arrears building up 
because cif delays which were entirely attributable to the Agerncy, 
were seen in all three offices where case-files were examined. 
There were also cases of details being sent to the wrong address, 
and many letters of apology from the Agency, often attributing 
their shortcomings to "volume of work". 
11.2.2 Dealing with the rising tide 
The wax's in which MPs relayed their dissatisfaction with the 
developing situation and dealt with the problems of their 
constituents varied. All MPs wrote directly to the Agency. Some 
also wrote to the Minister concerned; even where issues were 
clearly operational it was felt necessary to keep the relevant 
Minister aware of the problems being presented to MPs. 
However, if the matter was purely operational, it was merely 
passed to the Agency by the Minister with a standard letter to 
the MP explaining that the Chief Executive would respond in 
due course. 
Letters relating to policy were replied to by the Minister, usuallv 
referring to the basic principles of Children Come First and the 
a11-party support given to those principles. 
One MP interviewed for this studs' felt it useful to inform Select 
Committee members of issues being brought by constituents 
and (lid forward details of those cases felt to be pailirularly 
pertinent or illustrative. Another MP made use of the All Party 
Monitoring Group. One Nottingham MP fell particularly 
inclined to forward cases to Andrew Mitchell, the Minister with 
responsibility for the Agency at the time u ho was also a 
Nottingham MP. Based on conversations with MPs from outside 
Nottingham, the Nottingham connection weis felt to result in 
rather more detailed and personalised responses than MPs from 
other parts of the country were receiving, although, of course, 
this is conjecture. 
All of the MPs interviewed had met with groups opposed to the 
Agency, in their surgeries and at public meetings. Four of the 
five MPs interviewed (including a government minister with 
responsibility for the Agency) had at some time addressed a 
local APART meeting; the other had met with a delegation from 
APART but declined their invitation to speak at one of their 
meetings. [The activities of protest groups arc looked r11 in 
Chapter- 13. ] 
One MP's constituency office spent a good deal of time keeping 
in touch tivith those constituents who had contacted them over 
Agency issues. In the early days, the office would forward 
details of APART to constituents who raised queries about the 
Agency. Even where cases had been salisfactorily resolved, the 
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office forwarded details of Select Committee recommendations 
and evidence presented by voluntary organisations such as 
NACAB to interested or affected constituents. They also sent 
out copies of press releases issued on the subject of child 
maintenance. This was a substantial commitment, given that 
there had been over 60 constituency cases for this particular 
office. This communication was continued with all cases, both 
absent parents and parents with care, and it should be noted 
that the MP involved continued to make clear his preference for 
the Agency over the previous s_ystern. 
Another feature seen in all three offices where case-notes were 
examined was MPs having to deal with both the absent parent 
and the parent with care of the same child. The office staff were 
careful not to disclose information to which they were party and 
of course dealt with the cases as though they were entirely 
separate. 
Although receiving a large number of letters concerning the 
Agency, the main impact was felt at surgeries. At some 
surgeries, which normally only last two or three hours, there 
would be 15 absent parents in attendance. This even led to 
complaints from other constituents waiting, that the Agency was 
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taking up too much of the MP's time, making their own wait 
much longer or making an appointment difficult to get. 
Constituents' specific cases raised at surgeries or by letter 
would all be dealt with according to the nature of the problem. 
Some more general letters were also received at all the offices 
examined, but these were small in number compared to some 
other issues (animal welfare being the subject which attracted 
by far the highest number of letters). The way- the office staff 
dealt with letters meant that those concerning a specific 
constituent's complaint were most likely to reach the MP 
personally. Those dealing with more general comments would 
sometimes not reach the MP at all, but would simply be 
acknowledged by post. Thus, an issue such as the Agency, 
where there was a large number of specific complaints, would 
have more impact on an MI', as s/he would become personally 
involved in the cases. With surgeries fully booked over a 
number of months and continuing correspondence to deal with, 
the Agency loomed large as a problem for backbench MPS. 
11.3 The Social Security Select Committee 
Following on from the Committee's earlier ýýorl: on Children 
Come First, the decision to investigate the workings of the 
Agency was taken on 20th October 1993; evidence was taken in 
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November, and a report was issued in December (HC69,93-94). 
Further reports were issued in October 1994 and Januar-N, 1996 
(HC470,93-94; 1 IC50,95-96). 
Within a few months of the Agency becoming operational, the 
Committee had received over 800 letters from people affected by 
the workings of the Agency. The majority of complaints 
received by the Committee, from about September 1993, related 
to two main issues: 
(1) that it was believed that there was a policy of giving 
priority to those absent parents who were already paying; 
(2) that the assessments were unfair, either because they 
over-rode previous agreements, or because they failed to 
take proper account of circumstances (HC69,93-94, p 
vii). 
In fact, both these issues related to policy matters. The decision 
to gradually take on cases in a particular sequence had been 
agreed with Ministers. Although relating directly to operations, 
the order of priorities was a policy decision and linked the 
activities of the Agency to other institutions such as the courts 
and the Benefits Agency. The order of priorities was clearly set 
out before the Agency came into existence. Although it was not 
detailed in the first Business Plan, it was made clear in the 
Agency literature sent to MPs and to potential clients (see, for 
example, leaflet CSA 2001, p. 4). (As stated earlier, this did go 
against the comments on prioritising cases set out in Children 
Cone First. ) 
Evidence given by the Chief Executive to the Committee 
confirmed media reports (and the opinion of many absent 
parents) that in cases where the parent with care was claiming 
a relevant benefit, those cases where the absent parent was 
already paying some maintenance were being dealt with ahead 
of those where no maintenance was currently in payment. The 
Chief Executive claimed that this was inevitable given the fact 
that the Liable Relatives Units, which would have previously 
dealt with such cases, had been disbanded from April 1993, and 
further that the prioritising of cases had been agreed with 
Ministers (HC69,93-94, p. xi). 
Further criticism of this policy suggested that the target set for 
the Agency, to achieve an amount of benefit savings, had 
influenced the take-on of cases. However, it was also pointed 
out, by the Chief Executive, that in 28% of cases assessed by 
that time, no maintenance was payable at all because the 
absent parent had insufficient income to pay. To argue that 
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particular groups were being targeted in order to achieve greater 
benefit savings would therefore seem unfounded (HC69,93-94, 
pp 7-8). Also, with the take-on of new cases, it was impossible 
to know in advance which cases were likely to produce a high 
assessment and which weren't. 
Also clearly documented before the Agency commenced 
operations, was the way in which the formula would be applied, 
what would be taken into consideration and what would not. To 
say, as members of the Select Committee and other MPs were, 
that assessments were over-riding previous agreements or failed 
to take proper account of circumstances, was in fact a criticism 
of policy decisions taken prior to the Agency's 
operationalisation. To level such criticism at the Agency itself 
was unjustified. Nevertheless, the House of Commons saw 
many examples of this. 
The Select Committee on Social Security often confused policy 
with operational matters. This could also he seen in the Select 
Committee on the PCA report of March 1995, where Ann Chant 
and Michael Partridge (both senior civil servants) explained to 
MPs that it was in fact parliament's decisions that fixed the 
formula within which the Agency operated (HC 199,94-95). 
. 
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Details of the main recommendations made by the Select 
Committee on Social Security in December 1993 for changes to 
the formula are covered in the following chapter, along with the 
actual changes introduced by the government in February, 1994. 
Later examination by the Social Security Select Committee, their 
reports and recommendations are covered in Chapter 15. 
11 
.4 The Main Opposition Parties - calling 
for change? 
The Labour Party (in opposition between 1979 and 1997) had 
always supported the principles behind the Child Support Act, 
although it did oppose particular aspects. Specifically, the 
Labour Party continually called for a maintenance disregard for 
those parents with care on Income Support, to ensure that the 
children in those families gained from the legislation. Attempts 
were again made to get this included in the legislation during 
the Child Support Bill debates in 1995. The Conservative 
government's response continued to he that this would increase 
the disincentive to seek employment for the parent with care, 
with the government's preference being for the Back to Work 
Bonus (this bonus is discussed later in Chapter 12). 
The other main area of concern for the Labour Party in 
opposition was the retrospective fl ature of the legislation, and 
the lack of allowance for previous property or capital 
settlements. The Labour Party continued to call for change on 
this. 
Although stating that government changes did not go far 
enough, the Labour Party did not oppose the amendments made 
between 1993 and 1996, and did not call for the abolition of the 
Agency, though individual backbench MPs did. Support for the 
main principles of Children Come First continued, despite the 
obvious failings of the system in practice. 
The Liberal Democrats presented a rather confusing picture. 
Their Head Office continued to send out leaflets calling for 
reform of the Agency, whilst their spokesperson on Social 
Security issues, Liz Lynne MP, called for its abolition. Liz Lynne 
maintained that the party backed her repeated calls for- the 
Agency's total abolition. She issued press releases calling for a 
return to the court system, she asked many parliamentary 
questions and placed Early Day Motions. Yet, no official Liberal 
Democrat documents supported her line. However, evidence of 
Party support came during voting on the 1995 13111, when the 
Liberal Democrats did vote against, advocating the repeal of the 
Act and its replacement by an unspecified "genuinely fair 
system" of a unified family court (see NLJ Practitioner, 2/6/95, 
p. 820). 
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11.5 Commentary 
Backbench MPs were forced, by, the number of constituents 
seeking their help, to become more knowledgeable about the 
details of the formula being applied by the Agency. Although 
there had been a large amount of time spent debating Children 
Come First and the Child Support Bill, it seems mans' MPs did 
not realise the significance of some of the detail until the impact 
of the Agency in operation started to be felt by their 
constituents. 
As the Child Support Act passed through parliament 
contentious issues were raised. Indeed, Children Come First 
had included reference to some potential problems, for instance 
the need to consider the impact on retrospective cases involving 
`clean break' settlements, the impact of the formula on the 
incomes of second families and the continuing discussion on 
what constituted a realistic sum towards the costs of bringing 
up a child. 
Despite these and other matters being aired, the consensus in 
support of the over-riding principle (that parents continue' 10 
offer financial support to all their natriral children regardless of 
their living ýirran em( ]ts) resulted irr what might be considered 
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to be flawed legislation which to a considerable degree was 
proving unworkable. 
The problems being thrown up by' the formula were 
compounded by the lack of efficiency being shown I -)I\ 
Agency itself. The problems of constituents and the Select 
Committee reports pointed to a badly managed Agency 
struggling to deliver a major social policy change. Problems 
related to both policy and operations and threatened to destroy 
the Agency if changes were not made. Changes made to Agency 
targets have already been explained. It was also essential, if the 
Agency was to gain acceptance and become at all effective, to 
alter the detail of the formula. 
The following chapters examine what changes were introduced 
to address these problems. Referring again to Hall (1975) the 
following chapters assess: 
"Whose interests can be passed over because they have no 
power? Which interests command enough power to wrest 
consent from a reluctant government? " (Hall, 1975, p. 9). 
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